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This thesis is comprised of three chapters. The first investigates the implications 
of industrial clustering for labor mobility and earnings dynamics. Motivated by a 
theoretical model in which geographically clustered firms compete for workers, I exploit 
establishment-level variation in agglomeration to explore the impact of clustering in the 
software publishing industry on labor market outcomes. The results show that clustering 
makes it easier for workers to job hop among establishments within the sector. Further, 
workers in clusters have relatively steep earnings-tenure profiles, accepting lower wages 
early in their careers in exchange for stronger earnings growth and higher wages later. 
These findings underscore the importance of geography in understanding labor market 
dynamics within industries. 
While the first chapter reveals striking relationships between the human resource 
practices and location decisions of high-technology establishments, the second chapter 
(joint with F. Andersson, J. Haltiwanger, J. Lane, and K. Shaw) draws key connections 
between the hiring and compensation policies of innovative firms and the nature of their 
product markets. We show that software firms that operate in product markets with 
 
 
highly skewed returns to innovation pay a premium to attract talented workers. Yet these 
same firms also reward loyalty; that is, highly skilled workers faithful to their employers 
enjoy higher earnings in firms with a greater variance in potential payoffs from 
innovation. These results not only contribute to our knowledge of firm human resource 
practices and product market strategies, but also shed light on patterns of income 
inequality within and between industries.    
Building on this final idea, the last chapter (joint with F. Andersson, E. Davis, J. 
Lane, B. McCall, and L. Sandusky) examines the contribution of worker and firm 
reallocation to within-industry changes in earnings inequality. We find that the entry and 
exit of firms and the sorting of workers and firms based on worker skills are key 
determinants of changes in industry earnings distributions over time. However, the 
importance of these and other factors in driving observed dynamics in earnings inequality 
varies across sectors, with aggregate shifts often disguising fundamental differences in 
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Chapter 1  
Job Hopping, Earnings Dynamics, and Industrial Agglomeration* 
1.1 Introduction  
Over a quarter of the nation’s workers in the software publishing industry are 
located in one state, and nearly a third of that state’s software publishing workers are 
employed in a single county.1 Though one of the most prominent examples of industrial 
clustering, software is not the only sector in which it occurs; evidence suggests that firms 
in a number of industries, from automobile manufacturing to biotechnology, concentrate 
in particular locations to an extent over and above what we would expect given the 
distribution of economic activity more generally (Porter 1990; Krugman 1991; Kim 
1995; Ellison and Glaeser 1997, 1999). 
Clustering by firms in particular industries could influence local labor market 
dynamics by facilitating the pooling of skilled labor and by fostering competition over 
workers. Employing new data and novel measures of concentration, this chapter 
examines the nature and extent of industrial clustering and explores how agglomeration 
among establishments affects labor mobility, earnings levels, and earnings growth rates 
in one high-technology sector in which the availability of skilled workers is of prime 
importance. I develop a model of on-the-job search that features a spatial dimension and 
industry-specific skills. The model explains how variation in labor market outcomes 
across clustered and dispersed establishments could stem from the strategic interaction of 
                                                 
* The author gratefully acknowledges guidance and helpful comments from John Haltiwanger, John Shea, 
Michael Pries, and Fredrik Andersson. The author also thanks staff at the U.S. Census Bureau’s LEHD 
Program and Center for Economic Studies as well as participants at the University of Maryland 
macroeconomics seminar series and the 2006 Society of Labor Economists Conference for comments on 
earlier versions of this work. 
1 Author’s calculations based on publicly available County Business Patterns data for 2004. 
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firms that weigh the benefits and costs of agglomerating, and in particular the benefits of 
having access to a pool of skilled workers and the costs of having to compete over them.  
Consistent with the model, an empirical analysis using rich longitudinal 
employee-employer matched data reveals that geographic clustering among 
establishments in the software publishing industry is associated with shorter job durations 
and greater job-hopping among individuals within the sector. Moreover, relative to those 
employed by firms in more isolated locations, workers in regions with greater clustering 
generally enjoy stronger within-job earnings growth. However, workers in clusters reap 
these higher returns to tenure only after making implicit investments through lower 
wages early in their careers.  
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section reviews literature on industrial 
clustering, labor pooling, and job and earnings mobility. Section 1.3 develops a 
theoretical framework to analyze industrial agglomeration and local labor market 
dynamics. Section 1.4 describes the data, discusses the methodology I employ to measure 
clustering, and presents basic descriptive statistics. Section 1.5 turns to the empirical 
analysis, and Section 1.6 concludes. 
1.2 Literature 
Since Alfred Marshall’s observations on the geographic concentration of certain 
trades and manufacturing activities in his 1890 Principles of Economics, a substantial 
amount of evidence has accumulated on the degree of industrial agglomeration. The 
leading theoretical rationales for clustering among firms within industries are essentially 
the same now as when Marshall first proposed them over a century ago. These 
explanations include access to intermediate or final product markets, technological 
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spillovers, and labor pooling.2 Though each explanation has some substantiating 
evidence,3 this chapter focuses on the labor market as the source of incentives for firms to 
cluster or disperse.  
Labor pooling, or the accumulation of individuals with specific skills near a 
cluster of similar firms, is typically perceived as a means to ensure that employers can 
find workers with needed characteristics and that workers can find jobs that match their 
skills (Helsley and Strange 1990, Costa and Kahn 2000, Wheeler 2001). Clustering in a 
particular industry can encourage workers to specialize by reducing the risk associated 
with making industry-specific human capital investments (Rosen 1972, Pakes and Nitzan 
1983, David and Rosenbloom 1990, Rotemberg and Saloner 2000). Overall, by lowering 
search costs for firms and workers and by improving match quality, labor pooling is 
generally assumed to provide strong incentives for firms in some industries to locate in 
close geographic proximity. 
One strand of the agglomeration literature, building on Arrow’s (1962) idea that 
the knowledge of a firm is embodied in its workers, emphasizes a potential link between 
labor pooling and technological spillovers. Technological spillovers arise when one firm 
benefits from another’s research and development activities without sharing in the costs. 
To the extent that workers can carry their acquired skills and technical know-how from 
                                                 
2 For models in which firms co-locate to economize on transport costs and exploit access to product 
markets, see Ethier (1982), Krugman (1991), and Fujita et al. (1999). For technological spillover models, 
see Fujita and Ogawa (1982), Jovanovic and Rob (1989), Jovanovic and Nyarko (1995), and Glaeser 
(1999). For labor pooling models, see Salop (1979), Kim (1990, 1991), Helsley and Strange (1990), and 
Duranton and Puga (2004).  
3 For evidence that firms cluster to economize on transport costs and exploit product markets, see Krugman 
(1991), Justman (1994), Holmes (1999), and Davis and Weinstein (1999). See Jaffe et al. (1993) and 
Audretsch and Feldman (1996) for empirical work using patent citations to measure technological 
spillovers. For evidence that labor market considerations are important determinants of business location in 
some industries, see Costa and Kahn (2001), Rosenthal and Strange (2001), Dumais et al. (2002), and 
Andersson et al. (2007). 
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job to job, labor mobility within a particular geographic area could facilitate productivity-
enhancing knowledge transfers (Saxenian 1994, Almeida and Kogut 1999, Fallick et al. 
2006, Møen 2005). However, clustering in an effort to draw on a pool of skilled labor 
could come with a cost: a firm that locates close to others in the same industry faces a 
heightened risk that nearby firms will poach its experienced employees.4 Firms could lure 
workers from other businesses by offering superior earnings prospects, although 
threatened firms could also counter potential poaching by raising wages for their own 
employees. Hence, in sectors in which industry-specific human capital is important, there 
exists a tradeoff to clustering that is intimately tied to labor mobility (Combes and 
Duranton 2006). 
A number of researchers have documented relatively high rates of job mobility 
among workers in different clusters of high-technology firms, and several have noted that 
job-hopping could act as a source of agglomeration economies (Angel 1989, Saxenian 
1994, Fallick et al. 2006). However, the broader ramifications of clustering in particular 
industries for earnings dynamics are not as well explored. Some classes of job search 
models make predictions about not only job mobility patterns, but also individuals’ 
earnings-tenure profiles and wage variation within and between firms. Augmented with a 
spatial dimension and industry-specific skills, a model of on-the-job search yields 
insights into clustering’s potential implications for important labor market outcomes, 
implications that previous literature has not addressed. 
                                                 
4 In addition to its labor market effects, clustering clearly fosters greater local product market competition 
and congestion effects. Yet agglomeration in a particular industry can also have its advantages on the 
product market side; clustering could be associated, for example, with gaining access to upstream and 
downstream producers and consumers (Holmes 1999). In their location decisions, firms must weigh both 
labor and product market considerations. This chapter focuses on the software publishing industry, for 
which product market considerations are likely of second-order importance in driving location choice since 




To motivate the subsequent analysis, I briefly outline in this section a theoretical 
model that highlights the tension between labor pooling and poaching by considering the 
strategic interaction of firms as they compete over workers. In the model, which I 
describe in greater detail in Appendix A, workers continually search for new 
opportunities to boost lifetime earnings and firms that value sector-specific skills make 
offers and counteroffers to attract knowledgeable employees in an industry cluster. The 
model can account for the fact (documented below) that agglomeration among high-
technology establishments is associated with shorter job durations and more job-hopping 
by workers. Consistent with the data, the model also predicts that workers in high-
technology clusters will accept wage discounts at the start of their careers, but that they 
can expect faster wage growth and higher long-run earnings compared to those employed 
outside clusters.  
The model extends the on-the-job search models of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) 
and Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b) by incorporating a spatial dimension and 
industry-specific skills. Firms in a high-technology industry that are geographically 
clustered can tap into a pool of skilled labor but also face the risk of having their 
employees lured away by nearby firms in the same sector that can offer more attractive 
earnings prospects. High-technology firms that are isolated, on the other hand, do not 
have access to skilled workers, but face no risk that other similar firms will poach their 
employees. Operating in an environment of perfect information, firms pay each of their 
workers no more than the amount required to prevent them from quitting for another job. 
However, due to heterogeneous firm productivity, workers in a cluster may experience 
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both within-job wage growth, which arises as firms raise their employees’ wages to 
counter offers from other firms located nearby, and between-job wage changes, which 
arise as firms make sufficiently attractive offers to draw workers from their current 
employers. 
1.3.1 Setup 
There exist two industries, one comprised of low-technology firms (L) and the 
other comprised of high-technology firms (H). Homogenous and perfectly competitive L-
industry firms pay all workers their constant marginal product b and exist in each of an 
infinite number of locations. Firms in the H industry have constant returns to labor but 
are heterogeneous in their productivity p, which has CDF F over [pmin, pmax]. I assume for 
simplicity that each H-type firm’s p is time invariant and that pmin = b. H-type firms, 
which unlike firms in the L industry value industry-specific experience, may locate in a 
pre-existing cluster, of which I assume there exists at most one, or in any one of an 
infinite number of isolated regions. Isolated regions contain L-type firms and at most one 
H-type firm. 
There is a working population of fixed size M in all locations. While workers can 
move without cost between jobs within a region, I assume that the cost of moving among 
regions is prohibitively high (or, equivalently, that the cost for firms to hire from other 
regions is prohibitively high).5 Workers have a discount rate ρ > 0 and linear flow utility 
                                                 
5 Although the geographic immobility of workers represents a strong assumption, this chapter aims to 
explain localized job flows and earnings dynamics conditional on the spatial distribution of economic 
activity. The immobility assumption turns out only to be relevant in obtaining the model’s main results to 
the extent that workers cannot have the option of relocating to the clustered region from an isolated one and 
vice versa; workers will have no incentive to move between isolated regions. Furthermore, evidence 
suggests that even in high-technology sectors, the geographic mobility of individuals is limited and much 
job-hopping occurs within quite confined areas. According to Census data, in the information industry 
(NAICS 51), 19% of employed civilians 16 years of age and over changed residence addresses between 
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u(x) = x. All workers in a cluster of H-type firms are assumed to hold industry-specific 
skills that serve to save each agglomerated employer a recurring cost c that is otherwise 
subtracted from productivity; that is, whereas a firm with productivity p paying a wage w 
in a cluster earns profits of p-w, an identical firm outside a cluster earns profits of p-c-w.6 
This productivity differential in favor of labor in clustered firms could stem from local 
workers’ increased exposure to the industry, social networking, or any other form of 
endowment or spillover than might give rise to geographic variation in industry 
workforce quality.7  
In each location, H-type firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to workers, who 
search on the job in both sectors. L-industry workers receive offers from firms in the H-
industry at a rate λ and H-industry workers receive offers from other H-type firms in the 
region at a rate γ. An individual’s wage in a given job in the H industry can be 
renegotiated only by mutual agreement between the firm and the worker, which implies 
that while workers can receive pay raises within a firm, they cannot receive pay cuts. For 
simplicity, I assume a random matching technology such that, conditional on getting an 
offer from an H-type firm, workers in both the L industry and the H industry receive 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004 and 2005; 56% of these movers stayed within the same county and 80% within the same Census 
division (http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/migrate.html). Among individuals in my 
sample who leave one job within software publishing (NAICS 5112) for another in the same industry, of 
the 71% of workers who begin in a clustered establishment, 87% end up at a clustered establishment 
(where I define “clustered” using a employment-based location quotient with a radius of 25 miles, a 
measure I describe later in the chapter). Conversely, of the 29% who begin in an isolated establishment, 
69% remain in an isolated establishment when they change jobs within the sector. Additionally, the average 
physical distance between employers for job hoppers in my sample is 16.6 miles, and for over half of job 
hoppers it is fewer than 12 miles.  
6 An alternative way to model the difference between workers inside and outside a cluster is to assume that 
all workers inside the cluster have past experience in the industry whereas workers outside the cluster do 
not. In that case, H-type firms that disperse might have to bear a one-time training cost on each worker they 
hire.  
7 For industries in which input-output linkages are relatively important, such a productivity advantage could 
stem from reduced transportation costs or improved access to consumer markets. See Appendix A for 
further discussion of the nature of the productivity differential. 
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offers from every other H-type firm in the same location with equal probability.8 Let 
w’0(p) denote the wage an H-type firm with productivity p must offer to attract a worker 
from industry L, and let w’(x, y) denote the wage required for an H-type firm with 
productivity y to attract a worker from an H-type with productivity x < y. In addition to 
endogenous separations due to poaching, H-industry workers in all locations are 
separated from their jobs at an exogenous rate δ, in which case they immediately obtain 
jobs in the L industry. There is no unemployment. 
1.3.2 Labor Market Conditions Inside an Industry Cluster 
A worker in the L industry in a cluster of H-type firms will accept any offer from 
an H-type firm that promises more in present value than earning b forever. When a 
worker at an H-type firm in a cluster receives an offer from another H-type firm, the two 
firms make competing wage offers to the worker under Bertrand competition. The more 
productive firm will ultimately win the worker since the productivity of each firm places 
an upper bound on how much it would be willing to pay to retain or poach her.  
Importantly, as I describe in greater detail below, a worker’s wage need not be bid 
all the way up to the productivity level of the “loser” of the competition, as individuals 
will be willing to accept lower wages to work at higher productivity firms that can offer 
superior long-term earnings prospects. When faced with competition over scarce labor, 
more productive firms have the ability to grant greater future wage increases and hence 
provide more favorable career earnings prospects. Therefore, in anticipation of higher 
                                                 
8 The assumption of random matching, or that all H-type firms have an equal probability of being sampled, 
implies that the productivity distribution and the sampling distribution of H-type firms are identical. 
Alternative matching technologies include balanced matching, in which case the sampling probability is 
proportional to firm employment, and some mixture of random and balanced matching (Burdett and 
Vishwanath 1988, Mortensen and Vishwanath 1994). 
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future earnings, workers, and in particular those at the top end of the wage distribution at 
low productivity firms, will under some circumstances consent to wage cuts to move to 
better firms. 
To be more specific, when a “rival” H-type firm with productivity pr meets a 
worker earning a wage w at another H-type firm with productivity p, there are three 
possible outcomes. Let q(w, p) denote the threshold level of marginal productivity above 
which an H-type firm contacting a worker earning w in another H-type firm with 
productivity p induces a wage increase for the worker at her current employer (where 
q(w, p) ≤ p). If the rival firm’s productivity is such that pr ≤ q(w, p), the worker’s wage 
and employment status will not change as a result of the encounter. In this case, the rival 
firm cannot profitably offer the worker a wage that she would find preferable to her 
current employment situation.  
A second possibility is that q(w, p) < pr ≤ p, in which case the rival firm can make 
an attractive offer that still guarantees it will earn positive rents on the worker. However, 
since the productivity of each firm places an upper bound on how much it would be 
willing to pay to employ the worker, and since pr ≤ p, the worker’s wage in this case will 
be bid up within her current firm to w’(pr, p), precisely the level that renders that worker 
indifferent between staying with her employer and hopping to the rival firm. If pr is 
strictly less than p, the wage resulting from the competition will be less than pr, since, 
with its higher productivity level, the worker’s current employer offers superior long-
term earnings prospects than does the rival firm.9 Finally, if p < pr, the challenging firm 
can successfully lure the worker away from her current employer, as the rival can extend 
                                                 
9 If pr = p, the worker’s wage will be bid up to exactly the productivity level of the two competing firms 
and I assume that the worker remains with her current employer. 
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a more attractive wage offer and still profitably employ the worker. In this case, given the 
nature of competition, the rival firm will only offer the minimum wage required to poach 
the worker, or the wage w’(p, pr) such that the worker is indifferent between working at 
the two competing firms.  
Leaving the derivation to Appendix A, the optimal wage that an H-type with 
productivity pr offers to a worker earning w at a firm with productivity p < pr is 
 
w’(p, pr) = p – γ/(ρ + δ)∫p
pr[1 – F(x)]dx  
 
This expression yields several insights. First, w’(p, pr) does not depend on the current 
wage w, though it does depend critically on the current employer’s productivity p. A firm 
extending an offer cares not what the worker is currently earning, but rather the 
maximum that the incumbent firm could offer and that the worker would accept to stay in 
her current job. Also, the threshold wage required to attract a worker at an H-type firm 
with productivity p is, in fact, less than p. The amount by which it is less than p reflects 
the option value of working at the higher productivity firm; that value increases with the 
difference between the productivities of the two employers. Indeed, a poacher’s offer can 
be lower the greater is pr and the lower is p, and thus in some cases, depending on her 
wage history within a firm, a worker might accept a wage cut to move to an employer in 
which she expects stronger wage growth. Lastly, the higher the arrival rate or the lower 
the separation rate, the lower the wage offer required to poach a given employee.  
Intuitively, one can derive a similar equation for the offer made to a worker in the 




w’0(p) = b – γ/(ρ + δ)∫b
p
[1 – F(x)]dx 
 
An H-type firm can pay less than b to attract a worker from the L industry. In this case, 
the prospect of higher future wages in the H industry induces a worker to accept an initial 
cut in compensation to escape from the L sector; in a sense, a worker is willing to “pay” 
to get her foot in the door of the H industry. Further, the greater its productivity, the less 
an H-type firm must offer to hire a worker from the L industry.  
1.3.3 Labor Market Conditions Outside an Industry Cluster 
An H-type firm that locates in one of the infinite number of isolated regions does 
not have to compete with other H-type firms over workers, but must bear a recurring cost 
associated with distancing itself from similar firms. An H-type firm in an isolated region 
that meets a worker in the L industry will make the lowest possible wage offer to hire the 
worker, just as it would in a cluster. That offer must provide a value equal to the 
opportunity cost of employment in industry L. In a remote location, though, the lack of 
other H-type firms competing over workers implies γ = 0. Therefore, as I explain more 
formally in Appendix A, an isolated H-type firm need only pay its workers the going 
market wage in the L industry (that is, w’0(p) = b for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax]); wages are 
never bid upward due to competition and workers derive equal utility from working in the 
L and H industries outside an industry cluster.  
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1.3.4 Job Hopping and Earnings Dynamics  
As this chapter specifically aims to characterize the consequences of clustering 
for worker job mobility and earnings dynamics, I refrain from a lengthy formal derivation 
of its implications for firm location decisions. Instead, I concentrate on the empirical 
implications of the model that are independent of the determination of the spatial 
distribution of firms. Conditional on the existence of an equilibrium in which high-
technology firms make heterogeneous location choices (an assumption that finds support 
in the data even within very narrowly defined industries), the model generates several 
testable predictions regarding labor market dynamics inside and outside an industry 
cluster.  
Prediction 1:  Job durations in the H industry will be shorter inside a cluster than 
outside a cluster. 
A worker in the H industry outside a cluster separates from a job only at the 
exogenously given separation rate δ, whereas a worker in a cluster separates at the 
separation rate δ plus the probability of being contacted by another H-type firm with 
productivity greater than p, γ[1 – F(x)]. The likelihood that a worker will exit a clustered 
H-type firm is therefore decreasing in the productivity of that worker’s current employer 
and increasing in the arrival rate of offers from the H industry.  
A related prediction of the model concerns the probability that workers move 
between jobs at firms within the H industry. 
Prediction 2:  Job-hopping within the H industry will be more prevalent inside a 
cluster than outside a cluster. 
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Given the immobility of workers across locations in the model, the likelihood that 
an individual in an isolated region will transition directly from one H industry job to 
another H industry job is zero. In agglomerated areas, though, the probability that a 
worker employed at an H-type firm with productivity p will transition to another H-type 
firm equals γ[1 – F(p)], which is positive for p < pmax. A worker’s willingness to job hop 
within the sector depends on whether a prospective employer can promise larger wage 
gains over the long run than her current employer. Though the model assumes for 
tractability a constant arrival rate γ within a cluster, to the extent that a greater 
concentration of firms would increase the rate at which workers receive offers in reality, 
greater clustering would drive up the probability of a within-industry transition for a 
worker at any given establishment.  
Prediction 3:  Workers moving from outside the H industry into a clustered H-type 
firm will accept earnings discounts relative to workers moving into an 
isolated H-type firm. 
An H-type firm that meets a worker in the L industry need only offer a wage that 
makes the worker indifferent between taking the job and continuing to work in the L 
industry. In general, this wage is lower in a cluster of H-type firms, where a job in the H 
industry offers opportunities for advancement; indeed, the prospect of higher future 
wages due to competition among firms can induce a worker in a cluster to accept a pay 
cut to enter the H industry. In an isolated area, however, there is little incentive for 
workers to make such an implicit investment since there is no possibility of reaping any 
returns on it in the long run. Moreover, to the extent that it might drive up the arrival rate, 
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greater clustering would increase the magnitude of the initial pay cut that workers are 
willing to accept to enter the H industry.  
Prediction 4:  Workers inside a cluster will experience faster earnings growth and 
face steeper earnings-tenure profiles than workers outside a cluster. 
The likelihood of receiving a pay increase at an isolated establishment is zero 
regardless of its productivity; firms that do not cluster will have relatively flat wage-
tenure profiles, paying workers no more than what is required to hire them from outside 
the industry. Meanwhile, competition among firms that cluster acts to drive up earnings 
levels within each firm. The probability that a clustered firm with productivity p rewards 
a promotion to a worker earning w is γ[F(p) – F(q(w, p))], which implies that the 
likelihood of receiving a pay raise in a given firm is the greatest for workers with the 
lowest current wages. On the other hand, workers with longer tenures, who have on 
average received more offers and who have seen their wages bid relatively high, should 
not only receive fewer promotions in the future, but also be the least mobile on average 
since they will tend to be the ones employed by the highest productivity firms.10 
In sum, competition over labor among heterogeneous firms within a cluster gives 
rise to greater job mobility as well as inter- and intra-firm wage dispersion in the model. 
Due to the strategic interaction of firms, workers in clusters enjoy upward-sloping, 
concave wage-tenure profiles and benefit from past industry experience in securing jobs 
with good earnings prospects. Individuals at highly productive clustered firms see their 
wages rise over time as their employers respond to counteroffers from potential poachers, 
while workers at less productive clustered firms gradually make their way to more 
                                                 
10 Conditional on the current employer’s productivity, job mobility will not fall with tenure since [1 – F(p)] 
is the same for all workers within a given a firm. Hence, while the returns to tenure within a given firm are 
diminishing in the model, the probability of exiting a given firm at any time is not. 
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productive ones due to poaching.11 Meanwhile, job and earnings mobility are depressed 
in remote locations due to the lack of opportunities for on-the-job search and poaching. In 
contrast to conditions in a cluster, intra-firm wage dispersion is absent and workers face 
flat earnings-tenure profiles.12  
1.4 Data 
1.4.1 Sources 
To test the predictions of the model, I require a data set that combines information 
about workers and their employers and that permits me to track each over a long time 
span. Due to incomplete information about individuals’ employment and earnings 
histories, small sample sizes, and reporting problems, traditional survey data render it 
difficult to measure job mobility or to evaluate the temporal pattern of earnings changes 
among workers (Bound and Krueger 1991, Bound et al. 2001, Roemer 2002, Stinson 
2002, Abowd et al. 2006). I study the impact of industrial agglomeration on local labor 
market dynamics using a new employee-employer matched data set constructed and 
maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics 
(LEHD) Program. LEHD integrates quarterly administrative earnings information for 
workers derived from U.S. state unemployment insurance (UI) records with internal 
                                                 
11 Møen (2005) argues that R&D-intensive firms make technical staff “pay” for the knowledge they accrue 
early in their careers by paying relatively low starting wages, but reward these workers with stronger 
within-job wage growth and hence higher earnings later in their careers. He contends that these 
compensation patterns help to explain how the labor market internalizes potential externalities related to the 
worker mobility. 
12 It is worth noting that high productivity firms do not necessarily pay higher or lower wages than low 
productivity firms in the model. Indeed, a highly productive firm that takes root in one isolated area will 
pay the same wages as a less productive firm that locates in another isolated area. In a cluster, though, more 
productive firms will have an edge in attracting and retaining workers, and on average they will pay higher 
wages and experience fewer separations. Thus, within a cluster, higher productivity firms will tend to be 
the largest, the highest paying, and the most likely to have workforces with relatively long tenures, all 
predictions consistent with empirical evidence (Brown and Medoff 1989, Haltiwanger et al. 2007). 
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Census Bureau censuses and surveys.13 The result is a database that is particularly well 
suited to examining job mobility and earnings dynamics and that provides an opportunity 
to explore clustering’s impact on local labor markets more extensively than have past 
studies.  
LEHD data boast several advantages over household and business based survey 
data. The data are current and relatively accurate because businesses face financial 
penalties for misreporting their workers’ employment and earnings information. Since the 
scope of the quarterly longitudinal data is nearly the full universe of firms and workers, I 
can follow individuals over time as they move across the earnings distribution and across 
employers. Additionally, the integrated records contain information on workers’ 
demographic characteristics, including date of birth, race, sex, and education. Though 
sparse relative to the information on individuals in surveys such as the Current 
Population Survey and Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the worker characteristics on 
the LEHD data permit some flexibility in investigating variation across demographic 
groups and serve as important controls in the empirical analysis. Critically for this study, 
LEHD data also contain a detailed industry classification code (six-digit NAICS) and a 
unique address, including latitude/longitude coordinates, for nearly all establishments. 
The LEHD data have several limitations. First, the data are currently available 
only for a subset of U.S. states, and the amount of historical data varies by state.14 
Second, there is spotty coverage of workers and firms in some sectors, including 
                                                 
13 More extensive descriptions of LEHD data appear in Abowd et al. (2005) and Haltiwanger et al. (2007). 
14 As of late 2006, 43 states (including the District of Columbia) are participating in the LEHD Program. 
This is an ongoing project, and additional states are expected to join. For more information on the LEHD 
Program, see http://lehd.dsd.census.gov. 
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agriculture, non-profits, and public administration.15 Finally, business identifiers in the 
LEHD data are State Employer Identification Numbers (SEINs), which are used for state 
tax collection purposes and are potentially more aggregated business entities than 
establishments. While this aggregation requires that LEHD impute some measures of 
workforce composition and earnings for the small number of establishments that are part 
of larger multi-unit operations,16 it is nevertheless possible to pinpoint individual 
establishments within multi-unit SEINs geographically without resorting to imputation 
using LEHD data.17 
1.4.2 Sample 
In this chapter, I focus on establishments and workers in the software publishing 
industry (NAICS 5112).18 The software industry has been the subject of a large body of 
research on clustering and is a natural candidate for studying how labor mobility interacts 
with agglomeration (Saxenian 1994, Fallick et al. 2006). Products in the software 
publishing industry are generally sold in national or international markets, minimizing the 
importance of product market considerations in driving firms’ location decisions (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office 2006). Further, proximity to natural resources such as 
                                                 
15 See Stevens (2002) for a more detailed description of the LEHD database coverage issues. 
16 Fewer than 10% of establishments in the sample are part of multi-unit operations, though close to one-
fourth of workers in the sample are employed in establishments that are part of multi-unit operations.  
17 While SEINs are potentially more aggregated business entities than establishments, LEHD data provide 
breakouts of establishments for multi-unit SEINs, which are termed SEIN units. Only for a subset of multi-
unit SEINs does LEHD have information on precisely which individuals are employed at each SEIN unit, 
though the geographic location of each SEIN unit and its total employment are known. When the unit of 
work is unknown for a particular worker attached to a multi-unit SEIN, LEHD imputes that workplace 
based on the worker’s place of residence and the distribution of employment across establishments within 
the SEIN. See Abowd et al. (2005) for details on the imputation procedure. 
18 The Census Bureau defines NAICS 5112 as consisting of “establishments primarily engaged in computer 
software publishing or publishing and reproduction. Establishments in this industry carry out operations 
necessary for producing and distributing computer software, such as designing, providing documentation, 
assisting in installation, and providing support services to software purchasers. These establishments may 
design, develop, and publish, or publish only.” See http://www.census.gov/naics for details. 
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bodies of water is relatively unimportant, as is access to upstream suppliers of capital 
goods. Meanwhile, innovation in the industry over the past decade has been rapid, and 
anecdotal evidence suggests that labor poaching aimed at appropriating valuable 
knowledge from rivals occurs and represents a legitimate concern among firms in the 
industry.19  
For this study, I use data for one large U.S. state for the third quarter of 1991 
through the third quarter of 2003. I selected the sample state based on its size, its 
representativeness, the relatively long time span of its data, and the quality of the 
geographic coding of its establishments. I extract from the statewide data the complete 
employment and earnings histories of all individuals observed to work at least one full 
quarter in software, where being full quarter employed at time t requires a worker have 
positive earnings at a given establishment in periods t-1, t, and t+1. This largely 
eliminates from the sample workers employed only part of a quarter, and hence whose 
reported earnings represent compensation for an indeterminate amount of time (anywhere 
from one to 90 days).  
Over 2,400 unique software establishments, 153,000 software workers, and 
170,000 software jobs (i.e., worker-firm matches) appear in the data over the entire 
sample period. Additional information regarding the data as well as descriptive statistics 
appear in Appendix B, but several features of the workers and firms in the sample are 
                                                 
19 Google and Microsoft went to court in the fall of 2005 after a top researcher at Microsoft defected to 
Google, with Microsoft charging that the move violated a clause in the researcher’s contract that precluded 
him for working for a competitor (Richtel 2005). Such litigation is not without precedent; SAP America 
sued Siebel in 1999 for allegedly hiring 27 key SAP employees in what SAP deemed “predatory hiring 
practices… designed to injure SAP’s business and damage SAP’s ability to compete with Siebel.” 
(Boudette and Davis 1999). In 1997, Borland International sued Microsoft over the defection of 34 key 
employees to the software maker, claiming that Microsoft was attempting to drive it out of business (Bank 
1997). Also in 1997, Informix tried to obtain a restraining order against Oracle after 11 key software 
engineers left the firm (Richards 1997).  
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worth noting. The industry’s workforce is about two-thirds male and one-third non-white. 
Software workers, who generally have at least some college education, enjoyed 
substantial real earnings gains on average as the industry expanded in the 1990s. Earnings 
dispersion also rose sharply over the course of the decade. Meanwhile, software firms 
have grown larger on average, though after rising steadily in the 1990s, the total number 
of establishments in the industry has declined in recent years in the sample state.  
1.4.3 Measuring Clustering 
Researchers have long recognized that it is critical to control for the general 
spatial distribution of economic activity when measuring industrial clustering. However, 
most measures of clustering rely on coarse areal data that aggregate establishments to 
counties, metropolitan statistical areas, states, or other spatial zones (Krugman 1991, 
Ellison and Glaeser 1997, Duranton and Overman 2005). Not only do aggregated 
statistics that rely on arbitrary administrative boundaries often provide misleading 
impressions of the actual extent of clustering facing a given establishment, but they also 
are ill-suited to the analysis I seek to conduct given my interest in within-industry 
variation in clustering and its implications for individual worker outcomes.20 
I adapt the conventional location quotient (LQ) measure to examine the extent of 
clustering at the establishment level.21 The LQ is a measure of an industry’s level of 
concentration around a particular location over and above what one would expect in light 
of the general spatial distribution of economic activity. Typically, the LQ is computed as 
                                                 
20 Different methods have been developed to overcome at least some of the limitations associated with areal 
measures of agglomeration (Duranton and Overman 2005, Freedman 2006). The methods advanced in 
these papers, however, are either not applicable at the establishment level, and therefore not viable 
alternatives for evaluations of within-industry clustering patterns, or are extremely computationally 
burdensome, and therefore impracticable for the type of large-scale empirical analysis I perform.  
21 Holmes and Stevens (2002) develop a similar establishment-specific measure of industrial clustering to 
explore the relationship between firm size and agglomeration. 
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the ratio of an industry’s share of total establishments or employment in a “local” area, 
such as a county, relative to its share of total establishments or employment in a larger 
area, such as the nation. As a refinement on the conventional measure, I take advantage 
of the rich geographic information on my dataset and construct establishment-specific 
LQs by drawing circles with radii of five, ten, 25, and 50 miles around each 
establishment in the sample, and computing the industry’s share of total establishments or 
total employment within those rings relative to its share of total establishments or total 
employment in the state. For establishment j in industry k, the LQ for a circle with radius 
r is 
 
LQjkr = (Ejkr  / Ejr) / (Ek  / E ) 
 
where Ejkr is the number of establishments or employment within the circle of radius r 
around establishment j in industry k (excluding establishment j), Ejr is the number of 
establishments or employment in all industries within the circle of radius r around 
establishment j, Ek is the number of establishments or employment in the entire state in 
industry k, and E is the number of establishments or employment in the state across all 
industries. Values of the LQ exceeding one reflect higher than average concentration at a 
particular location; values less than one indicate less than average concentration.  
This methodology provides for each establishment a single measure of 
agglomeration that reflects the extent to which that establishment is more or less 
clustered than is typical for all businesses. For example, a software establishment with a 
large number of other software establishments or workers nearby will not have a LQ 
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greater than one unless it is the case that software is overrepresented in the immediate 
vicinity compared to economic activity more generally. Importantly, and in contrast with 
the more traditional LQ measure, the measure I construct can be applied at a variety of 
different spatial scales that need not be dictated by administrative boundaries,22 and it 
permits a closer evaluation of how clustering relates to other outcomes within a particular 
industry. 
1.4.4 Descriptive Statistics 
In this section, I present basic descriptive statistics on the nature and extent of 
agglomeration in the software publishing industry in the sample state. Figure 1.1 presents 
the average number of establishments and average employment within five, ten, 25, and 
50-mile radii of sample establishments, calculated from 1991 through 2003.  
                                                 
22 I calculate clustering statistics for the sample state alone and hence respect state boundaries, although the 
measure I construct does not depend on any administrative boundaries within the state and can be applied 
more generally to a more geographically expansive dataset.  
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Figure 1.1: Average Number of Software Establishments and Employment within 
Selected Radii 
NAICS 5112, 1991-2003 
Based on LEHD data. 
 
Throughout much of the 1990s, the number of other software establishments and 
workers located close to sample establishments climbed, reaching a plateau later in the 
sample period and retreating somewhat after 2000. While informative, this reveals little 
about whether establishments in the industry grew more or less clustered relative to the 
broader spatial distribution of economic activity.  
The LQ sheds light on the degree of clustering over and above what one would 
expect given the general distribution of economic activity. Table 1.1 presents clustering 





Table 1.1: Establishment-Specific Location Quotients for the Software Industry in Selected 
Periods 
Means and Standard Deviations 
(a) Establishment-Based 
 1992Q2 1998Q2 2003Q2 
Number of Establishments 822 1,020 882 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
5-Mile Radius 2.29 1.95 2.15 1.66 2.07 1.61
10-Mile Radius 2.02 1.49 1.98 1.41 1.9 1.35
25-Mile Radius 1.53 0.89 1.67 1.04 1.6 0.97
50-Mile Radius 1.38 0.65 1.47 0.75 1.4 0.69
Share Clustered at 25 Miles 0.63 0.48 0.63 0.48 0.59 0.49
(b) Employment-Based 
 1992Q2 1998Q2 2003Q2 
Number of Establishments 822 1,020 882 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
5-Mile Radius 2.22 1.98 2.52 4.19 2.92 5.09
10-Mile Radius 2.03 1.71 2.23 2.81 2.51 3.58
25-Mile Radius 1.63 1.24 1.93 1.59 2.06 1.83
50-Mile Radius 1.46 0.89 1.66 1.16 1.63 1.18
Share Clustered at 25 Miles 0.59  0.49  0.52  0.5  0.5  0.5 
Based on LEHD data.            
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Establishment-specific LQs, whether measured using neighboring establishments 
or employment, are on average well above one in the software industry for circles with 
radii of up to at least 50 miles. While average LQs have declined modestly over time on 
an establishment basis in the software industry, employment-weighted LQs rose on 
average between the early 1990s and early 2000s. In other words, employment in the 
industry has grown increasingly concentrated, though establishments have not. 
Compared to other four-digit NAICS industries, economic activity in the software 
sector is quite clustered taking into account to the broader spatial distribution of 
economic activity. Table 1.2 presents for 2003Q2 employment-based LQs using a 25-
mile radius for several selected industries. I chose some of these industries, such as 
nonmetallic mineral mining (NAICS 2123) and department stores (NAICS 4521), based 
on their representativeness of the broader set of industries within their general industry 
category, while I selected others, such as apparel knitting mills (NAICS 3131) and 
pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing (NAICS 3254), because they have served as 
the subject of much prior research into clustering. 
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Table 1.2: Establishment-Specific Location Quotients for Selected Industries 
2003Q2  
Employment Based, 25-Mile Radius 
Industry (NAICS)  Mean  SD 
Nonmetallic Mineral Mining (2123)  3.18  22.64
Apparel Knitting Mills (3131)  1.82  0.98
Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing (3364)  1.66  1.03
Communications Equipment Manufacturing (3342)  1.65  1.34
Scientific Research and Development Services  (5417)  1.55  1.23
Steel Product Manufacturing (3312)  1.34  1.38
Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing (3254)  1.28  0.76
Radio and Television Broadcasting (5151)  1.18  0.69
Securities & Commodity Contracts Brokerage (5231)  1.16  1.04
Department Stores (4521)  1.06  0.46
Junior Colleges (6112)   0.83   0.39
Based on LEHD data.     
 
Although there is a clear tendency toward clustering in the software industry, it is not the 
case that all activity in the sector is concentrated in a few locations. Indeed, as Table 1.1 
reveals, at a 25-mile radius, only 59% of sample establishments had an establishment-
based LQ greater than one in 2003; for the employment-based measure, this figure was 
50%.  
The histogram in Figure 1.2 depicts the distribution of values of the employment-
based LQ measured with a radius of 25 miles across software establishments in the 
second quarter of 2003. The figure reinforces the message that, while a large percentage 
of software establishments are clustered, there exists substantial variation in LQ values 
across businesses in the sample. Heterogeneity in the extent of clustering among software 
establishments constitutes the source of variation that permits me to identify relationships 
between clustering in the industry and particular labor market outcomes below. 
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Figure 1.2: Histogram of Establishment-Specific LQs for Software Establishments 
 NAICS 5112, 2003Q2 
Based on LEHD data. 
 
1.5 Empirical Analysis 
In this section, I turn to an empirical analysis of how establishment clustering 
affects job mobility and earnings patterns in the software publishing industry. Testing 
each of the main predictions of the model in Section 1.3 with a reduced-form approach, I 
examine first industrial clustering’s effects on job duration and then its implications for 
job-hopping within versus between industries. Next, I evaluate whether workers who 
obtain jobs in agglomerated software establishments accept lower starting wages, and 
finally I assess whether workers in clusters enjoy faster subsequent wage growth and 
steeper earnings-tenure profiles.  
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1.5.1 Job Mobility 
I begin my analysis of job mobility by identifying individual separations from 
software industry jobs, which I do by comparing worker and establishment matches in 
consecutive quarters in the data. A separation in quarter t occurs when a worker is full 
quarter employed at an establishment at t but not at t+1. The quarterly separation rate in 
the data averages 7%, slightly lower than estimates for the broader economy of close to 
10% by Abowd and Zellner (1985) and Shimer (2005) but not surprising given the age, 
gender, and educational profile of workers in software. The restriction that individuals in 
the sample be employed for a full quarter at each employer also eliminates workers with 
very transient spells in the industry.23  
For job spells that are not right censored, I can distinguish whether workers in 
NAICS 5112 move to new establishments in the same industry, establishments in 
different industries, or out of the sample. The majority of separated workers in the sample 
ultimately transition into new jobs as opposed to out of the sample, though most take 
positions at establishments outside the software industry. Of the 130,127 separations 
from NAICS 5112 establishments that I observe, about two-thirds (86,786) ultimately 
result in a transition from a software job to a job outside the software industry while 
about 8% (9,873) result in a transition to another software job.24 The remainder of the 
separations from NAICS 5112 establishments result in exit from the sample, which could 
                                                 
23 Firm exit could be responsible for observed worker separations. However, the worker separation rate is 
over twice the rate of firm exit in NAICS 5112. The average quarterly firm exit rate in the sample is 3.2%. 
24 Of the workers who leave NAICS 5112 for another industry, 59% stay within NAICS 5 (28% of all 
private-sector workers in the U.S. economy are employed in NAICS 5 according to the 2002 Economic 
Census), 16% go to NAICS 4 (22%), 14% to NAICS 3 (13%), and 4% to NAICS 6 (14%). The remaining 
7% transition to jobs in other industries. 
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be due to a right-censored spell of unemployment, withdrawal from the labor force, or a 
move to another state. 
The quarterly frequency of the data, together with the full quarter employment 
restriction, makes it difficult to assess accurately the incidence of direct job-to-job flows 
versus job-to-job flows with intervening spells of unemployment.25 Because I do not 
observe non-employment spells that last less than one quarter except in the razor-edge 
case in which a worker transitions between jobs right between quarters, I define a direct 
job-to-job transition as one involving one quarter or less of non-employment (i.e., no 
observed attachment to any firm) between jobs for the purposes of the empirical analysis. 
Roughly 46% of job transitions between software and different industries and 49% of job 
transitions within software occur with one quarter or less of intervening non-employment.  
Empirical Test of Prediction 1: Job durations in the H industry will be shorter inside 
a cluster than outside a cluster. 
To test the first prediction of the model empirically, I examine whether clustering 
among software establishments affects a worker’s propensity to separate from her current 
job, controlling for a host of worker and establishment characteristics. I use a panel that 
pools all new hires in the sample between 1991 and 2003; restricting the sample to new 
hires eliminates left censoring problems that arise because the data begin with some job 
spells in progress. The data in this case are organized at the job-quarter level, where a job 
is defined as unique individual-establishment match. I estimate a discrete-time hazard 
model of the probability that a worker i is observed to separate from establishment j after 
                                                 
25 The data do not permit me to distinguish between involuntary separations and voluntary separations (i.e., 
between layoffs and quits).  
 
 29
τ quarters, conditional on not having separated until that time. The discrete-time hazard 
rate, hijτ, is given by 
 
hijτ = Pr(Tij = τ | Tij ≥ τ; Cij,, Xit, Zjt, ηt) 
 
where Tij is a discrete random variable representing the quarter in which job spell ij ends; 
Cij represents a job-specific, time-invariant indicator for clustering equal to one if 
establishment j has an employment-weighted LQ greater than or equal to one in the 
majority of the quarters over which the spell ij is observed;26 Xit is a vector of 
characteristics for worker i at time t that includes a quadratic in the natural log of real 
($1997) annualized earnings and a quadratic in age as well as dummies for prior industry 
experience, gender, race, and education; Zjt is a vector of characteristics for establishment 
j at t that includes a quadratic in the natural log of employment, an urban density variable 
(calculated as the share of total sample employment across all industries within a circle 
with a radius of 25 miles of the establishment at t), and a dummy for county; and ηt is a 
dummy for year and quarter.27 I include time dummies to control for the influence of 
cyclical macroeconomic factors, while I include county dummies to control for the 
impact of differences across counties such as variation in infrastructure quality and 
industry composition. A logistic re-parameterization of the hazard is 
                                                 
26 Here as well as in the remainder of the empirical analysis I use an employment-based LQ calculated 
using a 25-mile radius. In my sample, 88% of workers who job-hop within the industry transition to a new 
establishment that is fewer than 25 miles away from their old establishment. By comparison, 38% job hop 
to a new establishment that is fewer than five miles away from their old establishment, and 62% hop to one 
that is fewer than ten miles away. Also, while for ease of exposition I use a time-invariant indicator for 
clustering, the results are robust to using instead the continuous, time-varying LQ measure (entering either 
linearly or as a quadratic). They are also robust to using a clustering indicator defined using radii fewer 
than 25 miles and defined using the average LQ over the spell. 
27 Note that τ, the number of quarters a spell lasts, is distinct from t, the calendar date associated with 




hijτ = 1/[1 + exp( – ζ(τ) – βCij  – ΦXit  – ΩZjt – ηt)] 
 
such that  
 
log[hijτ/(1– hijτ)] = ζ(τ) + βCij + ΦXit  +  ΩZjt + ηt 
 
where, in my preferred specification, the baseline hazard ζ(τ) consists of dummy 
variables for each period in which the worker is at risk of separating (corresponding to 
the length of the job spell in quarters).28 In contrast to continuous-time versions of 
survival models that assume a non-constant hazard (for example, the Weibull), the 
discrete-time model can capture non-monotonic changes in the baseline hazard. I assume 
there exists no unobserved heterogeneity and estimate the model using maximum 
likelihood. A single individual in the sample can potentially separate more than once 
from different software jobs, and since unobserved characteristics of each person are 
likely to be correlated over time, I correct standard errors by clustering on person.29  
The theoretical model implies that the coefficient β should be positive and 
significant, and the results from the discrete-time proportional hazard model, which I 
present in Table 1.3, confirm that this is the case. The point estimates indicate that, 
controlling for other worker and firm characteristics, clustering in the software industry is 
                                                 
28 As robustness checks, I also estimate log-time and cubic polynomial model specifications. The results 
from these alternative specifications are very similar both qualitatively and quantitatively to the results I 
present from the more flexible specification outlined in the text. 
29 If I allow for arbitrary correlation within counties or tracts over time instead of within workers, the 




associated with abbreviated job spells. The implied odds ratio suggests that being 
employed at a clustered software establishment increases the likelihood of separating by 
13% relative to being employed at an establishment that is not clustered. This statistically 
and economically significant effect comes on top of the impact of being in an 
economically dense location; the effect of urbanization is captured in the urban density 
coefficient, which is also positive and significant.  
The impact of clustering on job duration is robust to the inclusion of controls for 
earnings and employer size, each of which bears negatively on the probability of 
separation. Beyond possessing prior experience in the software industry, being male, and 
being white, which all tend to boost one’s likelihood of separating, the influence of other 
worker demographic characteristics on the probability of leaving a software firm are 
muted after taking into account earnings, firm size, and characteristics of the local area. 
Overall, while the results of the hazard model suggest that clustering tends to be 
associated with a more rapid rate of worker turnover in the software industry, they reveal 





Table 1.3: Factors Affecting the Probability of Separation from Software Industry 
Jobs 
Discrete-Time Proportional Hazard Model  
Clustering Indicator (0/1) 0.1266 
  (0.0180)*** 
Log Annualized Earnings ($1997) -1.522 
  (0.0657)*** 
Log Annualized Earnings Squared  0.0580 
  (0.0030)*** 
Urban Density 0.6618 
  (0.1126)*** 
Log Establishment Employment (FQ) -0.0355 
  (0.0080)*** 
Log Establishment Employment Squared -0.008 
  (0.0010)*** 
Observed Prior Experience in 5112 (0/1) 0.1977 
  (0.0112)*** 
Age (Years) -0.0003 
  (0.0025) 
Age Squared 0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Male 0.0184 
  (0.0069)*** 
White 0.1288 
  (0.0070)*** 
Education 12-15 Years  -0.0029 
  (0.0122) 
Education 16+ Years  -0.0037 
  (0.0125) 
Constant 5.9975 
  (0.6724)*** 
Observations (Job x Quarter) 1,249,964 
Controls include year and quarter dummies and county dummies. Sample excludes left-censored jobs.
Standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation over time within the same person. 




Empirical Test of Prediction 2: Job-hopping within the H industry will be more 
prevalent inside a cluster than outside a cluster. 
I next investigate how clustering among software establishments affects where 
separated workers wind up. I estimate a multinomial logit model aimed at revealing 
whether employment in a cluster affects one’s likelihood of taking a job with another 
establishment in the same industry as opposed to moving to an establishment in another 
industry or dropping out of the sample, conditional on having separated from a job in the 
software industry and controlling for the characteristics of the worker and the 
establishment from which she separates.  
Let S = {Transition to Same Industry Directly, Transition to Same Industry with 
Intervening Non-employment, Transition to Different Industry Directly, Transition to 
Different Industry with Intervening Non-employment, Transition Out of Sample} denote 
the set of outcomes facing each individual i employed at an establishment j in time t but 
not t+1. I condition the individual’s present work status sit = s to be in the software 
industry and estimate a model to evaluate the probability of landing in each destination 
state k∈S at time t+τ upon separating (τ ≥ 1). In implementing the multinomial logit 
model, I set the reference transition category as transitioning out of the sample. The 
probability of transitioning from a software job to any of the other four states can be 
expressed as follows: 
 
Pr(sit+1 = k | sit = s; C, X, Z, η) = exp(βkCjt + ΦkXit  +  ΩkZjt + ηt)/[1 + 
∑h∈Sexp(βhCjt + ΦhXit  +  ΩhZjt + ηt)],  
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k = Transition to Same Industry Directly, Transition to Same Industry with 
Intervening Non-employment, Transition to Different Industry Directly, 
Transition to Different Industry with Intervening Non-employment 
 
where Cjt represents a dummy for whether establishment j is clustered at the time of 
worker i’s separation t; Xit is a vector of individual-level covariates for worker i at the 
time of separation t that includes a quadratic in tenure and a quadratic in log real 
annualized earnings as well as dummies for prior industry experience, gender, race, and 
education; Zjt is a vector of establishment-level covariates at the time of separation t that 
includes a quadratic in log employment and urban density; and ηt is a time dummy. βk 
and the vectors Φk and Ωk are coefficients affecting the likelihood of transitioning to 
future work status k∈S. The number of separations from software firms that I observe in 
the data is relatively small at just over 130,000, and 13% of those separations are from 
left-censored software job spells. Therefore, to maximize sample size, I include in the 
multinomial logit estimation sample workers with left-censored job spells in software and 
incorporate a dummy for left censoring that I interact with terms subject to such 
censoring (in particular, tenure and tenure squared). I again cluster the errors on person 
since individuals in the sample may separate from more than one software job.30 
                                                 
30 One assumption of the multinomial logit model is that outcome categories for the model have the 
independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) property. That is, the inclusion or exclusion of categories 
should not affect the relative risks associated with the regressors in the remaining categories. Hausman tests 
for IIA conducted by excluding each outcome category in turn indicate in each case that I cannot reject the 
null hypothesis that the odds of one outcome occurring are independent of other alternatives. Wald tests for 
combining outcome categories also yield strong rejections of the null hypotheses that all coefficients 
(except intercepts) associated with a given pair of outcomes are zero, or, in other words, that categories can 
be collapsed. This holds in all specifications regardless of the radius chosen for the LQ and regardless of 
whether the LQ is establishment-based versus employment-based. 
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The log odds estimates from the multinomial logit that I present in Table 1.4 
reveal that, as the theory outlined above suggests, workers in clusters who separate from 
their software jobs are more likely to transition to other firms in the same industry 
directly (i.e., with one quarter or less of intervening non-employment) than they are to 
move to other industries directly or to take new jobs after a period of non-employment. 
Holding all other variables constant at their means, separating from a clustered as 
opposed to an unclustered software establishment boosts the predicted probability of 
transitioning directly to another software establishment by a significant 4.7%. This result 
is consistent with poaching by software firms, which would facilitate rapid job-hopping 
among workers within the industry. Separating from a clustered firm also increases the 
likelihood of obtaining a new job in a different industry, but by a smaller amount than it 
promotes direct within-industry transitions.31 Firms in other industries, though perhaps 
attaching some value to the skills obtained in software jobs, may not be as actively 
engaged in poaching software workers as software establishments themselves.  
                                                 
31 A Wald test for the significance of the clustering variable across all outcome categories (in which the null 
hypothesis is that all coefficients associated with the variable are zero) indicates that clustering is 
significant at the 1% level. The results are very similar using a different radius for the LQ and using an 
establishment-based instead of an employment-based LQ. Including the time-varying LQ (entering either 
linearly or as a quadratic) instead of including the clustering dummy also yields similar results. 
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Table 1.4: Worker Destinations following Separations from Software Industry Jobs 
Multinomial Logit Model 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
  
Transition Directly to 
Software  
Transition to Software with 
Intervening Non-
Employment   
Transition Directly to 
Different Industry  




Clustering Indicator (0/1)  1.6806 1.3405  0.2373 0.1828 
  (0.0900)*** (0.0714)***  (0.0384)*** (0.0368)*** 
  [0.0473]  [0.0093]  [0.0170] [-0.0024] 
Tenure in Current Job (Quarters) 0.0471 0.0255  0.0251 -0.0143 
  (0.0086)*** (0.0082)***  (0.0039)*** (0.0037)*** 
Tenure in Current Job Squared  -0.0015 -0.0007  -0.0012 0.0002 
  (0.0004)*** (0.0003)**  (0.0002)*** (0.0001) 
Log Annualized Earnings ($1997) 2.2938 1.7525  -0.0750 0.6774 
  (0.4166)*** (0.2695)***  (0.0717) (0.0808)*** 
Log Annualized Earnings Squared -0.0926 -0.0697  0.0033 -0.0330 
  (0.0185)*** (0.0121)***  (0.0034) (0.0039)*** 
Urban Density 1.8070 2.1796  0.1070 -0.6404 
  (0.6069)*** (0.4922)***  (0.2592) (0.2443)*** 
Log Establishment Employment (FQ) 0.6095 0.5931  0.2811 0.3165 
  (0.0501)*** (0.0482)***  (0.0202)*** (0.0194)*** 
Log Establishment Employment Squared -0.0603 -0.0552  -0.0292 -0.0370 
  (0.0050)*** (0.0049)***  (0.0022)*** (0.0021)*** 
Constant -20.1923 -16.2239  -1.6424 -3.7210 
  (2.2883)***  (1.4934)***   (0.4067)***  (0.4424)*** 
Observations (Separations) 130,127           
Controls include worker age, worker age squared, a gender dummy, a race dummy (white/non-white), education dummies (<12 years, 12-15 years, 16+ years), a 
dummy for prior software industry experience, year and quarter dummies, county dummies, and left censoring dummies (interacted). 
Change in predicted probabilities holding other variables constant at means in brackets; change for omitted category -0.0712.  
Standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation over time within the same person.    
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Based on LEHD data.    
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The likelihood of transitioning to an establishment in software is increasing in 
tenure at the separation establishment, earnings at the separation establishment, the size 
of separation establishment, and whether an individual had software industry experience 
prior to working at the separation establishment.32 Greater formal education and lower 
age, meanwhile, tend to decrease the likelihood of making a job-to-job transition (with or 
without an intervening spell of non-employment), perhaps because younger and better 
educated workers are more willing to move out of state when better job opportunities 
arise.  
Having established patterns of job mobility among software workers, I now turn 
to examining earnings dynamics within the industry. 
1.5.2 Earnings Dynamics 
This section aims to shed light first on whether workers who obtain jobs in 
clustered establishments accept lower starting wages, and second on whether workers are 
rewarded for these implicit investments with stronger wage growth and higher earnings 
later in their careers.  
Empirical Test of Prediction 3: Workers moving from outside the H industry into a 
clustered H-type firm will accept earnings discounts relative to 
workers moving into an isolated H-type firm. 
The model implies that individuals will tolerate lower initial earnings at clustered 
establishments with the expectation that, due to the heightened competition over labor in 
clusters, their earnings will be bid up over time once they get their foot in the door in the 
                                                 
32 Though the model suggests that current earnings, tenure, firm size, and prior industry experience should 
be positively correlated with establishment productivity in a cluster and hence that the probability of 
moving from one high-technology firm to another should be decreasing in each (at least on a cross-
sectional basis), in a richer model one might expect all these to serve as signals to potential poachers that 
the worker has accumulated valuable knowledge that she could bring to a new job. 
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industry. Workers starting in a different industry who take a job at an isolated software 
establishment, meanwhile, should not be willing to accept a discount given that their 
outside opportunities are at least as attractive in terms of expected long-term earnings.  
To test this prediction, I estimate a fixed effects model that captures workers’ 
earnings histories and identifies the impact of transitioning into a clustered or unclustered 
software establishment. Adapting the approach of Jacobson et al. (1993) and the 
program-evaluation literature, I pool information for workers directly transitioning from 
other industries into their first software jobs at pre-existing firms during the sample 
period.33 I then introduce a series of dummy variables for the number of quarters before 
or after workers’ transitions into the industry. In particular, I let Ditk = 1 if worker i 
transitions into software from outside the industry in quarter t-k and Ditk = 0 otherwise. I 
allow k to range from -12 to 12 and include in the estimation sample only those 
individuals for whom I have earnings information for the complete six-year window 
around the time of their transitions into software. Restricting attention to workers with 
long observed employment histories permits a better use of pre- and post-transition 
earnings to control for unobserved heterogeneity among workers by mitigating the effect 
of unusually high or low earnings for individual workers in particular quarters. 
To examine the earnings impact of moving from outside software into a clustered 
as opposed to an isolated software firm, one option would be to interact a dummy for 
clustering defined for destination software firms with each of the 25 transition dummies; 
however, inspection of the data reveals that a more parsimonious specification can 
                                                 
33 I restrict attention to moves into establishments in existence prior to the time at which a worker joins 
since my goal is to examine the implications of poaching by firms; start-ups and spin-offs essentially 
represent workers poaching themselves away from their own employers. Inclusion of these workers drives 
the estimated initial earnings change associated with a job change lower. 
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capture the relevant effects. Setting a “pre-transition” dummy Fit1 equal to 1 if worker i 
transitions into software within three years of time t and 0 otherwise, a “transition” 
dummy Fit2 equal to 1 if worker i transitioned into software in the current quarter and 0 
otherwise, and three “post-transition” dummies Fit3 , Fit4 , Fit5 equal to 1 if worker i 
transitioned into software 1-2 quarters ago, 3-8 quarters ago, and 9-12 quarters ago, 
respectively, and 0 otherwise, I estimate the following model:34 
 
ln(earnings)it = α + ∑m=15FitmCiβm + ∑k=-1212DitkMiΨk + ∑k=-1212Ditkδk +  ΦXit + 
ηt + φi + ωit + εit 
 
where ln(earnings)it is the natural log of real annualized earnings of worker i at time t and 
Ci represents a dummy for firm clustering equal to one if the software establishment into 
which i transitions has an employment-based LQ greater than or equal to one at the time 
of transition.35 Mi is a vector of worker and establishment characteristics at the time of i’s 
move into software that includes log establishment employment, urban density, and 
dummies for worker gender, race, and education; I include interactions between the 
elements of Mi and each of the 25 dummy variables Ditk, k = -12, -11, …, 11, 12, in order 
to isolate the earnings consequences of transitioning into a clustered or unclustered firm 
holding constant the distributions of these time-invariant characteristics across movers. 
Xit in the regression represents a vector of time-varying person characteristics at t that 
includes a quadratic in age, and ηt is a time dummy.  
                                                 
34 Since I observe some workers for longer than three years on either side of their time of transition into 
software, all the parameters of the model are identified. 
35 The results are robust to using the time-varying LQ (entering linearly or as a quadratic) instead of the 
clustering dummy, as well as to using clustering dummies defined using radii fewer than 25 miles and 
using the average LQ over the spell. 
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Critically, the person fixed effect, α + φi, captures worker heterogeneity in 
observed and unobserved characteristics that do not vary over time, thereby mitigating 
biases that might arise if transitions into software and their earnings consequences occur 
at least in part because of enduring individual characteristics.36 I also include a worker-
specific time trend, ωit, to account for possible differences across workers in trend rates 
of earnings growth. Since the observations for each person are likely not independent 
over time, I correct standard errors by clustering on worker; that is, the error term εit is 
assumed independent across workers but not necessarily within workers over time. 
Table 1.5 reports results for the fixed effects model.37 Holding constant the 
distribution of other worker and firm characteristics at the time of transition, there is little 
discernable difference in pre-transition earnings dynamics among workers who ultimately 
enter clustered software firms as opposed to unclustered firms. However, at the time of 
transition, workers who obtain jobs at clustered establishments accept significantly lower 
starting earnings relative to workers who take jobs at unclustered firms. The immediate 
earnings discount for those entering clustered as opposed to unclustered firms amounts to 
roughly 5%.38 Earnings growth among those starting at clustered firms remains depressed 
compared to growth among those at unclustered establishments for up to two years before 
showing signs of a relative recovery, though the effects beyond the initial impact in the 
quarter of transition are insignificant. 
                                                 
36 The worker fixed effects subsume the independent effects of each of the variables in Mi, which are all 
defined as of the time of transition for each individual in the estimation sample. 
37 An F test for the null hypothesis that φi = 0 for i = 1, 2, … leads to rejection at the 1% level. 
38 One can calculate the percentage effect on earnings from the coefficient estimates as eβ– 1.  
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Table 1.5: Earnings Consequences of Job Transitions into the 
Software Industry 
Fixed Effect Model (Worker Fixed Effects) 
Transition into Clustered Software Establishment x   
   Pre-Transition Period (1-12 Quarters before Move) 0.0088 
  -0.0189 
   Transition Period (Quarter of Move) -0.053 
  (0.0231)** 
   Post-Transition Period (1-2 Quarters after Move) -0.0105 
  -0.0193 
   Post-Transition Period (3-7 Quarters after Move) -0.0085 
  -0.019 
   Post-Transition Period (8-12 Quarters after Move) 0.0177 
  -0.0195 
Transition Period Dummy Dit0 (Quarter of Move) 0.0818 
 -0.0823 
Age (Years) 0.2514 
  (0.0173)*** 
Age Squared -0.0021 
  (0.0001)*** 
Constant 4.8345 
  (0.5000)*** 
Observations (Job x Quarter) 97,759 
Controls include worker fixed effects; 24 pre- and post-transition quarter dummies 
(Ditk, k = -12, …, -1, 1, …, 12); complete set of interactions of 25 transition quarter 
dummies (Ditk, k = -12, …, -1, 0, 1, …, 12) with software establishment size, urban 
density, and dummies for worker gender, race, and education;     worker-specific 
time trends, and year and quarter dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation over time within the 
same person. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Based on LEHD data. 
 
The results in this section suggest that, relative to those who obtain jobs at 
unclustered firms, workers who take jobs at clustered establishments experience 
significantly lower initial earnings and perhaps at least a short period of relatively weak 
wage growth. Yet these exercises include only individuals moving into software from 
jobs held outside the industry and are limited in the extent to which they control for 
variation in software establishment characteristics. In estimating clustering’s effect on 
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earnings-tenure profiles in the next section, I broaden the sample to include all software 
job spells and take further steps to account for underlying worker and firm heterogeneity.  
Empirical Test of Prediction 4: Workers inside a cluster will experience faster 
earnings growth and face steeper earnings-tenure profiles than 
workers outside a cluster. 
Individuals in the model enjoy relatively steep wage-tenure profiles in high-
technology industry clusters as firms compete over skilled labor. In this section, I 
estimate a panel regression that controls for both observable and unobservable worker 
and firm characteristics in order to isolate the true effect of clustering among software 
establishments on earnings patterns. I model heterogeneity across workers and 
establishments explicitly by assuming that each job has its own specific earnings 
intercept, α + θij. This fixed effect model, which eliminates both unobserved worker-level 
and establishment-level time-invariant error components, is specified as follows: 
 
ln(earnings)ijt = α + β1tenureijt + β2tenureijt2 + β3(Cij*tenureijt) + β4(Cij*tenureijt2) 
+ β5Uijt + β6(Uijt*tenureijt) + β7(Uijt*tenureijt2) + ΦXit +  ΩZjt + θij + ηt +  
εijt 
 
where ln(earnings)ijt is the natural log of real annualized earnings of worker i at 
establishment j at time t, tenureijt is accumulated tenure for i at j as of t, Cij represents a 
dummy for firm clustering equal to one if establishment j has an employment-weighted 
LQ greater than or equal to one in the majority of the quarters over which the spell ij is 
observed, Uijt is the urban density variable, Xit represents a vector of time-varying person 
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characteristics at t that includes age and age squared, Zjt represents a vector of time-
varying establishment characteristics at t that includes a quadratic in log employment, 
and ηt is a time dummy.39 I interact the clustering dummy with tenure to shed light on 
how agglomeration affects the shape of the earnings-tenure profile.40 I also include 
interactions between tenure and urban density to determine the extent to which being 
located in an economic dense area independently affects wage growth and to ensure β3 
and β4 capture only the marginal impact of clustering among software establishments on 
workers’ earnings-tenure profiles. Since the observations for each job are likely not 
independent over time, I correct standard errors by clustering on each establishment-
worker pair; that is, the error term εijt is assumed independent across jobs but not 
necessarily within jobs over time.  
An attractive feature of the fixed effect approach in this section, much as in the 
prior section, is that it helps to mitigate any bias that might arise because workers self-
select into clustered establishments. If more innately talented individuals select into 
clustered establishments, estimates of the earnings effects of clustering would be biased 
upward. Using job fixed effects, which are defined for each unique worker-establishment 
match, also mitigates potential problems stemming from firms’ endogenous location 
decisions; whether a firm decides to cluster depends on its assessment of the benefits and 
costs associated with labor pooling and poaching. To the extent that unobservable but 
time invariant factors affect firms’ location decisions, job fixed effects will resolve the 
endogeneity problem associated with firm location choice. Meanwhile, including time 
                                                 
39 The results are robust to using the establishment-specific time-varying LQ instead of the clustering 
dummy variable (with or without a quadratic in the LQ), as well as to using clustering dummy variables 
defined using radii fewer than 25 miles and using the average LQ over the spell. 
40 The clustering dummy variable itself is subsumed in the fixed job effect. 
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dummies eliminates bias due to any correlation between clustering and earnings resulting 
from shocks that vary over time but that are constant across jobs. 
While the fixed effect approach permits the error terms to be correlated with the 
job effects, the inclusion of job fixed effects drastically diminishes the number of degrees 
of freedom in the regression and precludes one from obtaining parameter estimates for 
time-invariant job, worker, and establishment characteristics. In the fixed effect 
framework, time-invariant characteristics, including the job-specific clustering dummy 
variable, are subsumed by the unit-specific intercepts, which are assumed to be non-
stochastic. Nonetheless, it provides a way to address several sources of bias in estimating 
clustering’s effect on the shape of the earnings-tenure profile.41  
The results of the fixed effects regression appear in Table 1.6.42 Earnings are 
increasing at a diminishing rate in tenure, as expected. Furthermore, the interaction terms 
suggest that workers employed at clustered establishments reap relatively large returns to 
                                                 
41 Random effects models permit one to obtain coefficient estimates for time-invariant worker and 
establishment characteristics and are not subject to the degrees-of-freedom problems to which fixed effects 
models are prone. Therefore, as a check and extension on my preferred fixed effects approach, I estimate a 
random effects model that assumes that the earnings intercept for a particular job is a random variable that 
is uncorrelated with observable person and firm characteristics. The random effects specification is  
 
ln(earnings)ijt = α + β1tenureijt + β2tenureijt2 + β3(Cij*tenureijt) + β4(Cij*tenureijt2) + β5Cij +  
β6Uijt + β7(Uijt*tenureijt) + β8(Uijt*tenureijt2) + ΦXit + ΩZjt + ηt + {eij + εijt} 
 
where eij is a job-specific error term, assumed to be orthogonal to job characteristics, i.i.d. across jobs with 
mean zero and variance σv2 (with 0<σv2<∞), and independent of εijt. I add to the vectors Xit and Zjt time-
invariant worker and establishment characteristics including dummies for worker gender, worker race, 
worker education, establishment clustering, and establishment county. All other variables are defined as 
before, and left-censoring dummies are incorporated in the random effects model where required. The 
results of the random effects model are qualitatively similar to those of the fixed effects model.  
While the random effects approach holds some advantages over the fixed effects approach, it is 
sensitive to assumptions on the statistical properties of the random variables, and in particular the 
independence of eij and job or person characteristics. Failure of this assumption would mean that the 
random effects model would yield inconsistent parameter estimates. A Hausman test for fixed effects 
versus random effects models generates a Chi-squared statistic that implies that I can reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients in the two models are identical. This suggests that, given that the model is 
correctly specified, the coefficients from the random effects model may not be consistent.  
42 An F test for the null hypothesis that θij = 0 for ij = 1, 2, … in the model leads to rejection at the 1% 
level.  
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tenure controlling for other worker and firm characteristics, both observable and 
unobservable. This is consistent with the model outlined above, in which workers in 
clusters face steeper earnings-tenure profiles as a result of the strategic interaction of 
firms as they compete over skilled labor. The results also reveal that larger establishments 
pay more on average than smaller establishments, which is consistent with the model as 
well as with findings in past literature (Davis and Haltiwanger 1996). 
Table 1.6: Earnings-Tenure Profiles in Software Industry Jobs 
Fixed Effect Model (Job Fixed Effects) 
Observed Tenure (Quarters) 0.0100 
  (0.0011)*** 
Observed Tenure Squared  -0.0002 
  (0.0000)*** 
Clustering Indicator x Tenure 0.0014 
  (0.0004)*** 
Clustering Indicator x Tenure Squared 0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Urban Density 2.5552 
  (0.1822)*** 
Log Establishment Employment (FQ) 0.0733 
  (0.0067)*** 
Log Establishment Employment Squared 0.0014 
  (0.0007)** 
Age (Years) 0.1230 
  (0.0047)*** 
Age Squared  -0.0012 
  (0.0000)*** 
Constant 7.4453 
  (0.1508)*** 
Observations (Job x Quarter) 1,522,806 
Controls include job fixed effects and year and quarter dummies. 
Standard errors in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation over time within the same job. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Based on LEHD data. 
 
   
 46
Importantly, job fixed effects absorb the impacts of time invariant but 
unobservable worker and firm characteristics whose omission from the regression might 
otherwise cloud estimates of clustering’s effect on earnings patterns. As previously 
discussed, the fixed effects furthermore help to resolve selection and endogeneity 
problems that could arise in cross-sectional analyses of the relationship of agglomeration 
and earnings dynamics. After addressing these sources of bias and controlling for 
observed and unobserved worker and firm heterogeneity, what is left is the key result that 
establishment clustering in the software industry interacts positively with worker tenure. 
The finding that earnings-tenure profiles are steeper in clusters is consistent with the idea 
that agglomeration fosters competition over workers that affects software firms’ 
compensation strategies. 
1.6 Conclusion  
This chapter takes advantage of new employee-employer matched micro-data 
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
Program to examine the implications of industrial clustering for labor mobility and 
earnings dynamics. I find evidence consistent with the predictions of a model in which 
clustering not only makes it easier for firms to hire workers with industry-specific skills 
(labor market pooling), but also makes it more likely that firms will lose workers or be 
forced to pay higher wages because of competition from nearby rivals (labor market 
poaching). Specifically, I find that workers in clustered establishments in the software 
publishing industry tend to have shorter job durations, are more likely to job hop to other 
software establishments, and experience steeper earnings-tenure profiles than workers in 
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more isolated software establishments, controlling for worker and establishment 
heterogeneity.  
By shedding light on the complex ways in which geography can interact with 
labor markets to affect individual worker outcomes, this work makes contributions to the 
macro, labor, and urban and regional economics literatures. It also opens up numerous 
avenues for future research. While I concentrate in this chapter on the predictions of my 
model for worker job mobility and earnings dynamics, the model also has implications 
for the location decisions of firms, suggesting further theoretical and empirical 
exploration of how firm and industry characteristics could influence the spatial 
distribution of economic activity.  
With respect to the empirical analysis in this chapter, a more careful treatment of 
endogeneity issues in the job mobility and earnings regressions may be warranted. This 
work makes some progress toward mitigating biases resulting from the simultaneity 
problem that arises due to worker self-selection into clusters, but different empirical 
approaches (such as an instrumental variable approach) could, at the very least, serve to 
substantiate the results. Examining other industries could also help to corroborate my 
empirical work as well as elucidate the precise nature of the benefits and costs that firms 
face when clustering. For sectors in which industry-specific skills are less important, such 
as retail trade, any gains to clustering stemming from the labor market would likely 
quickly be overwhelmed by the costs associated with the heightened competition over 
workers. This might provide an incentive for businesses in some industries to disperse 
that, in concert with other drivers of employer location decisions, would affect the 
geographic distribution of firms and thereby impinge on local labor market dynamics.  
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Chapter 2  
Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?* 
2.1 Introduction 
The process of innovation is wrought with both promise and risk, requiring 
substantial investments of time and money with uncertain payoffs. Identifying how, in the 
face of such uncertainty, firms recruit and motivate talented individuals and workers 
ultimately sort themselves across firms is critical to understanding the innovation process 
as well as observed changes over time in the structure of earnings in the U.S. economy. 
This chapter draws key connections between employers’ hiring practices and product 
market risk in the realm of high technology. We show that software firms that operate in 
product markets with highly skewed returns to innovation pay a premium to hire highly 
talented workers. These same firms reward loyalty; that is, talented workers who stay 
with their employers enjoy much higher earnings in firms that face greater variance in the 
potential payoffs from innovation.  
The software industry is often viewed as the poster-child for the advanced 
technology sector, and segments of the industry can be very risky indeed. Video games 
are at or near the top of the list for high stakes product development; some games 
generate huge returns for their creators, while others languish on store shelves. That said, 
in the same industry, some product lines present firms with substantially less risk. For 
instance, in the case of business applications software, once a sufficiently large 
                                                 
* This chapter draws on a joint paper with Fredrik Andersson, John Haltiwanger, Julia Lane, and Kathryn 
Shaw with the same title. The authors thank Tim Bresnahan, Charlie Brown, Ben Campbell, Erica Groshen, 
Phil Hardiman, Edward Lazear, Alex Mas, Paul Oyer, and Julie Wulf as well as seminar participants at 
Stanford University, Washington State University, the University of California-Santa Barbara, and the 
Society of Labor Economists meetings for their helpful comments. 
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community has adopted an application, software producers have an installed client base 
that provides a degree of stability for future product development. This chapter exploits 
this within industry variation in potential payoffs across product markets to explore how 
such variation maps into firms’ different approaches to attracting, motivating, and 
retaining talented workers.   
To investigate the link between the differential payoff distribution for different 
types of products and the hiring and compensation policies of firms in the software 
industry, we use a rich new longitudinal employer-employee matched data source that 
permits us to track both firms and workers over time. On the firm side, we have rich 
information about the detailed product mix and revenue outcomes of each business, 
which permits us to measure both its potential payoffs and its actual performance. On the 
worker side, we can measure earnings levels (including the contribution of exercised 
stock options and bonuses) as well as within-job and between-job earnings growth.  
The theoretical motivation for the empirical analysis begins with the assumption 
that innovative firms want workers who are good at designing or selecting new projects. 
The key insight of our model is that some firms value this talent more than other firms 
(Lazear 2005). In a product market in which innovation is rarely rewarded, or in which 
even a great project will generate small returns, the payoff distribution has a relatively 
low variance and firms in the market attach less value to worker talent. On the other 
hand, in a product market in which the payoff distribution has a greater variance, as it 
does in the video game example above, firms attach greater value to individual talent, 
since those that pick projects well can reap relatively large returns. Based on these ideas, 
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our model predicts that firms that operate in product markets with greater variance in 
potential payoffs will hire more talent and pay higher wages.  
Using our unique micro-data, we first show that, consistent with the model, firms 
that face greater risk in the product market, and that consequently wish to attract more 
talent, pay more in starting salaries than other firms. These firms select talented workers 
who themselves have a history of prior success (i.e., they hire workers who have in the 
past had high wage levels). Second, we show that firms in riskier product lines reward 
workers more for loyalty; that is, we find that those software workers who achieve the 
highest earnings do so by remaining at firms in product markets characterized by greater 
variance in payoffs.  
In short, our analysis reveals that firms that operate in more dynamic, risky 
product markets select the most talented workers and pay them both higher starting 
salaries and higher performance pay. These innovating firms offer skilled individuals 
substantial sums of money up front because they are betting on a high-stakes game of 
producing winning high-payoff products. They also pay for stars with performance pay 
aimed at rewarding loyalty, which further increases the likelihood of success in the 
marketplace. 
This work represents an advance on empirical and theoretical fronts. Previous 
empirical work seeking to establish a link between product markets and compensation 
policy has focused almost entirely on CEO pay and has, by and large, identified CEO 
compensation as a function of firm size or underlying strategies. The few “insider” 
studies that exist find evidence of a connection between strategy and pay within 
individual firms that stretches across their workforces to varying degrees (Baker and 
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Hubbard 2003; Stern 2004; Wulf 2002, 2005; Garicano and Hubbard 2005). Studies that 
employ survey data to examine the subject derive similar results (MacLeod and Parent 
1999). Each of these strands of the literature, though, suffers from a narrow focus, 
inaccurate or incomplete data, or both. From an empirical standpoint, by using a rich 
employee-employer matched data set, this work vastly expands our understanding of the 
nature and scope of the connection between product markets and compensation policy. 
This work also closes some of the gap between the theoretical and empirical 
models of incentive contracts and sorting. As the information industry has become an 
increasingly dominant part of the U.S. economy, research specifically on workers in 
high-technology sectors has blossomed (Chevalier and Ellison 1999, Garicano and 
Hubbard 2005, Fallick et al. 2006, Lerner and Wulf 2005). However, while theoretical 
models of incentive pay may state the conditions under which firms optimally adopt 
different forms of pay, empirical researchers have, at best, showed that some firms 
succeed and others fail with a given compensation policy. Efforts to document the 
adoption of different compensation schemes empirically have been stymied by data 
limitations. In this study, we show that incentive pay plans and sorting based on talent are 
optimal in firms with high potential payoffs in their respective product markets, and we 
find evidence consistent with these phenomena. 
On a broader level, the human resource practices of firms operating in innovative 
markets help to shape patterns of earnings inequality in the economy. Talent at such firms 
is valuable, and the relationships that we identify between product market strategies and 
compensation policy in innovative markets help to explain not only increases in the 
variance of starting salaries across workers, but also the widening of pay differentials 
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over time. Indeed, our findings shed light on relevant factors affecting the polarization of 
earnings at the upper end of the earnings distribution (Autor et al. 2006). The results 
suggest that in high-technology industries such as software, where potential payoffs vary 
across product markets, a driving force behind the growing earnings gap between 
workers at the top and everyone else are firms’ efforts to adapt their human resource 
practices to their particular business environments.    
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, we provide some 
background facts about the software industry to help motivate our analysis. We outline 
our application of Lazear’s (2005) model linking product market risk and pay policy in 
Section 2.3, and we provide a detailed description of the data we use to test the 
predictions of the model in Section 2.4. In Sections 2.5 and 2.6, we present our empirical 
specifications and the results from these specifications. We conclude and discuss the 
implications of our work in Section 2.7. 
2.2 Background 
In this section, we present a set of basic facts aimed at describing the wage 
distribution of workers and the potential payoff distribution facing firms in different 
product markets in the software industry. These facts will help to motivate the approach 
and analysis that follows.  
First, not only do workers in the software industry have relatively high salaries on 
average, but a small subset of workers in the industry receive extraordinarily high wages. 
Panel (a) of Table 2.1 provides summary statistics about the distribution of income from 
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the 2000 Decennial Census Public-Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) for workers in all 
industries as well as for workers specifically in the software industry.43  
 
 
                                                 
43 We focus on full-time workers between 21 and 44 years of age. For the purposes of our analysis, we 
define the software industry as SIC 7372 (prepackaged software). 
   
 54
Table 2.1: Summary Earnings Statistics  
Workers 21-44 
 Mean  Median* 90th* SD 
(a) 2000 Decennial Census (PUMS) Data - 35+ Hours/Week & 35+ Weeks/Year 
All Industries 
  Total Earnings 40,918  31,891 70,160 183,134
  Wage and Salary Income 38,685  31,466 69,097 173,449
Software Industry (SIC 7372) 
  Total Earnings 80,787  63,782 127,563 334,906
  Wage and Salary Income 80,006  63,782 127,563 333,669
Computer Software Engineers (Census Occupation Code 102) in the Software Industry 
  Total Earnings 90,668  70,691 138,193 369,374
  Wage and Salary Income 90,496  70,160 138,193 369,777
(b) LEHD Data for Ten States - Earning $50,000+ Annualized  
Software Industry 
  Starting Earnings (Excludes Left-Censored) 69,353  59,665 108,692 82,432
  Ending Earnings (Censored and Uncensored) 344,268  95,508 310,644 2,051,985
  One-Year Prior Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)** 199,172  86,796 220,760 1,101,658
  Prior-Spell Ending Earnings*** 60,951  51,532 100,987 133,153
Top Decile of Workers (by Ending Earnings) in Software Industry 
  Starting Earnings (Excludes Left-Censored) 107,660  80,899 184,951 142,526
  Ending Earnings (Censored and Uncensored) 2,532,500  670,993 6,688,470 6,064,204
  One-Year Prior Earnings (Censored and Uncensored)** 750,551  171,642 1,338,380 2,862,843
  Prior-Spell Ending Earnings***  98,467   73,434  164,194  150,428
* Average within a 10% band around the true percentile. ** Annualized earnings three quarters prior to last observed full quarter. 
*** Includes only individuals for whom we observe a prior spell in the data. 
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As panel (a) reveals, based on either mean or median figures, workers in the software 
industry as a whole earn more than twice what workers in all other industries earn. The 
PUMS data further suggest that, while the variance of pay in software is relatively large, 
compensation is not appreciably more skewed to the right for workers in software than in 
other industries. However, the figures in panel (a) do not capture performance bonuses 
and stock options, possibly important means of compensation in software. Further, with 
PUMS information alone, we cannot distinguish recent hires from experienced workers, 
which limits our ability to examine starting salaries and earnings-tenure profiles in the 
industry. 
To address these deficiencies, we present summary statistics in panel (b) of Table 
2.1 derived from data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) 
Program at the U.S. Census Bureau. These data are built from employer-filed 
unemployment insurance (UI) records, which contain data on all earnings, including 
bonuses and stock options.44 Because UI data do not contain hours of work or occupation 
information, we restrict our sample to workers earning at least $50,000 on an annual basis 
in the software industry.45 Moreover, we focus on job spells in the software industry that 
are ongoing in 1997, as this sample of spells is useful for our later analysis exploiting 
firm level characteristics.  
                                                 
44 These data are described in greater detail in our data section.  
45 The $50,000 threshold is discussed in more detail below, but it is worth noting that in the PUMS data, 
two-thirds of all software workers and four-fifths of software engineers have total earnings of at least 
$50,000. Indeed, the mean of total earnings for software engineers in SIC 7372 earning at least $50,000 is 
$103,881, only slightly higher than the $90,668 reported in Table 2.1 for workers at all earnings levels. It is 
also worth noting that the $50,000 represents the worker’s earnings when we last observed him or her in the 
data; 36% of those earning $50,000 or more when we last observe them have starting salaries less than 
$50,000. Fortunately, Table 2.1 (as well our robustness analysis discussed in more detail below) indicates 
that by using a relatively simple income cutoff, we can identify the software developers and managers in 
the administrative data. That is, focusing on workers earning more than $50,000 annually in constant 2001 
dollars yields workers that are well identified as software developers and managers.  
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The longitudinal nature of the data permits us to construct numerous different 
measures of earnings for software workers, and we report in panel (b) earnings for new 
hires (measured as annualized earnings at the start of the observed job spell excluding 
left-censored records), earnings for experienced workers (measured as annualized 
earnings at the end of the observed spell), earnings of workers one year prior to the end of 
the observed spell (or starting earnings if the spell was less than one year long), and 
earnings of workers in the last quarter of their prior spells (conditional on our observing 
the prior spell). There are left and right censoring issues that we address in the standard 
ways in our econometric analysis below, but even with these limitations, we see a number 
of interesting patterns in panel (b) of Table 2.1. Not only are ending earnings much 
higher than starting earnings, but they are also very skewed to the right. The skewness is 
especially pronounced for the most highly paid workers (the top decile in terms of ending 
earnings). The median exceeds $670,000 and the 90th percentile nearly $6.7 million for 
ending earnings, compared with a median of only about $81,000 and a 90th percentile of 
$184,000 for starting earnings. This suggests that a select group of workers have 
enormous average within spell wage growth at both the median and especially at the 90th 
percentile. At least a fraction of the high ending earnings could be bonuses or exercised 
options upon leaving the firm, which makes examining earnings patterns one year prior to 
the end of spell also potentially relevant. 
Another key characteristic regarding the nature of compensation in the software 
industry is that the pay of software workers rises markedly with tenure. Figure 2.1 
compares the earnings distribution of salaries for new hires (excluding left censored 
spells) to the distribution for experienced workers (ending earnings if the spell is not 
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censored and the last observed earnings otherwise). While 70% of starting earnings are 
below $75,000, only 29% of experienced workers earn below $75,000 (experienced 
workers have an average tenure of five years). Similarly, only 4% of starting salaries are 
above $150,000, but 21% of experienced workers earn above that amount. Since starting 
salaries include the salaries paid to new but experienced workers, earnings rise markedly 
with tenure. 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of Starting Earnings and Experienced Earnings 
SIC 7372, Experienced Workers 21-44 Earning $50,000+ 
Starting earnings excludes left-censored job spells.  
Based on LEHD data for ten states. 
 
A final pertinent feature of the software industry is that there appears to be a high 
variance to the gains to innovation in a number of product lines. As an illustrative 
example, we present in Table 2.2 the distribution of revenues for the top ten video games 
in 2002. The distribution is highly skewed, even restricting attention to the top ten games. 
Indeed, the top game earned nearly five times as much as the tenth on the list.  
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Table 2.2: Top Video Games in 2002 Ranked by Sales Revenues 
Game Firm 2002 Revenues (Millions) 
Grand Theft Auto Vice City Take 2 $218 
Grand Theft Auto 3 Take 2 $120 
Madden NFL 2003 Electronic Arts $119 
Medal of Honor Electronic Arts $73 
Kingdom Hearts Square Enix $59 
Spider Man Activision $54 
Halo Microsoft $51 
SOCOM Seals Sony $50 
Super Mario Sunshine Nintendo $49 
Tony Hawk  Activision  $46 
Based on Merrill Lynch's “Reinstating Coverage of Video Game Industry” report (January 21, 2004). 
 
As mentioned in the introduction, though, not all software firms face such a 
skewed payoff distribution for their products. In the consumer video game market, the 
costs of consumers switching to a new game is minimal, and hence firms in the market 
have enormous potential gains if the product does succeed in the market. However, the 
same is not true for firms that produce, for instance, enterprise resource software for large 
mainframe computers. Such firms tend to have lower variance payoffs, as customers are 
often locked into a software product and purchase it (or merely upgrades) on an ongoing 
basis. The provider in this case is profitable, but software product innovations do not 
have enormous upside potential gains. An example of this is the SAS Institute, which 
produces statistical software for businesses. SAS sells its software to firms through 
licenses, which have about a 97% renewal rate (Pfeffer 1998). 
Our empirical analysis encompasses software firms operating in product markets 
that span the spectrum from having high variance in potential payoffs, as in video games, 
to having low variance in potential payoffs, as in enterprise software. Before turning to 
our results, though, we outline in what follows a model that links the skewness of firms’ 
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potential payoff distributions to their hiring and compensation policies, and in particular 
to their propensity to reward talent and loyalty. 
2.3 Model of Innovation 
We model the process of producing innovative software products, though this 
process may well apply to innovations undertaken by most knowledge workers. The 
fundamental characteristic of software production is the uncertainty that arises because of 
firms’ inability to predict whether an innovative product will pay off.46 In software 
innovation, there are two integral groups of employees, each of which faces a degree of 
uncertainty and risk. On the one hand, programmers and engineers must begin working 
on a new software project not knowing whether they will develop a great product. On the 
other hand, managers must allocate funds to research projects not knowing whether the 
resulting products will succeed in the market. Thus, a model of project selection pertains 
to the work of programmers and engineers as well as managers. 
Given the uncertainty about the likelihood of success for a given project, the key 
role of an employee seeking to make innovations is to create or pick the best projects. A 
model by Lazear (2005) demonstrates how employees who are skilled at creating or 
picking projects should be sorted among firms operating in high variance payoff markets. 
Assume that projects can have two outcomes, a good outcome that occurs with 
probability P, and a bad outcome that occurs with probability (1-P). Uncertainty derives 
from the fact that ex-ante, software programmers and managers cannot identify which 
projects are good and which are bad. As a result, they can make false positive errors, 
                                                 
46 There are other related forms of uncertainty about product market payoffs that fit within the framework 
of our model. Suppose, for example, that a component of the uncertainty relates to whether workers 
implement a new idea effectively. In this case, the talented programmers may be those that implement the 
idea well (e.g., without problematic bugs or other product market features that would have an adverse 
impact on the returns from the product). 
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denoted H’, by accepting projects that they believe are good but that later turn out to be 
bad as well as false negative errors, denoted 1-H, in which they reject a project that 
would have turned out to be a good project. More specifically, a false positive is defined 
as 
 
H’ ≡ Pr(accept a project | project is actually bad)  
 
A false negative, on the other hand, is defined as 
 
1 – H ≡ 1 – Pr(accept a project | project is actually good)  
 
Assume that if a firm chooses to undertake a good project and it pays off, the firm earns 
$X. If, on the other hand, a firm chooses to undertake a project that turns out to be bad, it 
costs the firm $Y. A firm has zero costs and zero revenue if it rejects projects early. Given 
these probabilities and net revenues, the expected payoff for a firm is  
 
 E(payoff) = PHX – (1-P)H’Y + P(1-H)*0 +(1-P)(1-H’)*0 
 
which simplifies to 
 
 E(payoff) = PHX – (1-P)H’Y  
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Firms that achieve a high payoff are those that have a high value of PHX. Firms that fail, 
meanwhile, are those that have a high value of the losses, (1-P)H’Y. 
Lazear (2005) defines a “star” worker as an individual who has a higher 
probability of accepting truly good projects and a lower probability of accepting truly bad 
projects. This ability could stem from innate talent, be developed as human capital on the 
job through learning, or arise from higher effort in response to incentives. In any event, 
star programmers must develop great projects and star managers must allocate resources 
to them. Both sets of skills are important determinants of success in the software industry. 
Thus, we define 
 




H’ – ε ≡ Star’s Pr(accept or develop a project | project is actually bad) 
 
where ε captures the quality of the star worker, or the talent that person has in picking 
projects relative to non-star workers. Therefore, the value of selecting a star employee 
relative to a non-star employee, Δ, is the incremental expected payoff, 
 
Δ = [P(H + ε)X – (1 – P)(H’ - ε)Y] – [PHX – (1 – P)H’Y] 
 
or, more simply, 
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Δ = ε[PX – (1 – P)Y] 
 
Hence, firms in high variance payoff markets value star talent the most, since firms that 
have either high potential payoffs from good project selection (large $X) or large 
potential losses from bad project selection (large $Y) gain the most from having stars with 
extra talent ε.  
We illustrate this implication with a continuous distribution of payoffs in Figure 
2.2. The continuous distribution of payoffs is consistent with the model above in that, 
while a firm might have a range of possible projects with different potential payoffs, any 
given project might have the types of payoffs and probabilities previously described.  
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Figure 2.2: Shifts in the Payoff Distribution Due to Reductions in False Positive or False 
Negative Errors 
(a) More Risky Payoff Distribution 
 
(b) Less Risky Payoff Distribution 
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The bold line in Figure 2.2(a) shows a high variance payoff distribution, while the bold 
line in Figure 2.2(b) shows a low-variance payoff distribution. The dotted lines in (a) and 
(b) are the changes in the distributions attributable to star talent. In each case, the left tail 
shifts right due to stars because employing such workers reduces the occurrence of false 
positives; that is, for any given project, a star reduces by ε the probability H’ of accepting 
a project that is bad and, as a result, losing (1-P)Y. The right tail shifts right because stars 
also reduce the number of false negatives; that is, for any given project, a star increases 
by ε the probability H of accepting a project that is good and has payoff PX.  
Thus, by shifting the payoff distribution to the right, the mean payoff rises from 
PA1 to PA2 in the payoff distribution of Figure 2.2(a). This is the gain associated with 
paying for a star worker, a gain that must exceed the cost of hiring that employee. Figure 
2.2(b) depicts a narrower underlying project payoff distribution, which would arise when 
projects are less risky and thus potential losses as well as gains are smaller. When a star 
shifts this low-risk payoff distribution due to their talent for project assessment, the mean 
gains are smaller; in that case, the gains are PB2 – PB1. As is evident in the figures, the 
gains to stars are smaller in low-risk product markets than in high-risk product markets, 
as (PB2 – PB1) < (PA2 – PA1). In sum, because there are larger gains (or smaller losses) to 
the selection of great projects in high-risk product markets, stars are more valuable in (a), 
where potential payoffs are higher, than in (b), where potential payoffs are lower. 
Primary Hypothesis: Firms operating in product markets that have high variance 
payoffs should pay higher wages, because these firms hire and reward 
more highly talented software workers. 
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Underlying this hypothesis is the idea that firms in high variance product markets 
have human resource practices aimed at selecting, developing, and rewarding highly 
skilled workers. We cannot directly observe firms’ human resource practices, but we do 
observe in our data all the wages within each software firm, which in turn reflect these 
practices. Our empirical analysis revolves around exploring the relationship between the 
variance of product market payoffs across different software firms and various 
dimensions of the wage structure.  
Left open is the question of what mechanisms firms with high variance product 
markets use to attract and retain stars. For example, firms could devote a lot of resources 
to selecting star workers carefully, or alternatively they could allocate more resources to 
training workers on the job and providing strong incentives that reward (and sort) star 
workers over time as they gain experience within the firm.47 The simple model above is 
silent about whether such firms will reward star workers though high initial wages or 
through sharply rising wage-tenure profiles (potentially via bonuses or stock options). 
However, our data permit us to make these distinctions, and we examine in our empirical 
analysis the specific nature and structure of the compensation schemes that firms adopt.  
2.4 Data 
In order to study the connection between the structure of firms’ product market 
strategies and skill demand, we require a dataset with detailed information on the 
earnings and employment histories of workers as well as on the product market 
characteristics of the firms at which these workers are employed. We take advantage of a 
                                                 
47 Additional ways that firms can reward star performers is by assigning them to the most desirable projects 
or by furnishing them with time to do their own publishable work. Stern (2004) shows that star scientists 
“pay” to be in more R&D intensive firms by accepting lower wages early in their careers.   
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unique employer-employee matched data set constructed and maintained by the U.S. 
Census Bureau’s LEHD Program. We further augment the LEHD data with highly 
detailed firm characteristics from the Economic Census and worker characteristics from 
the 2000 Decennial Census PUMS. 
2.4.1 The Software Industry 
We test the hypotheses of our model by focusing on the prepackaged software 
industry, which corresponds to the four-digit SIC 7372.48 This narrow focus has a number 
of key advantages. The first is the payoff structure across different product categories 
within the sector. In many software product lines, the payoff distribution is characterized 
by high variance, which the video game example in Table 2.2 vividly illustrates. As we 
show below in our results, in such product markets, there are substantial rewards to 
producing successful products.  
The second advantage of our focus on SIC 7372 is the close link between the firm 
and the product in the industry. Software firms in many product markets tend to be R&D 
intensive units with high variance payoffs to innovation. By contrast, many traditional 
industries, such as automobile manufacturing, while characterized by R&D intensive 
segments, are not innovative across the board. An additional related advantage of 
studying the software industry is the ability to trace directly the performance of its 
primary employees, including software developers and managers, and to link employee 
performance to the payoff structure of the firm. In other industries, the “knowledge” 
                                                 
48 The Census defines SIC 7372 as “establishments primarily engaged in designing and developing 
prepackaged software, including operating, utility, and applications programs. These establishments may 
also prepare software documentation for the user, install software for the user, and train the user in the use 
of the software. Establishments primarily engaged in buying and selling prepackaged software are 
classified in Wholesale or Retail Trade. Custom computer software services, including computer code 
authors, are classified in Industry 7371.” In the conversion to the new industry classification scheme, SIC 
7372 was split into NAICS 51121 (Software Publishing) and NAICS 334611 (Software Reproducing).   
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workers are a smaller component of total employment and have a less direct impact on 
the output of their employers. 
  A final advantage of studying software is the richness of the available data. In 
the Economic Census surveys it conducts every five years, the U.S. Census Bureau 
collects a broad array of information on firms that produce software. The data that the 
Census Bureau collects for the software industry include detailed product line 
information (described below), which we in turn use to construct a measure capturing the 
variation in the payoff structure by product. The Economic Census data also provide 
information on the size and age of firms, which may serve as important controls to the 
extent that these characteristics are correlated with product market strategies in the 
software industry.49 
2.4.2 The LEHD Data 
We derive data on software workers from a larger database created by the LEHD 
Program housed at the Census Bureau. The LEHD Program’s longitudinal wage database 
is based on the quarterly records of the employment and earnings of individuals from UI 
data, which is in turn matched to internal administrative records and surveys containing 
information on workers’ date of birth, race, and sex.50  
These data have several important advantages. First, since the scope of the LEHD 
data is nearly the full universe of employers and workers, we can accurately track the 
                                                 
49 We thank Ron Jarmin for sharing information on firm age with the LEHD Program for this project. 
50 Because of the sensitivity of these data, they are anonymized before they are used in any Census Bureau 
projects; all standard identifiers and names are stripped and replaced by a unique “Protected Identification 
Key.” Only Census Bureau employees or individuals who have Special Sworn Status are permitted to work 
with the data, and there are serious penalties for disclosing the identity of an individual or business. Any 
research must be for statistical purposes only, and must be reviewed by the Census Bureau and other data 
custodians. Under Title 13 of the U.S. code, any breach of confidentiality can result in prosecution in which 
violators are subject to a $250,000 fine and/or 5 years in jail.  
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movements of workers through the earnings distribution within firms as well as across 
firms over time.51 Second, in contrast to survey-based information, the earnings data 
represent the earnings that firms actually pay workers as opposed to workers’ memories 
of their earnings.  
A third key benefit of using these administrative data, particularly in the context 
of this study and the time frame we consider, is that the earnings measures include 
bonuses and exercised stock options (though not fringe benefits).52 Obviously, valuing 
stock options is quite difficult; in this case, the options are valued when they are 
exercised, or when the employee cashes in the options. We do not have data on when 
options are granted to employees. However, our sense is that the exercised options 
available in our data are the preferred measure of pay for our analysis, rather than options 
granted to employees. Indeed, as Oyer and Schaefer (2002) point out, it generally takes 
about four years for stock options to be fully vested. Further, as Russell (2005) notes, for 
a typical software company, options are worth nothing for an employee’s first two years, 
and then are vested at a rate of 2% per month for the remaining three years. Thus, the 
value of options that a given firm grants depends not only on whether an employee stays 
with the firm until the options are vested, but also on the growth of the stock price of the 
company.  
                                                 
51 There are important exceptions. Most federal employment as well as some agricultural and nonprofit 
employment is not covered. Independent contractors and self-employed individuals are also not covered.  
See Stevens (2002) for a full discussion of coverage issues. 
52 To our knowledge, no previous studies have included stock options data for such a wide range of workers 
across firms. The nature of our data permit us to exploit the fact that in most employment contracts, 
employees must exercise all options within 90 days of leaving the firm. We are able to track the earnings of 
employees for those 90 days and we can thus capture the value of all exercised options. For the laws 
surrounding the reporting of options, see the example from the California Employment Development 
Department at http://www.edd.ca.gov/taxrep/de231sk.pdf.  For an analysis of options granted and data 
available on option values, see Oyer and Schaeffer (2002). 
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It is important to emphasize that the LEHD data capture nearly the full universe of 
covered employers and workers; they are not merely a sample of software workers or 
firms. However, when we look at certain specific features of workers or firms in the 
software industry, our data set becomes a smaller sample of the population of workers 
and firms. Our basic universe of data follows 83,497 employment spells of workers who 
were employed in the software industry in ten states in the U.S. between approximately 
1992 and 2001 (the exact starting years vary by state). This length of time enables us to 
construct sufficiently long worker employment and earnings histories to address our 
research questions.  
Our primary results are based on two analytical datasets, one consisting of 51,589 
employment spells and one of 26,276 spells. These smaller samples are based on a 
number of restrictions aimed at isolating sets of firms and workers well suited to studying 
the precise connection between product market strategies and compensation policies. 
First, we limit the data to workers between the ages 21 and 44 in order to model the 
demand for a fairly homogeneous collection of individuals in the prime of their careers 
with similar educational vintages. This reduces the sample from 83,497 to 67,452.  
Second, we limit we limit our data to those software workers earning more than 
an annualized $50,000 (in 2001 dollars) at the end of their 1997 job spell. We focus on 
software industry spells that span 1997 because software firms in existence that year are 
most readily matched to the 1997 Economic Census. The rationale behind the earnings 
threshold is that LEHD data do not contain information on hours of work or occupation. 
Therefore, to limit the data to workers who are likely to be full-time and in more highly 
skilled occupations, we choose those making more than $50,000. We choose the precise 
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threshold based on a close analysis of the distribution of earnings within the relevant set 
of software occupations (programmers, developers, engineers, and managers) using 
PUMS data.53 Together, the age and earnings restrictions reduce the sample to 51,589 
spells.  
While we could successfully match most businesses in our sample of workers to 
the Economic Census for 1997, a smaller subset had complete information on firm size, 
age, sales, and detailed product lines. There are 26,276 spells for which we have 
complete information on firm characteristics as well as worker characteristics. All told, 
688 unique software firms appear in this sample.54  
Lastly, we construct a subset of data of employees in high-skilled professions 
based on occupational information in the 2000 Decennial Census confidential long-form 
survey records. For this sample, we limit our data to those individuals in the software 
industry whom we can successfully match to the long-form and whom we can identify as 
software engineers, developers, or managers (irrespective of earnings). We drop those 
workers in other occupations within the software industry. Because the Decennial Census 
is a one in six sample of the population in 2000, this sample consists of only 2,638 
workers. We use this dataset to check the robustness of our main findings, but due to its 
                                                 
53 The primary occupations on which we focused included Census industry occupation codes 100 
(Computer and Information Scientists, Research), 101 (Computer Programmers), and 102 (Computer 
Software Engineers, Applications and Systems Software), as well as 001-043 (managerial occupations). 
54 Throughout this chapter, when we refer to a firm, we are referring to a firm defined at the State Employer 
Identification Number (the SEIN, or UI account number), which is the unit of observation in the UI-Wage 
data. It is an 11-digit number used for reporting taxes at the state level.  For single-unit firms, this reflects 
the entire firm, but for multi-unit firms, the SEIN reflects activity of the firm within a given state.  We are 
able to match the workers to information in to the Economic Censuses since the UI files also include the 
federal Employer Identification Number (the EIN is on the ES-202 data that is part of the related 
administrative data system). The EIN is a nine-digit number assigned by Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
and used for federal tax purposes by employers, sole proprietors, corporations, partnerships, non-profit 
organizations, trusts, estates of decedents, government agencies, certain individuals, and other business 
entities. 
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small size and the confidentiality of the data, we refer to the results using this sample 
largely in footnotes in the empirical analysis. 
2.4.3 Measurement  
2.4.3.1 Earnings Levels and Growth  
As previously discussed, a major benefit of the LEHD data is that they are 
longitudinal in both workers and firms. In other words, the data have information about 
spells of employment with a firm and the associated earnings over long stretches of time. 
These unique data permit us to capture multiple facets of workers’ earnings profiles. In 
modeling the link between product markets and compensation, we use information on 
earnings levels for new and experienced workers within firms, workers’ earnings 
trajectories within firms, and earnings growth associated with transitions between firms. 
We focus on four measures of earnings levels in the empirical analysis. One 
measure is beginning-of-spell earnings, which corresponds to a given worker’s total 
earnings in the first full quarter of employment with an employer (with dollar values at 
annualized 2001 dollars).55 Beginning-of-spell earnings include the earnings of new hires 
as well as the earnings of left-censored job spells in our data.56 The next measure is end-
of-spell earnings, which represents a worker’s last full quarter of real annualized earnings 
in a given job spell. Our end-of-spell measure captures the earnings of workers leaving 
the firm as well as right-censored job spells, and it potentially contains exercised stock 
                                                 
55 Throughout the analysis, we use full-quarter earnings, which represent earnings for workers who have 
been employed by the same employer for a entire quarter; that is, it represents earnings for a worker whom 
we observe at a firm in quarter t, t-1, and t+1. While this does not rule out part-time work, it does rule out 
obviously truncated quarters.   
56 Sixteen percent of the beginning-of-spell earnings are censored.  
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options.57 Another measure, which is less likely to include exercised stock options, is 
earnings one year prior to the end of the spell (or starting earnings if the spell was less 
than one year long).58 Finally, for those workers for whom we observe a prior spell, we 
measure the level of earnings in the last full quarter of their prior jobs.  
We also use two measures of earnings growth. Earnings growth within the firm, 
or within-job earnings growth, is the difference between end-of-spell and beginning-of-
spell earnings.59 Between-job earnings growth is the difference between earnings in the 
first full quarter of a given worker’s new software job and the last full quarter of his or 
her prior job.60 
2.4.3.2 Product Market Payoff Dispersion  
Testing the main implications of our model requires estimates of the variance of 
the expected payoffs of projects in the product market(s) in which each firm operates. For 
the prepackaged software industry, the 1997 Economic Census delineates 30 detailed 
product lines, ranging from consumer game and entertainment software to business 
graphics design and layout software to vertical industry banking software to mainframe 
computer applications. Firms in the Economic Census are asked to provide data on their 
revenue for each of the 30 product lines, and we exploit this information in order to 
                                                 
57 Forty percent of the end-of-spell earnings are censored.  
58 Heath et al. (1999) find that while employees’ option exercise is concentrated toward the end of their 
tenures when their grants are on the cusp of cancellation, they are also positively related to previous short-
term stock returns.  
59 More specifically, within-job earnings growth is defined as log annualized end-of-spell earnings less log 
annualized beginning-of-spell earnings, divided by the number of full quarters that a worker was on the job. 
60 More specifically, between-job earnings growth is defined as log annualized beginning-of-spell earnings 
in the new job less log annualized end-of-spell earnings in the old job, divided by the number of full 
quarters between jobs. Clearly, between-job earnings growth is only defined for those individuals in the 
sample for whom we observe them in a job prior to their software job (i.e., those whose software jobs are 
not left censored and those who are not recent entrants or re-entrants into the labor market). 
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construct a firm-specific measure that reflects the variance of payoffs in each product 
category.  
We create each firm’s product payoff dispersion measure in two steps. First, for 
each of the 30 product classes, we calculate the 90-50 difference of the log of revenue per 
worker across all firms in SIC 7372 in the U.S. economy. Because some of these firms 
produce and sell multiple software products, we treat each product within each firm as 
though it were a separate revenue stream, assuming due to data limitations that revenue 
per worker is constant across product lines within each firm. Second, for each firm, we 
calculate payoff dispersion in the product markets in which it operates by weighting the 
product-specific 90-50 differences for the 30 products by the share of revenue that the 
firm derives from each product class. More specifically, we construct the firm-specific 
product payoff dispersion measure as 
 
product payoff dispersionj = ∑k=1 (revenue sharejk)(product revenue dispersionk) 
 
where revenue sharejk is the share of firm j’s revenue coming from product class k, for 
product classes k = 1, 2,…, 30. The dispersion specific to product k is captured in product 
revenue dispersionk. Again, we calculate the latter term as the 90-50 difference in log 
revenue per worker across all business entities in the software industry producing in 
product class k, where we treat each product class within each software firm as if it were 
its own independent entity.  
Values of the product revenue dispersion measure for the product lines with the 
greatest and least dispersion appear in Table 2.3. The results suggest that there is 
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substantial variation in the skewness of revenues across product classes, implying a high 
degree of heterogeneity in the degree of risk firms face in product markets even within 
the narrowly defined industry of software. Further, observed patterns of dispersion across 
different product lines are in line with expectations, with categories such as video games 
topping the list of product lines with high payoff dispersion and database and distribution 
software falling near the bottom. 
Table 2.3: Software Industry Product Line Revenue Dispersion 
SIC 7372 
Product Line Code  Product Line Description 
90-50 Ratio of Product 
Line Log Revenue per 
Worker 
Product Lines in Software with Greatest Potential Payoffs/Risks 
1122  Game and Entertainment Software  1.31 
1183  Networking Software  1.17 
1123  Home Productivity Software  1.03 
Product Lines in Software with Smallest Potential Payoffs/Risks 
1161  Banking and Finance Software  0.66 
1142  Distribution Software  0.57 
1184   Database Software  0.55 
Based on 1997 Economic Census data for a national sample of firms. 
 
There are several features of the firm-specific product payoff dispersion measure 
worth emphasizing. First, this variable reflects each firm’s actual product mix, not its 
actual revenue. That is, the payoff measure reflects the skewness of revenue per worker 
in the product class(es) in which the firm operates as opposed to its actual revenues per 
worker. Thus, a firm with a high product payoff dispersion measure is not necessarily a 
high or low performing business, but rather has a product mix with a more highly skewed 
distribution of potential payoffs. Also notably, we use the 90-50 difference as the 
measure of dispersion in a given product line because the 90-50 difference captures 
skewness specifically in the upper tail of the payoff distribution. While our model refers 
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to the variance of the entire distribution (the lower tail as well as the upper tail), we focus 
on the upper tail because we do not observe firms’ losses – revenues are truncated at 
zero. 
2.5 Empirical Approach 
The model in Section 2.3 implies that firms operating in product markets with 
highly dispersed payoffs will structure their compensation schemes in efforts to attract 
and retain more highly talented workers. Our core empirical specification for addressing 
the predictions of the model is based on the following wage equation: 
 
(1)  ln(wij) = Xiβ + Zjδ + ασjp + εij 
 
where wij is annualized earnings for worker i at firm j (measured at some observed point 
of the employment spell), Xi is a vector of worker controls, Zj is a vector of firm controls, 
σjp is the payoff dispersion or variance that firm j faces in its product market(s), and εij is 
an error term.  
Several issues are important to bear in mind in the empirical estimation of 
equation (1). First, as previously mentioned, our data include the wage histories for all 
workers who had job spells ongoing in the software industry in our sample in 1997. Also 
as previously noted, to focus on software programmers, engineers, and managers with 
similar educational vintages and at similar stages in their careers, we use workers who are 
between the ages of 21 and 44 and who earn at least $50,000 at the end of these ongoing 
spells.  
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In using this sample to estimate (1), we consider real annualized earnings 
observed at particular points in the job spell, including at the beginning of the spell, at the 
end of the spell, one year prior to the end of the spell, and at the end of the prior job spell. 
We control for right censoring and left censoring by including censoring dummies 
interacted with the full set of worker controls. The latter include quadratics in tenure in 
the job, tenure in the industry, and age, all of which are fully interacted with each other 
(as well as with the censoring dummies). While the set of worker controls is limited, 
restricting attention to 21-44 year-old workers earning at least $50,000 implies, as we 
previously discussed, that we are largely capturing individuals in the relevant educational 
and occupation categories. 
For the firm controls, we include for each firm a quadratic in (log) employment; 
dummies for age; its employment growth rate; and a dummy for whether it is in a high 
density, high education, and industrially diversified county. We also include in the firm 
controls log revenue per worker and the rate of worker churn. All firm variables 
measured in 1997. The size, age, and growth controls are intended to capture other 
factors that might influence the rent sharing with workers in an indirect manner, while 
log revenue per worker is included as a control to account directly for rent sharing 
associated with actual outcomes. Worker churn at a firm, which we measure as the 
worker accession rate plus the separation rate less the absolute value of net employment 
growth, acts a control for riskiness on the labor market side. We discuss the role of this 
control as well as other aspects of our specification that take different dimensions of risk 
into account below. 
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In the empirical analysis, we consider a number of alternative versions and 
refinements of the benchmark specification (1). One incorporates the idea that wages 
should be more sensitive to the firm’s payoff dispersion for more highly skilled workers. 
In the software industry, the top talent should command the highest premium in firms that 
operate in product markets with relatively high potential payoffs. By contrast, pay for 
low-wage workers should not be a function of the firm’s product payoff dispersion, as 
worker sorting in the lower echelons of the skill and earnings distributions is less 
relevant. We explore this idea by supplementing OLS results from estimating (1) with 
results using quantile regressions, hypothesizing that the impact of payoff variance 
should be greater at higher percentiles of the earnings distribution relative to lower 
percentiles, conditioning on other worker and firm characteristics.61 
Another refinement of the model involves a closer examination of the impact of 
more variance in potential payoffs on earnings growth as opposed to just earnings levels. 
There are a number of reasons why our current model would predict that firms in riskier 
product markets would offer high base pay that also rises sharply with tenure. Such firms 
might offer higher base pay because they value skills or talent more than other firms, and 
hence structure starting salaries so as to expand the pool of applicants and thereby ensure 
they can acquire the most talented people. Similarly, we would expect that pay should 
rise with tenure due to sorting; as in all matching models, the return to tenure would be 
high because firms both retain stars and pay them more over time. On the other hand, 
firms that place a high premium on talent would more readily fire workers who do not 
                                                 
61 As another example of this technique, Buchinsky (1994) shows that the returns to education are higher at 
high wage quantiles, while the returns to experience are lower at high wage quantiles. Also, Hallock et al. 
(2004) show that among CEOs, the sensitivity of wages to firm performance rises as one moves up the 
earnings distribution. 
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meet their standards given the severe consequences of poor choices with respect to 
project development.  
There are a number of other reasons to expect wages to increase with tenure 
among firms operating in riskier product markets. For one, firms in high-risk markets 
may invest more heavily in the human capital of their employees in light of the high 
returns to good project selection. Also, firms in high variance product markets may pay 
more for effort, in effect offering relatively steep incentive pay contracts.62 Variation 
across firms in different product lines in the importance of teamwork is another reason 
we might expect wages to rise over time differentially; if people are working in teams in 
which their skills are likely to be complementary with the other team members in some 
environments more than others, some employers may take longer to identify and reward 
individual talent. Lastly, whether because they want to preserve a team at least through a 
given product cycle, reduce churning, or provide incentives for effort, many software 
firms intentionally tie employees down by granting stock options that vest slowly. In 
sum, firms operating in product markets associated with greater risk likely pay more for 
loyalty, compensating their employees for staying more so than firms in less risky 
product markets. As previously discussed, we have at our disposal several different 
measures of earnings levels and earnings growth rates that we can use to disentangle 
these effects empirically. 
One concern is that a positive coefficient on σjp in (1) and the related 
specifications might simply reflect a compensating differential for risk rather than a firm 
strategy designed to attract and retain talented workers. The presence of such differentials 
                                                 
62 Case study evidence suggests that some firms offer such contracts. Russell (2005) finds that a larger 
percentage of a given workers’ pay is performance-based as the worker’s skill level rises. 
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would imply that firms operating in high variance product markets seeking to induce high 
performance among employees would offer incentive contracts that involve low base or 
starting salaries but high performance-based pay. Firms in lower risk markets, on the 
other hand, would be expected to offer higher base pay with little possibility for growth if 
the worker or company performs well.  
By contrast, our model states that firms operating in high variance product 
markets will want to select the highest quality workers, not necessarily those willing to 
shoulder the most risk. As a result, such firms will have higher starting salaries than firms 
in low-variance product markets. Hence, with starting salaries as the dependent variable, 
a positive coefficient on σjp in (1) and in the related specifications is likely to reflect a 
return to skills, not a return to risk taking.63 With earnings observed later in a given job 
spell as the dependent variable, though, a positive coefficient could at least in part reflect 
a return to risk taking (assuming the worker had taken a lower starting salary with the 
hope of future uncertain gains).64 Yet the inclusion in each specification of a control for 
worker churning at the firm, which one can interpret as a control for job security, 
                                                 
63 A firm’s losses could harm a worker if that worker is fired or the firm fails; in each case, a worker may 
suffer losses in earnings and sacrifice any accumulated firm-specific human capital. However, this too 
should produce a compensating risk differential for experienced workers, not for young workers who have 
yet to invest in firm-specific skills. Also, Russell (2005) finds that within the firm, pay levels, bonuses, and 
options are highly correlated across individuals, reflecting the fact that more able workers have higher pay 
of every kind than less skilled workers.  
64 Under some circumstances, we might expect there to be less incentive pay in firms operating in high 
variance product markets. Indeed, in a tournaments model of incentive pay, increasing the amount of noise 
or luck reduces the use of incentive pay (Lazear and Rosen 1981). In our model, variance in payoffs could 
arise in part from idiosyncratic shocks representing noise or luck, but it also arises because some firms hire 
more talented people who select more successful products and should have pay tied to performance. In the 
data, we cannot identify whether the variance in the payoff arises from luck or effort, but our model of 
innovation proposes that it is high skill that produces high payoffs, so the coefficient σjp should be positive 
as opposed to negative. Prendergast (2000, 2002) also points out that higher risk environments may have 
more performance-based pay because the cost of determining what inputs to monitor in such environments 
is greater. Since we cannot identify the source of the variance in payoffs and we do not have time-series 
data on product-specific variances or firm-specific variances, we turn to the data to determine the sign. For 
related empirical models of risk-pay incentive relationships, see Baker and Hall (2004), Core et al. (2003), 
Ittner et al. (2003), Murphy (1986), Schaefer (1998), and Wulf (2005). For excellent reviews of the 
literature on the subject, see Hallock and Murphy (1999) and Murphy (1999).   
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mitigates concerns that a positive coefficient on σjp might reflect merely a compensating 
risk differential. Moreover, we consider alternative specifications that exploit workers’ 
earnings on their prior jobs, reasoning that if firms are paying for talent rather than risk-
taking, it should be reflected in individuals’ earnings histories. 
2.6 Empirical Results 
2.6.1 Earnings Levels 
The wage regression results in Table 2.4 explore the relationship between 
software worker earnings levels and the riskiness of the product markets in which firms 
in the industry operate. Again, product market risk for each firm represents the revenue-
weighted 90-50 percentile difference in log revenue per worker across all firms that 
operate in the same product markets. We examine the impact of product payoff 
dispersion on mean earnings for software workers at various points in the job spell in the 
first column, then turn to an investigation of the impact at various percentiles of the 
earnings distribution in subsequent columns. 
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Table 2.4: Earnings Level Regression Results 
 OLS 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile
(a) End-of-Spell Earnings - "Experienced Earnings" 
Product Payoff Dispersion 0.3868 0.0537 0.1203 0.8279 1.0215 
  (0.0629)*** (0.0340) (0.0397)*** (0.0990)*** (0.1341)*** 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.1360 0.0349 0.0996 0.1906 0.2241 
  (0.0102)*** (0.0055)*** (0.0064)*** (0.0186)*** (0.0279)*** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  1.8940 0.5522 1.5728 2.1794 2.6960 
  (0.1974)*** (0.1209)*** (0.1247)*** (0.3175)*** (0.4204)*** 
R-Squared 0.26 0.05 0.09 0.31 0.37 
Number of Observations  26,276  26,276   26,276  26,276    26,276 
(b) Beginning-of-Spell Earnings - "Starting Salaries" 
Product Payoff Dispersion 0.0526 -0.1848 -0.0141 0.2129 0.3527 
  (0.0331) (0.0460)*** -0.0331 (0.0557)*** (0.0860)*** 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.0651 0.0399 0.0603 0.0578 0.0707 
  (0.0053)*** (0.0075)*** (0.0053)*** (0.0095)*** (0.0152)*** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  0.6201 0.3002 0.4667 1.6007 2.1551 
 (0.1029)*** (0.1499)** (0.1031)*** (0.1628)*** (0.2411)*** 
R-Squared 0.18 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.12 
Number of Observations  26,276  26,276   26,276  26,276    26,276 
 
   
 82
Table 2.4 (continued): Earnings Level Regression Results 
 OLS 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile
(c) End-of-Prior Spell Earnings  
Product Payoff Dispersion 0.1840 0.1145 0.1734 0.1406 0.1702 
  (0.0563)*** (0.1149) (0.0516)*** (0.0722)* (0.1072) 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.0520 0.0571 0.0470 0.0342 0.0380 
  (0.0103)*** (0.0208)*** (0.0094)*** (0.0123)*** (0.0177)** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  0.7319 0.1743 0.6640 1.8479 1.8208 
  (0.1911)*** (0.4089) (0.1754)*** (0.2278)*** (0.3238)*** 
R-Squared 0.28 0.22 0.15 0.14 0.13 
Number of Observations 10,803 10,803 10,803 10,803 10,803 
(d) Lagged (One Year) Earnings 
Product Payoff Dispersion 0.1312 -0.1674 -0.0759 0.4983 0.7846 
  (0.0518)** (0.0445)*** (0.0349)** (0.1001)*** (0.1512)*** 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.1035 0.0476 0.0805 0.1395 0.1353 
  (0.0084)*** (0.0069)*** (0.0057)*** (0.0184)*** (0.0300)*** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  1.6789 0.2986 1.4020 2.6819 3.1453 
  (0.1627)*** (0.1499)** (0.1097)*** (0.3194)*** (0.4971)*** 
R-Squared 0.17 0.07 0.08 0.17 0.22 
Number of Observations  26,276  26,276   26,276  26,276    26,276 
Worker controls include quadratics of tenure at job, tenure in industry, and age, fully interacted with each other and with appropriate left and 
right censoring dummies. Firm controls include a quadratic in (log) firm employment, dummies for firm age (<6 years, 6-10, 11+ years), the net 
employment growth rate, and a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density/high education/industrially diverse county. Controls also 
include time dummies for quarter of separation and/or quarter of accession as appropriate. 
R-Squareds for OLS regressions are unadjusted; R-Squareds for quantile regressions are one minus the sum of weighted deviations about the 
estimated quantile divided by the sum of weighted deviations about the raw quantile. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Based on LEHD data for ten states. 
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Looking first at the regression results in panel (a) of Table 2.4, it is clear that the 
product payoff dispersion variable has a very significant positive effect on end-of-spell 
(or experienced) earnings at the mean and at the top percentiles of the earnings 
distribution. A perusal of the columns of panel (a) suggests that the impact of the product 
payoff dispersion measure rises sharply with skill level, and indeed the differences 
between coefficients on product payoff dispersion at the lower and upper ends of the 
distribution are highly significant. For example, an F-test for the equivalence of the 10th 
and 90th percentile product payoff dispersion coefficients based on the full covariance 
matrix of the estimators from the simultaneous quantile regression (with estimates of 
variance obtained by bootstrapping) yields an F-statistic of 39, indicating that we can 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.65 In other words, software workers at the upper 
reaches of the earnings distribution gain the most from working at firms in product 







                                                 
65 Based on 50 bootstrap repetitions. A 95% confidence interval for the difference between the 90th 
percentile and the 10th percentile coefficient on product payoff dispersion is [0.53, 1.02]. While the 
differences between the coefficients at the 10th and 95th percentiles, the 50th and 90th percentiles, and the 
50th and 95th percentiles are also significant at the 1% level, the differences between the coefficients at the 
10th and 50th and the 90th and 95th are not. Varying the number of bootstrap repetitions has little effect on 
the standard error estimates, and estimates from the bootstrap model differ little from the analytic estimates 
we present in the tables. 
66 Hallock et al. (2004) point out that “higher ability managers [would have] higher pay for performance 
incentives than low ability managers” (7) due to the lower cost of effort for high ability managers.  
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Figure 2.3, which plots the coefficient on σjp at each percentile of the earnings 
distribution, illustrates the sharply increasing impact of product payoff dispersion for 
these experienced workers.  
Figure 2.3: Effects of Product Payoff Dispersion across the Earnings Distribution 
Experienced Earnings 
 
Worker controls include quadratics of tenure at job, tenure in industry, and age, fully interacted with each 
other and with appropriate left and right censoring dummies. Firm controls include a quadratic in (log) firm 
employment, dummies for firm age (<6 years, 6-10, 11+ years), the net employment growth rate, and a 
dummy for whether the firm is in a high density/high education/industrially diverse county. Controls also 
include time dummies for quarter of separation and/or quarter of accession as appropriate. 
Based on LEHD data for ten states. 
The magnitudes of the effects of product payoff dispersion in Table 2.4 and 
Figure 2.3 are sizable. Holding all other controls fixed and using the product line 
dispersion statistics from Table 2.3, workers at the 50th percentile employed at a firm 
producing a product with the highest payoff risk would have end-of-spell or experienced 
earnings that are 9% higher than if they were employed at a firm producing a product 
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with the lowest risk. This differential jumps to 63% at the 90th percentile, and further 
grows to 77% at the 95th percentile.67  
For beginning-of-spell earnings, results for which appear in panel (b) of Table 
2.4, the impact of the product payoff dispersion measure is positive (albeit not highly 
significant) at the mean. However, it is positive and significant at the 90th and 95th 
percentiles, suggesting that even among new hires, firms operating in product markets 
with greater variance in potential payoffs pay higher wages. This, in turn, implies that 
firms in the industry that face greater risk in the product market may be more actively 
seeking to select talented, highly skilled workers.68  
These results are consistent with not only the model in Section 2.3, but also 
extensive industry testimony that describes the software industry’s very careful and 
deliberate hiring practices, all aimed at identifying the right talent and reflecting the high-
commitment work environment of the industry (Hoch et al. 2000). Meanwhile, the results 
for starting salaries are not consistent with the notion that firms pay a compensating wage 
differential for risk taking among workers, in which case we would expect a negative as 
opposed to a positive coefficient on the dispersion measure. To the extent that we can 
interpret prior spell earnings as a proxy for skill, the results in panel (c) of Table 2.4 
further undermine the argument that compensating wage differentials are driving the 
                                                 
67 In interpreting the results in terms of magnitudes, it is important to emphasize that the reported effects 
from the quantile regressions yield the implied effect of the variable in question on the conditional quantile 
distribution. The conditional quantile distribution is the distribution of earnings taking into account all the 
other explanatory variables. Thus, the reported coefficients do not yield inferences about the impact of 
variables on the unconditional distribution of earnings.  For our purposes, the focus on the conditional 
distribution of earnings is appropriate since we are interested precisely in the impact of product payoff 
dispersion holding the impact of all other factors constant. For further discussion of these issues, see 
Buchinsky (1994). 
68 F-tests for beginning-of-spell earnings indicate that we can reject at the 1% level the equivalence of the 
product payoff dispersion coefficients at the 10th and 50th percentiles, the 10th and 90th percentiles, the 10th 
and 95th percentiles, the 50th and 90th percentiles, and the 50th and 95th percentiles. The difference between 
the coefficients at the 90th and 95th is not significant at the 1% level. 
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results and lend more support to our model; the positive coefficient on product payoff 
dispersion for prior spell earnings indicates that high-risk firms recruit the most skilled 
workers, not merely those willing to bear greater risk.  
A comparison of the results in Table 2.4 for experienced earnings (panel (a)) and 
for starting earnings (panel (b)) suggests that earnings are much more sensitive to product 
payoff dispersion for experienced workers than for new hires. Moreover, as the earnings 
figures in Table 2.1 suggest, rewards for experienced workers can be huge. Indeed, 10% 
of software workers earn more than $310,000 at the end of their spells. The very high 
compensation for experienced workers could reflect a number of factors, including higher 
marginal products (as in our model), a tournament reward structure, participation in a 
high-performance team, or improved selection of talented workers over time in the firm. 
We cannot distinguish among these alternatives with our data, but Russell (2005) 
provides very detailed evidence for one software company that suggests that all of these 
factors may enter the earnings of software workers.69 In any case, however, the individual 
who can create or select the best projects will have more skills and more incentive pay in 
firms with high product payoff dispersion.   
The regression results for experienced workers (panel (a) of Table 2.4) may be 
influenced by the inclusion of exercised stock options in the earnings measure. To test the 
sensitivity of our results to the inclusion of options and any other compensation that 
might only be realized at the end of workers’ job spells, we run an additional regression 
in which experienced earnings are redefined as those for people one year before they quit 
                                                 
69 All indications are that the firm in Russell’s (2005) study looks very much like the typical large firm in 
our data. The median age among workers is 33, and tenure ranges from 2.7 to 3.1 years over 1996 to 1999. 
About 65% of workers were in research and development and 30% were in management or administration. 
These figures are very consistent with the age, tenure, and occupational profile of the workers in our 
sample.  
   
 87
their job or prior to dropping out of our sample due to censoring. As the results in panel 
(d) of Table 2.4 reveal, although the point estimates of the impact are smaller than for 
end-of-spell earnings, the same basic results hold when we use lagged earnings as the 
dependent variable. Indeed, as one might expect, the coefficient estimates in panel (d) for 
product payoff dispersion at the mean and across the distribution fall squarely between 
those in panel (a) and (b), hinting at the extent to which earnings grow increasingly 
sensitive over time to the degree of risk firms face in their product markets. 
Several of the coefficients on the control variables in the regressions in Table 2.4 
are of interest in light of our model. First, consider the effect of firms’ actual revenues on 
the different earnings measures. The results in Table 2.4 show that, notwithstanding the 
earnings measure chosen, workers tend to earn more when their employers are 
successful; indeed, pay rises very significantly as a function of log revenue per 
employee.70 Additionally, the quantile analysis in panel (a) suggests that experienced 
high-wage workers are paid disproportionately more when their firms thrive. This should 
be interpreted as a firm fixed effect; firms that are highly productive in 1997 (when we 
measure firms’ revenues) pay more to workers in adjacent years as well.71  
Also of note in Table 2.4, we find that pay is increasing in the amount of worker 
churning at firms. As we discussed earlier, the inclusion of worker churning as a control 
                                                 
70 Using end-of-spell earnings, F-tests indicate that we can reject at the 1% level the equivalence of the log 
sales per worker coefficients at the 10th and 50th percentiles, the 10th and 90th percentiles, the 10th and 95th 
percentiles, the 50th and 90th percentiles, and the 50th and 95th percentiles. The difference between the 
coefficients at the 90th and 95th is not significant at the 1% level. 
71 In interpreting these results, it is useful again to emphasize that, while the product mix payoff risk 
measure varies across firms, it is not driven by the realized payoffs of the firm but rather the potential 
payoff distribution based upon the pool of firms with that product mix. This feature substantially mitigates 
concerns of contemporaneous endogeneity of the payoff mix measure. This payoff risk measure does 
reflect a choice by the firm (i.e., the choice of product mix), but this choice is likely made either at the 
founding of the firm or, at the very least, is made infrequently. After controlling for firm performance, the 
effects of the product market payoff remain unchanged, which should further reduce concerns about 
endogeneity.  
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helps to capture effects that may be associated with compensating differentials for risk 
taking, since turnover can be thought of as a proxy for job security. That the main results 
are robust to the inclusion of this control provides yet more evidence that our finding that 
greater product payoff dispersion is associated with higher earnings reflects firms’ efforts 
to attract and retain highly talented workers rather than to compensate for risk. 
In sum, the OLS and quantile regression results in panels (a) through (d) of Table 
2.4 indicate that software workers’ earnings are higher when their employers operate in 
high variance product markets. The results suggest that this relationship reflects more 
than merely rent sharing by high-risk firms that might be more successful, as we control 
for individual firm performance. Critically, workers at the upper end of the earnings 
distribution are rewarded disproportionately when their employers operate in high 
variance product markets and when their employers succeed by achieving high revenues. 
These results are robust to using different measures of earnings and, as we find in 
unreported regressions,72 to using different specifications with varying sets of control 
variables.73 
                                                 
72 In separate regressions, we include end-of-prior spell earnings as a control variable in the end-of-spell, 
beginning-of-spell, and lagged earnings level regressions. This specification sheds light on the extent to 
which firms are hiring the best workers as opposed to offering a different schedule of wages for workers 
with a given level of talent. The results indicate that, even controlling for talent as proxied by end-of-prior 
spell earnings, those firms in product markets characterized by higher risk in terms of potential payoffs to 
innovation reward talent and loyalty more highly. That is, the coefficients on the product payoff dispersion 
measure are qualitatively similar with the inclusion of end-of-prior spell earnings as an additional 
independent variable. 
73 Also in unreported regressions, we find that the results are robust to subsetting the data to look only at 
individuals for whom we can identify their occupation using Decennial Census data. While limiting the size 
of our sample substantially, integrating occupation data from the Decennial Census permits us to exclude 
workers other than programmers, engineers, and managers in software firms. For workers outside these 
occupations, such as administrative and sales staff, we might expect the link between project success and 
compensation to be weak. 
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2.6.2 Earnings Growth 
We next turn to examining the relationship between the nature of the product 
markets in which firms operate and the earnings growth workers experience both on the 
job and as they move between jobs. The main results on the impact of greater product 
payoff dispersion on within-job earnings growth are in line with the spirit of the model in 
Section 2.3 and echo the results using experienced earnings levels in Table 2.4. Indeed, as 
panel (a) of Table 2.5 reveals, within-job earnings growth rates rise sharply with the 
product payoff dispersion of firms, and the impact is greatest for workers at the highest 
earnings quantiles. For example, an F-test for the equivalence of the 10th and 90th 
percentile product payoff dispersion coefficients based on the full covariance matrix of 
the estimators from the simultaneous quantile regression yields an F-statistic of 55, 
indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level.74   
 
                                                 
74 F-tests for within-job earnings growth indicate that we can reject at the 1% level the equivalence of the 
product payoff dispersion coefficients at the 10th and 50th percentiles, the 10th and 90th percentiles, the 10th 
and 95th percentiles, the 50th and 90th percentiles, and the 50th and 95th percentiles. The difference between 
the coefficients at the 90th and 95th is not significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 2.5: Earnings Growth Regression Results 
 OLS 10th Percentile 50th Percentile 90th Percentile 95th Percentile
(a) Within-Job Earnings Growth 
Product Payoff Dispersion 0.0706 -0.0060 0.0481 0.1837 0.2074 
  (0.0120)*** (0.0073) (0.0065)*** (0.0191)*** (0.0227)*** 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.0102 -0.0058 0.0037 0.0340 0.0471 
  (0.0020)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0011)*** (0.0037)*** (0.0048)*** 
Firm Average Worker Churn  0.2283 0.1346 0.2489 0.3331 0.3824 
 (0.0379)*** (0.0225)*** (0.0205)*** (0.0668)*** (0.0845)*** 
R-Squared 0.16 0.07 0.08 0.23 0.28 
Number of Observations 26,276 26,276 26,276 26,276 26,276 
(b) Between-Job Earnings Growth 
Product Payoff Dispersion -0.2169 -0.2352 -0.1725 -0.2597 -0.2215 
  (0.0476)*** (0.0653)*** (0.0270)*** (0.0921)*** (0.1965) 
Log Revenue per Worker 0.0188 0.0367 0.0195 0.0080 -0.0221 
  (0.0087)** (0.0116)*** (0.0049)*** (0.0164) (0.0337) 
Firm Average Worker Churn  0.2146 -0.1877 0.2511 0.2766 0.1832 
 (0.1624) (0.2353) (0.0921)*** (0.3099) (0.6815) 
R-Squared 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.09 0.11 
Number of Observations  10,803  10,803  10,803  10,803  10,803 
Worker controls include quadratics of tenure at job, tenure in industry, and age, fully interacted with each other and with appropriate left and 
right censoring dummies. Firm controls include a quadratic in (log) firm employment, dummies for firm age (<6 years, 6-10, 11+ years), the net 
employment growth rate, and a dummy for whether the firm is in a high density/high education/industrially diverse county. Controls also 
include time dummies for quarter of separation and/or quarter of accession as appropriate. 
R-Squareds for OLS regressions are unadjusted; R-Squareds for quantile regressions are one minus the sum of weighted deviations about the 
estimated quantile divided by the sum of weighted deviations about the raw quantile. 
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Based on LEHD data for ten states. 
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By contrast, between-job earnings growth, results for which appear in panel (b) of 
Table 2.5, is not a function of the potential payoff of the firm. That is, while workers reap 
large returns in terms of earnings growth when they stay with firms that operate in 
product markets characterized by greater risk, the gains to job-hopping into such firms do 
not tend to be disproportionately large. For the median worker, the effect of product 
payoff dispersion for between-job earnings growth is actually negative and significant, 
though at higher earnings quantiles it is insignificant.75 Thus, though beginning-of-spell 
earnings are higher for individuals working in firms operating in high variance product 
classes (panel (a) of Table 2.4), these firms do not appear to be offering any higher 
starting salaries to workers relative to their past earnings than other firms in the 
industry.76  
To the extent that earnings on the prior job spell reflect workers’ innate and 
accumulated skills, these findings are consistent with our model. In order to attract 
talented workers, firms that operate in riskier product markets are willing to pay higher 
starting salaries, but tend to do so more often for more experienced workers who have 
been successful in the past and therefore have higher prior spell earnings.77  
Therefore, the results suggest that, while job-hopping for higher future earnings 
may be a common strategy, it is not the best short-term strategy for wage growth. In this 
sense, loyalty pays, as workers who stay with their employers tend to see stronger 
                                                 
75 F-tests for between-job earnings growth indicate that we cannot reject at the 1% level the equivalence of 
the product payoff dispersion coefficients between any pair of percentiles we present in panel (b) of Table 
2.5. 
76 The results for within-job and between-job earnings growth are qualitatively similar with the inclusion of 
end-of-prior spell earnings as an additional control variable. 
77 Since starting compensation does not include options granted, we may be underestimating the gains to 
job-hopping if software workers are moving between firms to achieve higher option grants. However, 
options granted are not yet compensation; an individual must typically stay with a firm four years to vest 
the options granted. Thus, even if options are granted with job change, the pay is only realized from within 
firm pay increases. 
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earnings gains over time. Moreover, the firms that reward loyalty the most are the very 
firms that operate in high-risk, and thus high potential payoff, product markets. We 
cannot assess precisely why loyal workers tend to reap the greatest rewards in firms in 
high-risk markets, and indeed the differential may arise due to factors ranging from 
variation across markets in the importance of teamwork, firm-specific human capital 
accumulation, monitoring costs, intellectual property protection, etc. In any case, the 
results make clear that loyalty in the software industry pays, and pays disproportionately 
among firms that face the riskiest product markets. Firms in these dynamic markets, 
therefore, structure compensation not only to select the most talented workers, but also to 
ensure they motivate and retain them.  
2.7 Conclusion 
The process of innovation in the U.S. economy is fundamentally dependent on 
employing and rewarding highly talented workers. This chapter highlights important 
relationships between the product market strategies and human resource practices of 
innovative firms. In particular, we show that software firms that operate in product 
markets with highly skewed returns to innovation, or high variance payoffs, are more 
likely to attract and pay for highly talented workers. Such firms do so first by paying 
more up-front in starting salaries to attract and motivate skilled employees, and second by 
rewarding talented workers handsomely for loyalty. These striking effects are robust to 
the inclusion of a wide range of controls for both worker and firm characteristics, 
including variables capturing rent-sharing opportunities and proxies for other types of 
risk.  
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Though we focus on the software industry, our model and findings should 
generalize to any industry in which firms employ knowledge workers and face 
uncertainty in the probability of success on any given project. Our results documenting a 
link between income variance and innovation also complement the literature on income 
inequality, changing skill demand, and economic growth. Recent research suggests that 
returns to skill have been increasing within as well as across occupations and industries, 
and furthermore that increases in earnings inequality in recent decades have been driven 
largely by changes in the upper as opposed to lower tail of the income distribution (Autor 
et al. 2003; Autor et al. 2005, 2006; Lemieux 2006b). Our results for the software 
industry speak to these broader patterns. We find that innovative high-technology firms 
pay a premium for talent, contributing to a highly skewed distribution of earnings. We 
cast this inequality in a positive light, showing how high variance in earnings goes hand-
in-hand with innovative activity in dynamic and risky markets. To the extent that these 
markets have been and will continue to be a source of growth in the economy, our 
research makes important contributions to our understanding of not only firm human 
resource practices and product market strategies, but also patterns of income inequality 
and economic development.    
 
 
   
 94
Chapter 3  
Decomposing the Sources of Earnings Inequality: Assessing the Role of 
Reallocation* 
3.1 Introduction 
Disentangling the sources of changes in earnings inequality has long been a 
challenge. The literature has provided both demand and supply side explanations, 
including, for example, skill-biased technological change, minimum wage adjustments, 
changes in workforce composition, and declines in unionization. Yet although wages are 
determined by the interaction of both firms and workers, most analytical work has been 
based on cross-sectional surveys of workers. As a result, little is known about the impact 
on the earnings distribution of changes over time in the types of firms and the allocation 
of workers across those firms.  
In this chapter, we begin to fill this gap in the literature by using matched 
administrative data that contain longitudinal information on workers as well as on the 
firms for which they work. Our empirical work not only complements earlier worker-
based studies that analyze changes in within group inequality by investigating within 
industry inequality, but also advances knowledge about the sources of changes in 
earnings inequality in several ways. First, it quantifies the impact of changes in 
workforce composition, particularly workforce skill and experience, on the earnings 
distribution by examining the reallocation of workers into and out of the workforce. 
                                                 
* This chapter draws on a joint paper with Fredrik Andersson, Elizabeth Davis, Julia Lane, Brian McCall, 
and L. Kristin Sandusky with the same title. The authors acknowledge helpful comments from Charlie 
Brown, David Card, Erica Groshen, and the participants of the labor lunch at the University of California-
Berkeley. 
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Second, it tracks the reallocation of workers across jobs to reveal the earnings impact of 
changing firm wage premia, which could be attributable to variation in degrees of 
unionization, compensating differentials, or rent-sharing. Finally, it studies the impact of 
firm entry and exit, and the resulting job allocation, on the earnings distribution, 
providing commensurate insight into the impact of changing production processes. 
Because our interest is primarily in understanding the impact of changes in firms and the 
allocation of workers across firms rather than on changing industry structure, we examine 
each major industry separately.  
In general, we find that there is no single “silver bullet” that explains changes in 
the earnings distribution in each industry. Even when the direction of change is similar 
across industries, the underlying contributing factors can be very different. Furthermore, 
even in industries in which overall inequality is trending in opposite directions, the 
influence of one set of factors can be consistently in the same direction.  
Not surprisingly given the extensive amounts of worker reallocation and firm 
reallocation that occur both between and within industries, we find that both types of 
reallocation have large effects on different parts of the earnings distribution. In particular, 
the entry and exit of firms and sorting of workers and firms based on underlying worker 
skills are important determinants of changes in industry earnings distributions over time.  
On the whole, new firms act to buttress earnings at the bottom end of the income 
distribution. However, at the same time, existing low-wage firms have expanded their 
share of employment of low-wage workers. The former result is consistent with the 
notion that new firms are more productive than old, while the latter is consistent with the 
fears of policymakers that there are fewer high-wage jobs available to low-wage workers. 
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Although our analysis focuses on the consequences of within-industry reallocation, these 
results suggest caution when searching for simple answers to questions raised by complex 
economic phenomena. 
The chapter is structured as follows. After a brief review of the literature and 
discussion of the data, we present some basic empirical facts about the changes in the 
earnings distribution in each industry sector. We then develop an econometric method for 
decomposing the sources of change in earnings distributions using employer-employee 
matched data. The remaining sections of the chapter describe the results of performing 
these decompositions and summarize the implications. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 Earnings Inequality 
Despite a vast literature that attempts to distinguish among the many possible 
sources of the increase in earnings inequality that occurred in recent decades in the U.S., 
there is still not complete consensus on its causes.78 A large number of researchers agree 
that the change was driven by skill-biased technical change interacting in complex ways 
with changes in unionization, management structure, and international trade (e.g., 
Acemoglu 2002). However, there is some disagreement about the relative importance of 
labor market versus institutional factors in driving changes in the earnings distribution. 
Some researchers, such as Lemieux (2006a), point to changes in the composition of the 
U.S. workforce as an important contributor to recent shifts in the distribution of earnings. 
Others point to structural changes; for example, Card and DiNardo (2002) argue that 
changes in the minimum wage and declines in unionization were the principal 
                                                 
78 For a recent survey of the wage inequality literature, see Autor and Katz (1999). 
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contributors to recent observed trends in inequality. Fortin and Lemieux (1997), 
meanwhile, highlight the impact of deregulation on changes in earnings inequality in the 
1980s, focusing on the transportation, communication, and banking industries. Levy and 
Murnane (1992) as well as Danziger and Gottschalk (1995) provide excellent summaries 
of research on possible causes of observed changes in earnings inequality.  
Notably, Autor et al. (2006) find that since the late 1980s, there has been a 
divergence in the change in wage inequality between the upper and lower halves of the 
wage distribution. The lower half of the distribution, as measured by the 50-10 difference 
in log wages, has changed little over time, while the upper half, as measured by the 90-50 
difference, has exhibited a steady widening. They further find that labor force 
compositional shifts have acted to increase wage inequality, with the impact being an 
offset to countervailing wage compression movements in the lower half of the 
distribution and a reinforcement of residual wage inequality increases in the upper half of 
the distribution. 
Nearly all of the empirical studies on wage inequality are limited to analyses of 
worker-based surveys, most notably the Current Population Survey (CPS). However, 
there is some evidence that suggests that changes in the distribution of wages may be due 
in part to changes on the firm side of the labor market. Bernard and Jensen (1998) find 
that increases in wage inequality across states are highly correlated with shifts in 
industrial composition, and in particular with the decline in manufacturing. Meanwhile, 
Burgess et al. (2001) observe marked differences in trends in earnings inequality across 
industries in Maryland. Other studies have also established the role of firm effects on 
wages and on wage inequality. For example, Davis and Haltiwanger (1991) find that firm 
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size is an important determinant of wages, and that wage inequality has shifted both 
among and within manufacturing plants. Also using longitudinal employee-employer 
matched data, Abowd et al. (1999) investigate the interaction between high-wage firms, 
or firms that seem to pay a wage premium or markup, and high-wage workers, or those 
who earn a more than we would expect given their observable characteristics, most likely 
as a return to unobserved skill.  
3.2.2 Worker and Firm Reallocation 
The approach we take in this chapter differs from that taken in most studies on 
changes over time in earnings inequality. Often, researchers seek to untangle the relative 
contribution of different factors on changes in inequality using a time series of cross-
sectional datasets. However, an important paper by Gottschalk and Moffitt (1994), which 
examines changes in earnings for individuals in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, 
decomposes earnings into a permanent and a temporary component and finds an 
important role for each. This implies that we cannot paint a complete picture of how 
changes in the earnings distribution arise without data that permit us to track individuals 
over time. Further, given the extent of firm reallocation in the economy as well as well-
documented relationships between industrial structure and earnings, access to information 
on the firms at which individuals are employed is also potentially critical in 
understanding changes in the distribution of wages. 
By exploiting longitudinal employee-employer matched data in this study, we can 
focus on the impacts of variation over time in the types of workers, the types of firms, 
and the sorting of firms and workers on changes in the earnings distribution. These 
results, in turn, can shed light on the relevance of different hypotheses regarding the 
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sources of changes in inequality. For example, changes in workforce composition that 
lead to an increasingly skilled workforce would be consistent with demand-side 
explanations such as skill-biased technological change. Similarly, firm entry and exit that 
lead to high premium firms replacing low premium firms can be linked to firm learning 
and selection of new technologies, and worker sorting effects can be tied to changes in 
the productivity of matches between individuals and firms (Jovanovic 1982, Ericson and 
Pakes 1995, Haltiwanger et al. 2007). Changing sectoral earnings inequality in low-wage 
and highly unionized industries would be consistent with hypotheses about the impact of 
institutional factors such as real minimum wages and changing unionization.  
There is strong evidence that there exist sufficient turbulence in workforce 
composition, in firm composition, and in the reallocation of workers to drive changes in 
industry earnings distributions over time. The potential to change even the most stable 
workforce at the firm level over a decade or more is quite substantial. Burgess et al. 
(2000) point out that after nine years, only 42% of workers are still employed by the 
same employer in non-manufacturing; in manufacturing, the percentage is an even lower 
32%. In addition, there is ample room for changing firm and industry structure to alter the 
economic landscape. Davis et al. (1996) document the large magnitude of job creation 
and destruction and highlight the dominance of idiosyncratic factors in accounting for the 
observed rapid pace of job reallocation. Meanwhile, Spletzer (2000) reports that 40% of 
new businesses die within three years of their birth, and that more than half of all jobs 
destroyed in a three-year period are due to the death of establishments. Recent work, 
including, for example, Foster et al. (2005), also suggests that in the course of this 
reallocation, more productive firms tend to replace less productive ones. 
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3.3 Data 
A database created and maintained by the Longitudinal Employer and Household 
Dynamics (LEHD) Program at the U.S. Census Bureau makes our approach to 
decomposing the sources of changes in earnings inequality over time possible. These data 
enable us to match workers with past and present employers, together with employer and 
worker characteristics. This database consists of quarterly records of the employment and 
earnings of almost all individuals from the unemployment insurance (UI) systems of a 
number of U.S. states in the 1990s.79  
These data have been extensively described elsewhere (Abowd et al. 2004), but it 
is worth noting several advantages they hold over household-based survey data. The data 
are current, and the dataset is extremely large. Since the scope of the data is nearly the 
universe of employers and workers in the covered private sector, it is possible to trace the 
movements of workers across earnings categories and across employers.80 The UI records 
have also been matched to internal Census survey data and other administrative records 
to obtain basic demographic information including workers’ date of birth, place of birth, 
race, and gender.  
Of particular importance given the focus of this study is the reasonably accurate 
reporting of both earnings and industry. A recent paper by Hirsch and Schumacher (2004) 
points out that as many of 30% of respondents to the CPS do not respond to income 
questions, and consequently have imputed income information. In the LEHD data, 
earnings are very accurately reported since there are financial penalties for firms for 
                                                 
79 Because of the sensitivity of these data, the records are anonymized before they are used in any Census 
Bureau projects. Any research that is engaged in must be for statistical purposes only, and under Title 13 of 
the U.S. code, any breach of confidentiality can result in prosecution in which violators are subject to a 
$250,000 fine and/or five years in jail.  
80 Stevens (2002) describes coverage issues related to the LEHD database. 
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misreporting. In addition, there is substantial internal evidence from the LEHD Program 
that not only do workers often misreport earnings, but also that they do not correctly 
identify their industry, even at the major sector level (Decressin et al. 2006).81  
Because almost all jobs in the covered private sector workforce appear in the 
LEHD dataset, we can analyze two different facets of the labor market, jobs and 
employment. The two differ to the extent that there is multiple job holding as well as to 
the extent that there is constant churning of workers through different sets of jobs. When 
we use workers as the unit of analysis, we typically describe their employment with their 
main (or dominant) employer over the year, and characterize that employer’s industry, 
size, and turnover rates.82  
Since we do not observe hours worked in the data but instead only observe 
quarters worked, we use log real annualized earnings as our primary measure of earnings. 
This measure represents, for each worker, the full-time, full-year earnings equivalent of 
the quarterly earnings information in the UI data, adjusted for discontinuities in labor 
market attachment during the year.83 The final dataset includes year and sector specific 
                                                 
81 See Bound and Krueger (1991) and Bound et al. (2001) for further discussion of measurement error in 
longitudinal data. 
82 A worker’s dominant employer is the SEIN (state employer identification number, which represents the 
state UI administrative unit) that contributes the most to the worker’s earnings in each year. Thus, each 
worker employed during a year has one (and only one) dominant employer that year.  
83 More specifically, in order to calculate log real annualized earnings, we first define full-quarter 
employment in quarter t as having an employment history with positive earnings for quarters t-1, t, and t+1. 
Continuous employment during quarter t means having an employment history with positive earnings for 
either t-1 and t or t and t+1. Employment spells that are neither full quarter nor continuous are designated 
discontinuous. If the individual was full-quarter employed for at least one quarter at the dominant 
employer, the annualized wage is computed as four times average full-quarter earnings at that employer 
(total full-quarter earnings divided by the number of full quarters worked). Otherwise, if the individual was 
continuously employed for at least one quarter at the dominant employer, the annualized wage is average 
earnings in all continuous quarters of employment at the dominant employer multiplied by eight (i.e., four 
quarters divided by expected employment duration during the continuous quarters of 0.5). For the 
remaining small number of observations, annualized wages are average earnings in each quarter multiplied 
by 12 (i.e., four quarters divided by an expected employment duration during discontinuous quarters of 
0.33). For additional definitions and details, see Abowd et al. (2002). 
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earnings statistics for workers whom we have identified as having a dominant employer 
that year, whom we impute to work full time that year, whom we have identified as likely 
working at the end of the first quarter that year, and who have (real) earnings of at least 
$250 in at least one quarter of the year.84 
The LEHD database also includes new measures of human capital that we 
actively exploit in our analysis. Standard measures of human capital such as education 
and experience do not capture important variation across individuals in underlying ability 
and other unobserved factors that could affect earnings. Moreover, work by Juhn et al. 
(1993) demonstrates that a major contribution to increased earnings inequality in the 
1980s was an increase in returns to “unmeasured” characteristics, such as interpersonal 
skills. The LEHD dataset permits the quantification of the value of these measures, 
although not permitting a decomposition of the sources (Abowd et al. 1999, Abowd et al. 
2002). This is achieved by capturing the portable component of individual earnings, or 
that component that belongs to an individual as he moves from job to job in the labor 
market and that is separate from the type of firm for which he works.  
Our chosen measure of human capital combines two elements, one associated 
with unobservable individual time invariant heterogeneity and one associated with time 
varying experience. In interpreting the human capital measure, several remarks should be 
made. First, the human capital measure is not simply a ranking of the wage of the worker, 
                                                 
84 We restrict attention to full-time workers, using data from the CPS in combination with LEHD state data 
to impute whether or not a worker is employed full time in each year at his dominant job. In addition, since 
the distribution of workers employed in a sector at a particular point in time may differ substantially from 
the distribution of all workers working in the sector at any time during the year, we obtain a “snapshot” of 
the earnings and human capital distribution in each sector by identifying those workers most likely working 
at a certain point in time, which we chose to be the end of quarter one of each year. This timing is 
consistent with the timing of the employment count reported by businesses in the Economic Census and 
other business surveys. For more discussion of imputation methods and restrictions on LEHD samples, see 
Abowd et al. (2006). 
   
 103
precisely because wages include both person and firm effects. Second, the measure will 
reflect the influence of any time-invariant personal characteristics, including unobserved 
dimensions of skill as well as observed accumulated skill correlates such as educational 
level.  
At the same time, our measure of human capital abstracts from firm effects that 
may be present in measures based upon observable characteristics. Indeed, it will not 
reflect either firm-specific human capital or match effects, which we evaluate separately 
in our analysis. The firm effect literally captures the extent to which the firm to which the 
worker is attached pays above or below average wages (after controlling for person 
effects), and may reflect many factors including rent sharing, firm-specific human capital, 
compensating differentials, or unionization effects (Abowd et al. 2002, Andersson et al. 
2005). Match effects, meanwhile, reflect changes in the joint distribution of unobserved 
worker attributes and firm pay policy, or the sorting of workers and firms. 
In order to analyze the widest possible time interval (1992-2003) as well as to 
ensure computational feasibility given the large number of records in the data, we restrict 
our attention to four U.S. states, incorporating data from California, Illinois, Maryland, 
and North Carolina. In 2003, these four states accounted for approximately 21% of U.S. 
employment.85 
                                                 
85 The fraction was computed using data from the CPS’s Monthly Outgoing Rotation Group for 2003.  
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3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
3.4.1 Changes in Earnings Inequality 
 We use the 1992-2003 difference in log real wages at different percentiles to 
illustrate changes in earnings distributions across industry sectors.86 Table 3.1 shows for 
2003 the 90th, 50th (median), and 10th percentile of earnings by sector as well as the 90-
10, 90-50, and 50-10 log wage differences by sector. An examination of the first three 
columns of Table 3.1 reveals that there are substantial earnings differences across 
industries. For example, median earnings are over twice as high in mining as in 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry. The highest 90th percentile earnings are in the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector, while the lowest 10th percentile earnings are in the retail 
trade sector. The distribution of earnings also varies across sectors, particularly at the 
upper end. The 90-10 log wage gap in 2003 is largest in services, but is also very high in 
finance, insurance, and real estate; wholesale; retail; and manufacturing. These same five 
industries also had the highest 90-50 log wage differences in 2003. In contrast, inequality 
at the lower end of the earnings distribution does not vary as much across industries, 
though services had the largest 50-10 log wage difference.  
                                                 
86 We use the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) to identify industry sectors and omit the public 
sector.  
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Table 3.1: Earnings Levels, Differences, and Changes by Sector 
1992-2003 




















Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry  $44,149 $19,234 $9,126  1.58 -0.14  0.83 -0.02  0.75 -0.12
Mining  $82,705 $45,879 $22,427  1.30 -0.09  0.59 -0.06  0.72 -0.03
Construction  $73,174 $34,181 $14,831  1.60 -0.12  0.76 -0.01  0.83 -0.11
Manufacturing  $90,650 $34,176 $15,183  1.79 0.13  0.98 0.16  0.81 -0.02
Transportation & Communication  $82,987 $39,597 $15,959  1.65 0.13  0.74 0.12  0.91 0.01
Wholesale  $96,084 $34,852 $15,307  1.84 0.11  1.01 0.12  0.82 0.00
Retail  $51,404 $19,820 $8,512  1.80 -0.05  0.95 0.01  0.85 -0.06
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  $114,428 $37,083 $16,244  1.95 0.18  1.13 0.15  0.83 0.03
Services  $83,079 $31,346 $11,523  1.98 0.05  0.97 0.08  1.00 -0.03
All Sectors  $82,207 $31,477 $11,992  1.93 0.06  0.96 0.10  0.97 -0.03
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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Figure 3.1 depicts empirical estimates of the cumulative distribution functions of 
annualized earnings for all sectors and, as expected, shows a rightward shift from 1992 to 
2003. 
Figure 3.1: Log Earnings Cumulative Distributions 













6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
Log Earnings 
1992 2003 
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
 
When we repeat the same exercise on an industry-by-industry basis (not shown), we find 
that although the direction of change is the same for each industry, the most marked 
rightward shifts were in the agriculture, fishing, and forestry sector and in the finance, 
insurance, and real estate sector. Other sectors, including manufacturing, transportation 
and communication, and wholesale, had only modest shifts, but each had a tendency 
toward increasing inequality (a larger shift right at the top of the distribution). The most 
remarkable result, however, was the lack of volatility over time in the earnings 
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distributions, which is especially notable given the dramatic changes in the 
macroeconomic environment that took place over the 1992-2003 period. 
The overall rightward shift was not by the same amount at all points of the 
earnings distribution in each industry, as once again evidenced in Table 3.1. In fact, 
overall earnings inequality, which from here on we measure by the 90-10 log wage 
difference, declined in four industries, including agriculture, fishing, and forestry; 
mining; construction; and retail trade. By contrast, earnings inequality increased in five 
industries, including manufacturing; transportation and communication; wholesale; 
finance, insurance, and real estate; and services.  
In three of the four industries in which overall inequality declined, much if not all 
of the decrease was in the lower half of the earnings distribution (as measured by the 50-
10 log wage gap). Only in mining was there a notable decline in the upper half of the 
distribution (the 90-50 log difference). In contrast, lower-tail earnings inequality did not 
increase in the five industries in which overall inequality increased. The increase in 
earnings inequality in manufacturing; transportation and communication; wholesale; 
finance, insurance, and real estate; and services occurred in the upper tail of the earnings 
distribution. The distance between the 90th and 50th percentiles increased in these six 
industries, while the 50-10 log difference stayed about the same or decreased slightly. 
These results corroborate the findings of Autor et al. (2006), who show using CPS data 
that economy-wide, the 90-50 wage gap grew through the 1990s while the 50-10 
difference leveled off after about 1987. However, here we also see differences in trends 
in upper and lower tail inequality across sectors.  
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To compare the changes observed in our four-state LEHD data with the U.S. labor 
market as a whole, we compute estimates of the log real weekly earnings percentiles for 
1992 and 2003 for all workers using data from the Monthly Outgoing Rotation Groups of 
the CPS (CPS-MORG). We provide these estimates in Table 3.2, panel (a). Panel (b) of 
Table 3.2 presents similar statistics from the CPS-MORG when the samples are limited to 
the same four states we use in our LEHD analyses. As one can see from the two tables, 
the estimated change in the 90-10 difference between 1992 and 2003 was somewhat 
higher for the full-sample CPS-MORG data (0.09) as compared to the LEHD data (0.06). 
The estimated change in the 90-50 difference for the LEHD data was higher than the 
CPS-MORG data (0.09 for LEHD versus 0.06 for CPS-MORG). The estimated change in 
the 50-10 difference, however, was substantially lower for the LEHD data (-0.03 for 
LEHD versus 0.03 for CPS-MORG). As a comparison of Table 3.1 and panel (b) of 
Table 3.2 reveals, though, the differences are in large part attributable to the fact that the 
LEHD data contain only four states. 
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Table 3.2: Weekly CPS Earnings Differences and Changes by Sector 
1992-2003 
   
90-10 Log Wage 
Difference  
90-50 Log Wage 
Difference   
50-10 Log Wage 
Difference 
Sector  2003 
Change 
from 
1992  2003 
Change 
from 




(a) All States 
    
Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry  1.46 0.00  0.79 0.07   0.67 -0.06
Mining  1.34 -0.12  0.66 -0.10   0.68 -0.02
Construction  1.42 0.04  0.73 0.06   0.69 -0.02
Manufacturing  1.51 0.04  0.84 0.07   0.67 0.14
Transportation & Communication  1.57 0.19  0.72 0.13   0.85 0.06
Wholesale  1.59 0.07  0.82 0.01   0.77 0.06
Retail  1.88 0.04  0.91 -0.01   0.97 0.04
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  1.75 0.14  0.96 0.12   0.78 0.02
Services  1.97 0.05  0.92 0.04   1.05 0.00
All Sectors  1.86 0.09  0.89 0.06   0.97 0.03
(b) Four States (CA, IL, MD, and NC) 
Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry  1.46 0.22  0.97 0.24   0.49 -0.02
Mining  1.38 0.04  0.96 0.31   0.43 -0.27
Construction  1.46 -0.02  0.75 0.10   0.71 -0.11
Manufacturing  1.69 0.13  0.97 0.17   0.72 -0.05
Transportation & Communication  1.63 0.36  0.74 0.20   0.89 0.16
Wholesale  1.63 0.13  0.87 0.13   0.76 0.01
Retail  1.89 0.03  0.96 0.02   0.93 0.01
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  1.78 0.08  0.95 0.12   0.83 -0.04
Services  2.01 0.04  0.95 0.03   1.06 0.01
All Sectors  1.87 0.05  0.92 0.04   0.95 0.01
Weighted using CPS earnings weights. Based on CPS-MORG data 
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3.4.2 Changes in Workforce Composition 
One possible reason for these changes in the earnings distribution is that 
workforce characteristics have changed over time. That there is potential for such 
changes to occur as a result of workforce composition variation is evident from an 
examination of Table 3.3, which documents patterns of worker mobility in the sample by 
sector. 
Table 3.3: Worker Mobility by Sector 
1992-2003 
    





Pairs in 1992 
and 2003  
in 1992,  
not 2003
in 2003,  
not 1992 
in 1992  
and 2003
Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry 578,036  39% 48% 13%
Mining  67,888  56% 29% 14%
Construction  1,511,595  32% 53% 14%
Manufacturing  5,145,894  44% 35% 21%
Transportation & Communication 1,775,581  37% 44% 19%
Wholesale  2,006,918  41% 47% 12%
Retail  4,214,151  39% 49% 12%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate  2,101,998  36% 47% 17%
Services  10,196,180  31% 51% 18%
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
  
In manufacturing, for example, of the more than five million workers who were 
employed in either 1992, 2003, or both years, over 40% were only in the industry in 
1992, 35% were only in the industry in 2003, and only 21% were in the industry in both 
years. As one might expect, churn in the workforce is even more marked in the retail 
industry, where 39% of workers only appeared in the data in 1992, almost half only 
appeared in 2003, and fewer than 12% appeared in both years. 
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Table 3.4 shows that this mobility did not translate into enormous swings in the 
age, gender, and skill distributions of workers, although there were some dramatic 
changes in the allocation of workers across sectors. In particular, as services expanded, 
the mining and manufacturing sectors shrank markedly. In the meantime, both mining 
and manufacturing, which have historically been predominantly male and skewed toward 
older workers, remained so in the wake of subtle shifts in industry demographics between 
1992 and 2003. Industries such as finance, insurance, and real estate as well as services, 
which had more females and younger workers at the start of the 1990s, also saw only 
minor shifts in their overall demographic profiles over the sample period. Although the 
skill level of the workforce increased in all industries between 1992 and 2003 (using both 
the overall measure of human capital, which includes experience, and the individual fixed 
effect, which does not), the swings were not substantial.  
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Table 3.4: Changes in Workforce Composition by Sector 
1992-2003 
     Change Between 1992 and 2003 in 






Sector   
Employment 





Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry 300,709  17%  -7%  -6%   1%  5%  0.17  0.05
Mining   48,063  -39%  2%  0%   -11%  10%  0.11  0.08
Construction   704,268  46%  -1%  -5%   1%  4%  0.10  0.03
Manufacturing   3,357,441  -14%  2%  -7%   -1%  7%  0.17  0.06
Transportation & Communication 991,212  14%  2%  -3%   -4%  7%  0.09  0.06
Wholesale   1,066,376  11%  0%  -7%   0%  7%  0.13  0.06
Retail   2,138,239  20%  0%  -5%   1%  4%  0.12  0.04
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate   1,111,889  21%  3%  -5%   -1%  6%  0.14  0.05
Services   4,998,570  41%  0%  -4%   -4%  7%  0.08  0.06
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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3.4.3 Changes in Firm Characteristics 
Another possible reason for changes in earnings inequality is changes in the types 
of firms that are hiring workers. We examine this possibility in Table 3.5, which can be 
read in the same way as Table 3.3. In manufacturing, for example, of the more than 
100,000 unique firms that employed individuals in either 1992, 2003, or both years, 36% 
were only in the industry in 1992, 37% were only in the industry in 2003, and only 27% 
were there in both years. The rates are even lower in industries with more small firms; in 
retail trade, for example, 40% were only in the industry in 1992, 41% were only in the 
industry in 2003, and about 20% were in the industry in both years. While industry 
differences exist, all industries had high rates of firm entry and exit over the 1992-2003 
period. 
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Table 3.5: Firm Entry and Exit Rates by Sector 
1992-2003 
     Entrants  Exiters  Continuers 















Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry 50,825   32% -0.28   39% -0.23   29% -0.23
Mining   2,135   45% 0.38   35% 0.28   20% 0.35
Construction   155,195   33% 0.02   45% 0.05   22% 0.10
Manufacturing   107,200   36% 0.20   37% 0.15   27% 0.18
Transportation & Communication 56,355   35% 0.18   45% 0.16   20% 0.21
Wholesale   143,414   36% 0.11   43% 0.12   21% 0.11
Retail   263,093   40% -0.23   41% -0.24   20% -0.22
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 120,763   33% 0.13   46% 0.20   22% 0.13
Services   686,606   31% 0.05   49% 0.04   19% 0.01
* Means are employment weighted. 
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD and NC. 
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3.4.4 Changes in Assortative Matching 
Changes in the joint distribution of employee human capital and firm pay levels 
over time constitute another possible source of change in earnings distributions. Suppose 
we estimate a linear panel data model with fixed firm and individual effects such as that 
described in Abowd et al. (1999),   
  
( , )it i j i t ity θ ψ ε= + + +itx β   
 
where ity  are individual i's earnings at time t, xit is a vector of observed productivity 
measures of individual i at time t, iθ  is an individual fixed effect that measures an 
individual’s unobserved productivity or human capital and ( , )j i tψ  the fixed effect of the 
firm that individual i works for at time t and measures a firm’s pay policy. Then changes 
in the distribution of earnings may be due to changes in the joint distribution of θ  andψ . 
For example, over time it may be the case that high θ  individuals are more likely to work 
at high ψ  firms and low θ  individuals are more likely to work at lowψ  firms, which 
would tend to increase earnings inequality.  
Using the estimated values of θ  and ψ  from this model, Figure 3.2 plots the joint 
distributions of θ  and ψ  for 1992 and 2003.87  
                                                 
87 The estimates include age variables as controls. 
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Figure 3.2: Joint Distribution of Worker Human Capital (theta) and Firm Pay Policy (psi) 
Match 
1992 and 2003, All Sectors 
 
1992 2003 







As Figure 3.2 reveals, between 1992 and 2003, the likelihood of a low θ  individual being 
attached to a high ψ  firm declined. That is, individuals with low skill levels were less 
likely in 2003 than 1992 to be paired with firms with high pay policies, which could be 
construed as evidence of increasing positive assortative matching.  
Figure 3.3 displays the expected values of θ  by quantile groups of ψ  for 1992 
and 2003. This figure clearly shows that there has been a large upward shift between 
1992 and 2003 in the expected value of θ  for the highestψ  group of firms. Based solely 
upon Figure 3.3, however, we cannot determine whether this shift is a result of entry and 
exit of different types of firms and workers or is due to a reshuffling of worker-firm 
matches. 
   
 117
Figure 3.3: Expected Value of Worker Human Capital (theta) by Percentile of Firm Pay 
Policy (psi) 












Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC.  
Percentiles of theta and psi are measured as deviations from year means. 







Indeed, although these descriptive statistics hint at the potential for worker and 
job reallocation to affect earnings inequality, they report average effects for all firms and 
workers in the industry. To investigate the trends in inequality further, in the next section 
we develop an econometric approach to examine different points of the earnings 
distribution. 
3.5 Decomposition Methodology  
In this section, we develop econometric methods for decomposing changes in 
earnings distributions using employer-employee matched panel data. For ease of 
exposition in describing the earnings decomposition methodology, we initially assume 
that we have only one continuous exogenous predictor variable, x. Let θ  be a variable 
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representing an individual’s (unobserved) productivity, which is assumed to be constant 
over time. Further, let ψ  represent a firm’s (unobserved) pay policy variable, which is 
also assumed to be constant over time. We furthermore assume that an individual’s 
earnings are determined by the function ( , , , )y g xε θ ψ= , where ε  is a random error 
component that is independent of x,θ , and ψ . 
Again for expositional simplicity, we assume that the variables x, θ , ψ , and 
ε have a continuous joint probability density function ft for each time period, t = 1, 2.  
 
(1) d ( , , , ) ( , , , )dtt tP x f xε θ ψ ε θ ψ=       
    
One important facet of the data is the fact that between the two time periods, within an 
industry firms can be created or destroyed and workers may enter or exit. Thus, for both 
firms and workers, there are stayers (s), leavers (l), and new entrants (n). Therefore, we 
can rewrite the joint distribution in (1) at time 1 as a mixture of these worker-firm types, 
 
(2) 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
ss ls
sl ll
f x p s s f x p l s f x
p s l f x p l l f x
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
= + +
+
     
   
where p1(w=s, f=s) is the fraction of worker-firm matches where both firm and worker 
remain in the industry until time 2, p1(w=l, f=s) is the fraction of worker-firm matches 
where the firm remains in the industry until time 2 but the worker leaves, p1(w=s, f=l) is 
the fraction of worker-firm matches where the worker remains in the industry until time 2 
but the firm leaves, and p1(w=l, f=l) is the fraction of worker-firm matches where both 
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the worker and firm leave by time 2. The distributions 1 ( , , , )
ssf xε θ ψ , 1 ( , , , )
lsf xε θ ψ , 
1 ( , , , )
slf xε θ ψ , and 1 ( , , , )
llf xε θ ψ  are the analogous conditional distributions. On the 
other hand, the joint distribution in (1) at time 2 as can be written as  
 
(3) 2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
ss ns
sn nn
f x p s s f x p n s f x
p s n f x p n n f x
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
= + +
+
.    
 
where n indicates new entrants into the industry between time 1 and time 2. 
The order of the sequential decomposition may differ. Here, we first analyze the 
extent to which worker entry and exit has changed the earnings distribution by 
considering the counterfactual earnings distribution that would have arisen had there been 




2 2 1 1 2 2(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )( , , , )
ss ls sn
w p s s f x p l s f x p s n f xf x
R
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψε θ ψ + +=  
 
where 2 1 2(w= , f= ) (w= , f= )+ (w= , f= ).R p s s p l s p s n= +  In this case, we have assumed 
that, had those individuals who left the sector actually stayed, they would have matched 
with firms in a manner analogous to the distribution of workers who actually left those 
firms that stayed in the industry. Next, we consider the impact of the change in the 
distribution of x. Here, we note that, for example, 2 2 2( , , , ) ( , , | ) ( )
ss ssf x f x f xε θ ψ ε θ ψ≡ , 
and replace 2 ( )f x  by 1( )f x . This yields the following expression: 
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(5)  , 12 2 1 2
2
( )( , , , ) ( , , | ) ( ) ( , , , ) ( )
ss x ss ss f xf x f x f x f x f xε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψ









, 2 2 1 1 2 2(w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )( , , , )
ss x ls x sn x
w x p s s f x p l s f x p s n f xf x
R
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψε θ ψ + +=   
 
Next, we evaluate the impact of firm entry and exit by considering the counterfactual that 




, , , , ,
1 2 1 1 1 1( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , ) (w= , f= ) ( , , , )
w x e ss x ls x ll xf x p s s f x p l s f x p l l f xε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψ ε θ ψ= + +  
¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯Ř¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯¯ 
  
Finally, after we have restricted the set of firms and workers to be the same as in time 1, 
it is still possible to examine how the distribution of θ  given ψ  may have changed 




, , , , , ,
2 2 2
, , , ,
2 2 1
( , , , ) ( , , , | , ) ( , )
( , , , | , ) ( | ) ( )
w x e w x e w x e
w x e w x e
f x f x f
f x f f
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ θ ψ θ ψ
ε θ ψ θ ψ θ ψ ψ
≡
=
    
    
so we can define  
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(9) , , , , , , ,2 2 1 1( , , , ) ( , , , | , ) ( | ) ( )
w x e a w x e w x ef x f x f fε θ ψ ε θ ψ θ ψ θ ψ ψ≡    
   
where the superscript refers to the fact that we are now holding the allocation of workers 
to firms constant.   
Based on these counterfactual distributions, we can decompose changes in the 
total earnings distribution. Let Y be the range of y and let A be a subset of Y (i.e., A Y⊂ ). 
Then we can write 
 
(10) 
{ , , , }: ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )t t
x g x A
P y A f x d d d dx
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈ = ∫  
       
We can therefore define the counterfactual probabilities by 
 
(11)  2 2
{ , , , }: ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )w w
x g x A
P y A f x d d d dx
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈ = ∫        
(12) , ,2 2
{ , , , }: ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )w x w x
x g x A
P y A f x d d d dx
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈ = ∫      
  
(13) , , , ,2 2
{ , , , }: ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )w x e w x e
x g x A
P y A f x d d d dx
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈ = ∫     
(14)  , , , , , ,2 2
{ , , , }: ( , , , )
( ) ( , , , )w x e a w x e a
x g x A
P y A f x d d d dx
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
ε θ ψ ε θ ψ
∈
∈ = ∫      
   
The “Oaxaca type” decomposition of the change in the probability of the event y A∈  can 
then be written as 






2 2 2 2
, , , , , , , ,
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2 2
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( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
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Suppose, in general, that we wish to decompose the expected value of some function r of 
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where D denotes the domain of ( , , , xε θ ψ ). Note that in (15), we have ( ) ( )r y I y A= ∈ , 
where I is the indicator function.88 
                                                 
88 This decomposition technique can be extended to the case in which the earnings function 
( , , , )y g xε θ ψ=  varies over time (i.e., ( , , , )ty g xε θ ψ= ) by incorporating an additional 
decomposition step that would measure the impact of this “structural” change on the distribution of 
earnings.  
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We apply this general decomposition technique to the LEHD data in order to 
explore the determinants of earnings distribution changes over time for different 
industries. To put more structure on the relationship between y and ( , , , xε θ ψ ), we 
assume that the relationship takes the form of a linear panel data model with fixed firm 
and individual effects (Abowd et al. 1999). The function g in this case has the following 
form:89 
 
(16) ( , )( , , , )it i j i t ity g ε θ ψ θ ψ ε= = + + +itx x β       
  
We use (16) to estimate the determinants of log earnings using the entire LEHD database. 
Since our focus is on examining changes in earnings distributions over time within 
industries, from this estimation we calculate ( , , , )tdP ε θ ψ x  for each industry.  
In the LEHD data, all exogenous variables (e.g., age and gender) are discrete. 
Thus, the discussion presented above, which analyzed decompositions with a continuous 
explanatory variable, does not directly apply. With discrete explanatory variables, 
however, we simply estimate the distribution of ( , ,ε θ ψ ) for each distinct category of 
every exogenous variable within each industry-time cell.  
To perform the full decomposition, we must estimate the continuous distribution 
of ( , ,ε θ ψ ) for several categories of x within each of the nine industries. Since the 
number of observations in the LEHD data is extremely large, we accomplished this task 
by discretizing these variables. We discretized each variable by breaking the range into 
100 mutually exclusive intervals and assigning the midpoint value to each observation 
                                                 
89 We assume that no structural change has occurred over the relevant time period. 
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that falls within the interval. We applied this method for all intervals except the lowest 
and highest intervals (which are unbounded). For the highest (lowest) interval, we assign 
a value that equals the average of the lower (higher) boundary value and the highest 
(lowest) observed value in the (industry) sample. We denote the discretized values by 
( , ,d d dε θ ψ ) and recompute earnings by 
 
(17) ( , )
d d d d
it i j i t ity θ ψ ε= + + +itx β .       
   
We then perform the decompositions on dity  using the discrete analogs of the equations 
above. 
3.6 Decomposition Results 
In our initial decomposition, we break out the change in the earnings distribution 
for all sectors into the amount attributable to changes in the distribution of employment 
across industries, worker entry and exit, changes in observable worker characteristics, 
firm entry and exit, and changes in the distribution of unobserved worker attributes (θ ) 
for a given firm pay policy (ψ ) (i.e., sorting). The results of this decomposition appear in 
Table 3.6.90 The results in the first three rows of each panel decompose the sources of 
earnings changes at the 90th, 50th, and 10th percentiles of the earnings distribution, while 
the last three rows describe the effect on changes in inequality. Thus, the first column 
indicates that log earnings in 2003 stood at 9.38 for a worker in the 10th percentile, 10.34 
for a worker in the 50th percentile, and 11.32 for a worker in the 90th percentile. As a 
                                                 
90 While the order of the decomposition may affect the results, switching the order of worker entry and exit 
and firm entry and exit in the decompositions led to similar findings. For the sake of brevity, these results 
are not reported. 
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result, the 90th percentile worker made roughly 194% more than the 10th percentile 
worker and 98% more than the median worker. The median worker, meanwhile, earned 
about 96% more than the 10th percentile worker. A comparison of this with the 1992 
distribution, which we present in the second to last column, shows that inequality as 
measured by the 90/10 ratio was lower in 1992 relative to 2003; the 90th percentile 
worker made 188% as much as the 10th percentile worker in 1992. The increase in 
inequality between 1992 and 2003 came about entirely from higher earnings for the 90th 
percentile worker relative to the median worker; in fact, the rise in the 90-50 difference 
was so large as to overwhelm an actual decline in the 50-10 difference. 
These gross changes, however, mask considerable flux in the earnings distribution 
that can be attributed to changes in the underlying factors, which we break out in the 
intervening columns of Table 3.6. The columns report the values of each earnings 
percentile and difference taking out each component of the decomposition sequentially, 
with panel (a) showing overall levels and panel (b) showing marginal contributions of 
each factor. For example, column (2) shows that the 90-10 difference in 2003 would have 
been 1.93 instead of 1.94 (a marginal contribution of 0.01) if we control for changes in 
the distribution of workers across different major sectors of the economy; column (6), 
meanwhile, reveals that if we account for changes in the sector distribution, worker entry 
and exit, changes in observable worker characteristics, firm entry and exit, and worker-
firm sorting, the 90-10 difference would have been 2.16 (with sorting having a marginal 
contribution of 0.88). 
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Table 3.6: Decomposition of the Change in the Earnings Distribution, All Sectors 
1992-2003 
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
Measure   2003 
Sector 
Distribution
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
+ Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.38 9.39 9.40 9.25 8.26 9.08 9.28  0.10
50th percentile   10.34 10.35 10.36 10.21 10.06 10.19 10.27  0.07
90th percentile   11.32 11.32 11.34 11.25 11.30 11.24 11.16  0.17
90-10 difference   1.94 1.93 1.93 2.01 3.04 2.16 1.88  0.06
90-50 difference   0.98 0.98 0.98 1.05 1.24 1.05 0.88  0.10
50-10 difference   0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 1.80 1.11 1.00  -0.03
(b) Marginal Effects 
10th percentile   9.38 -0.01 -0.01 0.16 0.98 -0.82 9.28  0.10
50th percentile   10.34 -0.01 -0.01 0.15 0.15 -0.13 10.27  0.07
90th percentile   11.32 0.00 -0.02 0.08 -0.04 0.06 11.16  0.17
90-10 difference   1.94 0.01 0.00 -0.08 -1.03 0.88 1.88  0.06
90-50 difference   0.98 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.20 0.19 0.88  0.10
50-10 difference   0.96 0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.83 0.69 1.00  -0.03
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
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An examination of the column (2) of Table 3.6 reveals that changes in the 
distribution of employment across sectors led to small increases in both the 90-50 and 50-
10 log earnings differences between 1992 and 2003. This suggests that workers have 
been moving into industries with greater inequality from industries with less inequality, 
though such cross-sector reallocation alone has not been sufficiently large to give rise to 
large changes in overall observed inequality. Worker entry and exit, meanwhile, had 
almost no impact on the 50-10 log earnings difference or the 90-50 log earnings 
difference. Changes in observed worker characteristics had more sizable effects, leading 
in particular to a marked decline in the 90-50 log earnings difference.  
While the entry and exit of firms led to large decreases in the 50-10 and 90-50 log 
earnings differences, the effect was almost entirely offset by the impact of sorting of 
workers and firms. The effects of these final two factors were particularly evident at the 
lower end of the earnings distribution. Looking at the first row, the results reveal that had 
there been no entry and exit of firms (controlling for changes in the sector distribution, 
worker entry and exit, and changes in observable worker characteristics), earnings at the 
10th percentile would have been substantially lower; indeed, firm turnover acted to 
buttress earnings at the bottom end of the distribution disproportionately. However, 
conditional on firm entry and exit and other underlying factors, the sorting of firms and 
workers acted to depress earnings levels at the bottom end of the distribution and bolster 
earnings levels at the at the top end; ultimately, then, earnings inequality would have 
been much lower had it not been for the contribution of assortative matching over the 
1992-2003 period. 
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The results in Table 3.6 highlight the relative importance of firm entry and exit as 
well as worker sorting in driving changes in earnings distributions across industries over 
time. The findings are broadly consistent with a model of creative destruction in which 
assortative matching among workers and firms occurs alongside firm turnover that ushers 
in new, more productive businesses to supplant those that are failing (Jovanovic 1982, 
Haltiwanger et al. 2007). 
Table 3.7 presents the same set of sequential decompositions of the cumulative 
distribution functions by sector, but now showing only the marginal contributions of each 
factor for brevity. Panel (a) presents results for industries in which inequality (as 
measured again by the 90-10 log wage difference) declined, and panel (b) presents results 
for industries in which inequality increased. The first striking result of the 
decompositions is the degree to which each separate factor affected the earnings 
distributions, even in industries such as services where in net terms there were not 
substantial changes in earnings over time. Indeed, our analysis reveals remarkable 
differences in the way in which changes in the composition of workers, firms, and the 
match between the two affects earnings in different parts of the distribution, often in 
offsetting ways.  
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Table 3.7: Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector 
1992-2003 
(a) Sectors with Declining Inequality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 
Workers 1992  
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries 
10th percentile   9.12 -0.01 0.21 0.26 -0.20 8.84  0.28
50th percentile   9.86 -0.01 0.14 0.04 -0.02 9.70  0.16
90th percentile   10.70 -0.01 0.12 -0.11 0.10 10.56  0.14
90-10 difference   1.58 0.00 -0.08 -0.37 0.29 1.72  -0.14
90-50 difference   0.83 -0.01 -0.02 -0.15 0.12 0.85  -0.02
50-10 difference   0.75 0.00 -0.07 -0.23 0.18 0.87  -0.12
Mining 
10th percentile   10.02 0.01 0.22 1.34 -1.37 9.99  0.03
50th percentile   10.73 0.01 0.11 0.29 -0.36 10.74  -0.01
90th percentile   11.32 0.01 -0.03 0.13 -0.03 11.39  -0.07
90-10 difference   1.31 -0.01 -0.25 -1.21 1.35 1.40  -0.09
90-50 difference   0.59 0.00 -0.14 -0.17 0.33 0.65  -0.06
50-10 difference   0.72 0.00 -0.12 -1.04 1.01 0.75  -0.03
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Table 3.7 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector 
1992-2003 
(a) Sectors with Declining Inequality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.61 -0.01 0.16 0.56 -0.36 9.41  0.20
50th percentile   10.44 -0.02 0.12 0.16 -0.08 10.35  0.09
90th percentile   11.20 -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.01 11.13  0.08
90-10 difference   1.60 -0.01 -0.09 -0.53 0.37 1.72  -0.12
90-50 difference   0.76 0.00 -0.06 -0.12 0.09 0.77  -0.01
50-10 difference   0.84 -0.01 -0.04 -0.41 0.28 0.94  -0.11
Retail 
10th percentile   9.05 -0.01 0.11 0.48 -0.36 8.93  0.12
50th percentile   9.89 -0.01 0.14 0.13 -0.06 9.83  0.06
90th percentile   10.85 -0.01 0.12 -0.02 0.07 10.78  0.07
90-10 difference   1.80 -0.01 0.01 -0.50 0.43 1.85  -0.05
90-50 difference   0.95 0.00 -0.02 -0.15 0.13 0.94  0.01
50-10 difference   0.85 0.00 0.03 -0.35 0.30 0.90  -0.06
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Table 3.7 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector 
1992-2003 
(b) Sectors with Rising Inequality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




 + Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.63 0.01 0.20 1.35 -1.29 9.55  0.08
50th percentile   10.44 0.01 0.21 0.13 -0.25 10.38  0.06
90th percentile   11.42 0.00 0.13 -0.08 -0.01 11.20  0.22
90-10 difference   1.79 0.00 -0.07 -1.43 1.28 1.65  0.14
90-50 difference   0.98 0.00 -0.08 -0.21 0.24 0.82  0.16
50-10 difference   0.81 0.00 0.01 -1.22 1.05 0.83  -0.02
Transportation & Communication 
10th percentile   9.68 -0.01 0.17 0.70 -0.69 9.70  -0.02
50th percentile   10.59 -0.01 0.09 0.13 -0.17 10.61  -0.02
90th percentile   11.33 -0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.05 11.22  0.11
90-10 difference   1.65 0.01 -0.11 -0.69 0.65 1.52  0.13
90-50 difference   0.74 0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.13 0.62  0.13
50-10 difference   0.91 0.00 -0.08 -0.57 0.52 0.90  0.01
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Table 3.7 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector 
1992-2003 
(b) Sectors with Rising Inequality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.64 0.00 0.17 0.46 -0.38 9.55  0.09
50th percentile   10.46 0.00 0.15 0.02 -0.09 10.38  0.08
90th percentile   11.47 0.00 0.08 -0.38 0.29 11.28  0.20
90-10 difference   1.84 0.00 -0.10 -0.84 0.67 1.73  0.11
90-50 difference   1.01 0.00 -0.07 -0.40 0.38 0.90  0.12
50-10 difference   0.82 0.00 -0.03 -0.44 0.29 0.83  0.00
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
10th percentile   9.70 -0.01 0.18 0.79 -0.66 9.53  0.17
50th percentile   10.52 -0.01 0.16 0.14 -0.08 10.32  0.20
90th percentile   11.65 -0.01 0.09 -0.10 0.20 11.30  0.35
90-10 difference   1.95 0.00 -0.09 -0.89 0.86 1.77  0.18
90-50 difference   1.13 0.00 -0.07 -0.24 0.28 0.97  0.15
50-10 difference   0.83 0.00 -0.02 -0.65 0.58 0.80  0.03
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Table 3.7 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector 
1992-2003 
(b) Sectors with Rising Inequality 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.35 0.02 0.13 1.27 -0.99 9.24  0.11
50th percentile   10.35 0.02 0.11 0.19 -0.08 10.27  0.08
90th percentile   11.33 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.11 11.16  0.17
90-10 difference   1.98 -0.01 -0.09 -1.26 1.10 1.92  0.05
90-50 difference   0.98 -0.01 -0.07 -0.18 0.18 0.89  0.08
50-10 difference   1.00 0.00 -0.03 -1.08 0.92 1.03  -0.03
Entries in columns (2) - (5) report the change in the measure when the factor is either assumed not to have occurred (as with worker and firm entry 
and exit) or replaced by its 1992 value (as with observed worker characteristics and the conditional distribution of worker matches given a firm level 
of pay). 
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
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Considering first the four industries in which overall inequality declined, column 
(2) of panel (a) reveals that, despite the high levels of worker churning, the churning was 
among workers of the same average skill level (θ ), resulting in very little change in 
inequality in each of the sectors. That this is true in every industry suggests that, by and 
large, workforce quality within each industry is quite persistent, which is consistent with 
work by Haltiwanger et al. (2007). An analysis of column (3) shows that, holding θ  
constant, the aging of the workforce (and the associated returns to experience) acted to 
decrease earnings inequality in three of the four industries, with little impact in the retail 
sector. Increased experience led to increased earnings at both ends of the distribution, but 
with a larger impact at the 10th percentile than at the 90th (except in retail), thus 
decreasing inequality.  
The entry and exit of firms clearly has an enormous impact on the earnings 
distribution, as is evident from a comparison of column (3) with column (4) in panel (a) 
of Table 3.7. In mining, column (4) (compared to column (3)) indicates that if no firm 
entry or exit had occurred between 1992 and 2003, the 90-10 log wage gap would have 
swung by over 120 log points. Notably, firm entry and exit generally acted to increase 
earnings at the bottom end of the distribution more than at the top; in some cases, it 
worked to decrease earnings at the top. Ultimately, firm entry and exit resulted in a 
decline in the 90/10 ratio in each industry.  
Finally, the effect of the sorting of workers and firms is apparent in a comparison 
of columns (4) and (5). Sorting of workers across different sets of firms generally worked 
to increase earnings inequality, depressing earnings at the lower end of each industry’s 
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distribution relative to those at the upper end. Indeed, sorting acted to increase 90th 
percentile earnings in three of the four industries.  
Panel (b) of Table 3.7 reports the decompositions for the five industries in which 
overall earnings inequality increased. As was the case for the declining-inequality 
industries, worker churning had little effect on the earnings distribution in these sectors. 
Columns (2) and (3) in panel (b) show that increased experience lowered inequality by 
raising earnings more at the bottom than the top of the earnings distribution in each of the 
five industries. Interestingly, however, the impact of changing experience on earnings, 
while largely symmetric across the distribution within industries, was quite different 
across industries. For example, changes in experience boosted each earning percentile by 
nearly twice as much in log points in manufacturing than in services.  
The effect of firm entry and exit was substantial in these five industries, and in 
general it led to a decrease in earnings inequality. Entry and exit of firms tended to raise 
earnings at the bottom more than at the top end of the distribution in each of the 
industries. In wholesale, the 90th percentile of earnings dropped considerably due to firm 
entry and exit. Finally, comparing columns (4) and (5) indicates that sorting of workers 
among firms generally led to an increase in inequality. Earnings at the bottom of the 
distribution were much lower due to sorting, which resulted in rises in the 90-10, 90-50, 
and 50-10 differences in all five industries. This effect was particularly large in 
manufacturing and services. 
Overall, the decompositions in Table 3.7 show that, while trends in overall 
inequality diverged across industries, similar underlying factors were at work. Worker 
entry and exit had little effect on the wage inequality measures despite high levels of 
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worker churning in the economy. Increased experience (as measured by the aging of 
workers) acted to increase earnings at all levels, but with a larger impact at the lower end 
of the distribution. Thus, increased experience tended to lessen wage inequality in all 
industries.  
Firm entry and exit and sorting of workers were the biggest factors driving 
changes in earnings distributions, with the former acting to decrease inequality and the 
latter acting to increase it in most cases. That is, both in the aggregate as well as within 
most individual industries, the results lend support to a model of creative destruction that 
features ongoing assortative matching amid heavy firm entry and exit. That said, despite 
the similarities in the underlying factors driving changes in earnings distributions, the 
magnitudes of the effects differed considerably across industries.  
The Kullback-Leibler measure of the divergence between probability distributions 
provides a useful aggregate summary statistic for comparing these trends and a means by 
which to substantiate our main results.91 Table 3.8 presents the decomposition of the 
Kullback-Leibler measure between the 1992 and 2003 earnings distributions. 
                                                 
91 The Kullback-Leibler measure for two density functions f1 and f2 is defined by 
[ ]1 2 1 20 ( ) ( ) ln( ( ) / ( ))f w f w f w f w dw
∞
−∫ . 
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Table 3.8: Kullback-Leibler Distance Measure Decompositions by Sector 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 





















Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.01
Mining   0.02 0.02 0.07 0.67 0.07
Construction 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.02
Manufacturing 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.06
Transportation & Communication 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.19 0.03
Wholesale 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.06
Retail   0.02 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.04
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 0.09 0.10 0.03 0.17 0.03
Services   0.02 0.03 0.01 0.19 0.06
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
 
Consistent with our results, the Kullback-Leibler measures in Table 3.8 indicate 
that the largest shifts in earnings distributions between 1992 and 2003 occurred in 
agriculture, fishing, and forestry as well as in finance, insurance, and real estate. Further, 
the decomposition results in Table 3.8 suggest that worker entry and exit led to a modest 
increase in the distance between the 1992 and 2003 earnings distributions in mining, 
manufacturing, as well as transportation and communication, while leading to a slight 
decline or no change at all in the distance in each of the other industries. The effect of 
worker entry and exit appears to have been greatest in agriculture, fishing, and forestry; 
finance, insurance, and real estate; and services, where, as the results in Table 3.8 
suggest, distances between earnings distributions would have been markedly larger had 
such entry and exit not occurred between 1992 and 2003. Notably, changes in the 
observable characteristics of workers tended to shrink the distance between the two 
   
 138
distributions only for those three industries in which worker entry and exit tended to 
widen the distance. 
As expected given the results using our decomposition methodology, firm entry 
and exit narrowed the distance between the 1992 and 2003 earnings distributions across 
all industries. That is, in all sectors of the economy, distances between earnings 
distributions would have been substantially larger had firm entry and exit not occurred 
between 1992 and 2003. In contrast, and once again consistent with earlier findings, 
assortative matching widened the distance across all industries; without the contribution 
of reallocation of workers across firms, earnings inequality within in each industry would 
have been considerably lower.  
 To summarize, earnings distributions changed differently across industries 
between 1992 and 2003. Worker entry and exit into an industry appeared to have little 
effect on the industry earnings distribution over the period, but firm entry and exit tended 
to compress within-industry earnings distributions. Meanwhile, sorting among firms and 
workers tended to result in greater dispersion in each industry’s earnings distribution. 
Changes in the observable characteristics of workers, which in our data primarily reflect 
the aging of workers, led to increases in earnings across the distribution in all industries 
with mixed but generally muted effects on inequality. 
Focusing in on the observed decrease in the 50-10 percentile difference, which 
occurred overall and across many industries, it appears as if at least a small portion of the 
decline was attributable to changes in observable characteristics. The remainder of the 
decrease occurred as the entry and exit of firms and changes in employee-employer 
matches had big but offsetting impacts; the negative impact of the firm turnover tended to 
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dominate the positive impact of the change in employer-employee matches. The one 
factor that appears to have played a role in the increase in the 90-50 difference that we 
observed both overall and for many individual industries was sorting among workers and 
firms. Changes both in observable characteristics and in firm entry and exit tended to 
lower this difference. 
3.7 Robustness 
3.7.1 Workforce Characteristics and Mobility 
Before concluding, it is important to note that the decomposition of changes in the 
earnings distribution, while accounting for worker entry and exit into an industry, do not 
account for the origins of workers who enter each industry and the destinations of those 
who exit. Workers can enter a particular industry either by leaving another industry or 
entering the sample over the period. Similarly, workers can exit an industry by moving to 
another industry or leaving the sample.92 Those individuals who are new to the sample, 
those who exit the sample, those who switch industries, and those who remain in their 
industry over the 1992-2003 period may have systematically different characteristics, 
including both observable and unobservable characteristics, that could affect our 
interpretation of the decomposition results. Some data on the observed and unobserved 
measures of human capital for these industry entrants (leavers) as well as the pay policies 
of the firms they join (leave) appear in Table 3.9.  
 
                                                 
92 Workers entering the sample can be new labor force entrants who resided in our group of states or 
migrants from other states. Workers leaving the sample can be workers leaving the labor force or workers 
moving to a state outside our group of states. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish these different groups of 
sample entrants and leavers. 
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Table 3.9: Worker Sector and Sample Mobility 
1992-2003 
           Mean 
Mobility Type  Number Percent   θ xb 1992 xb 2003 y 1992 y 2003
Switchers  (switch sectors between 1992 & 2003)  2,523,443 9.6%   0.08 1.08 1.37 0.04 0.08
Entrants  (not in 1992 sample, in 2003 sample)  10,982,559 41.7%   -0.05   1.26   0.01
Exiters  (in 1992 sample, not in 2003 sample)  7,859,437 29.8%   0.02 1.15   0.04   
Stayers  (remain in sector between 1992 & 2003)  4,974,338 18.9%   0.24 1.16 1.38 0.09 0.09
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
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Among workers entering industries between 1992 and 2003, over 80% were 
individuals not in the sample in 1992. Relative to workers who remained in each sector 
between 1992 and 2003, industry entrants who were new entrants into the sample 
between 1992 and 2003 had both lower observed and unobserved skill levels, and 
furthermore tended to work at firms that paid less. While workers who switched 
industries between 1992 and 2003 also had lower unobserved skills and worked at firms 
that paid less than those who did not switch, the magnitude of the difference was 
considerably smaller than for those who were new entrants into the sample. Moreover, 
the observed skills of industry switchers were similar to non-switchers. 
Among workers exiting industries between 1992 and 2003, over three-quarters 
left the sample. While sample leavers had lower unobserved skills than those who 
switched industries, their observed skill levels were slightly higher on average. Moreover, 
those that left the sample tended to leave firms that had pay policies similar to those from 
which industry switchers left.  
3.7.2 Minimum Wage Effects 
As previously mentioned, the large and offsetting effects of firm entry and exit 
and worker-firm sorting are most evident at the bottom end of the earnings distribution, 
which raises the possibility that the sorting adjustment is due to the substantial minimum 
wage hikes that took place exclusively in California during the sample period. While the 
federal minimum wage remained constant at $5.15 between 1997 and 2003, California 
increased its state minimum wage three times during the five-year span, the last time in 
January 2002 bringing it to $6.75. To check the robustness of the results given the 
possibility that California minimum wage legislation is behind the observed sorting 
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adjustment, as well as to shed light on the potential influence of the change in minimum 
wage on industry earnings distributions themselves, we present results excluding 
California in Table 3.10.93  
Consider first the services industry, which has a relatively large number of 
individuals working at or near minimum wage. If we include California, as in Table 3.7, 
the counterfactual that assumes there had been no entry and exit of firms implies that the 
log wage in services would change by 1.27 at the 10th percentile, where minimum wage 
legislation might be most likely to bind. Excluding California, as in Table 3.10, the same 
counterfactual suggests that the log wage would change by only 0.13. At the 50th 
percentile, meanwhile, the difference between the changes in log wages with California 
included (0.19) versus without California (0.01) is much smaller. Similarly, differences 
between the changes with or without California at the 90th percentile are negligible. 
                                                 
93 For studies more closely examining the effects of changes in the real value of the minimum wage over 
time, see, for example, DiNardo et al. (1996) and Lee (1999). 
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Table 3.10: Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector, Excluding California 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 
Workers 1992  
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Agriculture, Fishing, & Forestry 
10th percentile   9.20 -0.02 0.17 0.26 -0.18 8.98  0.22
50th percentile   9.98 -0.02 0.14 0.06 -0.03 9.87  0.11
90th percentile   10.83 -0.05 0.09 -0.08 0.10 10.72  0.11
90-10 difference   1.63 -0.03 -0.09 -0.34 0.28 1.74  -0.11
90-50 difference   0.85 -0.03 -0.05 -0.14 0.14 0.85  0.00
50-10 difference   0.79 0.00 -0.03 -0.20 0.15 0.89  -0.11
Mining 
10th percentile   9.93 0.00 0.27 0.65 -0.47 9.91  0.02
50th percentile   10.65 0.00 0.19 0.16 -0.30 10.70  -0.05
90th percentile   11.14 0.00 0.14 0.00 -0.11 11.16  -0.02
90-10 difference   1.21 0.00 -0.13 -0.65 0.37 1.25  -0.04
90-50 difference   0.49 0.00 -0.05 -0.16 0.19 0.46  0.03
50-10 difference   0.72 0.00 -0.08 -0.49 0.18 0.80  -0.07
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Table 3.10 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector, Excluding California 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.60 -0.01 0.17 0.55 -0.38 9.43  0.17
50th percentile   10.42 -0.02 0.16 0.14 -0.09 10.29  0.13
90th percentile   11.18 -0.02 0.09 0.01 0.02 11.04  0.14
90-10 difference   1.58 -0.01 -0.08 -0.55 0.40 1.61  -0.02
90-50 difference   0.76 0.00 -0.07 -0.13 0.11 0.75  0.01
50-10 difference   0.82 -0.01 -0.01 -0.41 0.29 0.86  -0.03
Manufacturing 
10th percentile   9.65 0.00 0.25 1.55 -1.55 9.54  0.11
50th percentile   10.38 0.00 0.24 0.10 -0.22 10.27  0.11
90th percentile   11.26 0.00 0.15 -0.25 0.08 11.08  0.18
90-10 difference   1.62 0.00 -0.10 -1.80 1.63 1.54  0.08
90-50 difference   0.88 0.00 -0.09 -0.34 0.30 0.81  0.07
50-10 difference   0.74 0.00 -0.01 -1.45 1.33 0.73  0.01
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Table 3.10 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector, Excluding California 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 
Workers 1992  
Change from 
1992 to 2003
Transportation & Communication 
10th percentile   9.69 0.00 0.20 0.27 -0.25 9.56  0.13
50th percentile   10.46 0.00 0.16 -0.09 -0.04 10.34  0.11
90th percentile   11.45 0.00 0.09 -1.04 0.86 11.25  0.20
90-10 difference   1.77 0.00 -0.11 -1.31 1.12 1.70  0.07
90-50 difference   1.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.95 0.91 0.91  0.09
50-10 difference   0.77 0.00 -0.04 -0.36 0.21 0.79  -0.02
Wholesale Trade 
10th percentile   8.96 -0.01 0.09 0.58 -0.50 8.87  0.09
50th percentile   9.86 -0.01 0.16 0.12 -0.09 9.77  0.09
90th percentile   10.83 -0.02 0.13 -0.14 0.12 10.74  0.09
90-10 difference   1.87 -0.01 0.03 -0.72 0.62 1.87  0.00
90-50 difference   0.97 -0.01 -0.03 -0.26 0.21 0.96  0.00
50-10 difference   0.90 0.00 0.06 -0.46 0.41 0.91  0.00
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Table 3.10 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector, Excluding California 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.72 -0.01 0.18 0.91 -0.78 9.54  0.18
50th percentile   10.50 -0.01 0.18 0.13 -0.10 10.27  0.23
90th percentile   11.62 -0.01 0.11 -0.17 0.23 11.26  0.36
90-10 difference   1.91 0.00 -0.08 -1.08 1.01 1.72  0.18
90-50 difference   1.12 0.00 -0.08 -0.30 0.33 0.99  0.14
50-10 difference   0.78 0.00 0.00 -0.78 0.68 0.73  0.05
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 
10th percentile   9.34 -0.03 0.14 0.25 -0.19 9.22  0.12
50th percentile   10.30 -0.03 0.13 0.06 -0.04 10.20  0.11
90th percentile   11.24 -0.02 0.06 -0.16 0.18 11.09  0.15
90-10 difference   1.90 0.00 -0.08 -0.42 0.38 1.87  0.04
90-50 difference   0.94 0.01 -0.07 -0.22 0.22 0.89  0.05
50-10 difference   0.96 0.00 -0.02 -0.19 0.16 0.98  -0.01
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Table 3.10 (continued): Decompositions of Changes in Earnings Distributions by Sector, Excluding California 
1992-2003 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 
Measure   2003 
 + Worker 
Entry and 
Exit 




+ Firm Entry 
and Exit 
 + Sorting of 
Firms and 




10th percentile   9.83 -0.07 0.09 0.13 -0.18 9.82  0.02
50th percentile   10.46 -0.08 0.07 0.01 -0.06 10.45  0.01
90th percentile   11.07 -0.06 0.06 0.00 0.00 10.97  0.10
90-10 difference   1.23 0.01 -0.03 -0.13 0.18 1.15  0.08
90-50 difference   0.60 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.52  0.09
50-10 difference   0.63 -0.01 -0.03 -0.12 0.13 0.64  0.00
Entries in columns (2) - (5) report the change in the measure when the factor is either assumed not to have occurred (as with worker and firm entry 
and exit) or replaced by its 1992 value (as with observed worker characteristics and the conditional distribution of worker matches given a firm level 
of pay). 
Based on LEHD data for CA, IL, MD, and NC. 
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On the other hand, while like the services industry, the retail trade industry has a 
large number of minimum wage workers, an examination of Table 3.10 reveals little 
evidence that similar patterns hold in each industry with respect to changes in the lower 
portion of the earnings distribution including and excluding data from California. 
However, an analysis of CPS data shows a substantial drop in the proportion of part-time 
workers in the retail industry, from 33% in 1992 to 22% in 2003. The observed 
differences in trends across industries might be due to a tendency among exiting retail 
firms to have hired a disproportionate number of part-time workers compared to entering 
firms. This explanation would focus more on hours than wages, and relies on the fact that 
part-time workers are more likely to be at the lower end of earnings distribution. 
3.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we use linked employer-employee data from the LEHD Program 
at the U.S. Census Bureau to explore changes in earnings distributions across sectors of 
the economy, paying particular attention to the way in which the reallocation of jobs and 
workers affect changes in earnings inequality. Our decompositions shed light on the 
extent to which changes in workforce composition, firm entry and exit, and job 
reallocation affect industry-specific earnings distributions. We also directly examine the 
degree to which changes in the matching of workers and firms affect earnings inequality.  
While we document differences across industries in the magnitudes and directions 
of change in various aspects of the earnings distribution between 1992 and 2003, our 
earnings decompositions reveal that most factors had similar qualitative effects in each 
sector. In particular, even in industries in which there was very little change in the 
aggregate earnings distribution between 1992 and 2003, there were enormous, albeit 
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offsetting, changes in the factors contributing to earnings change. The same factors that 
were at work in industries with declining earnings inequality tended to be at work in 
those with increasing inequality. The magnitudes of these effects, however, varied 
considerably across sectors. 
More specifically, we find that worker entry and exit had very little impact on 
changes in the earnings distributions between 1992 and 2003 in each of the industries we 
examine. Despite the ample opportunities for firms to change their workforce 
compositions, industry workforces remained, by and large, very similar, and earnings 
gains due to experience tended to be higher at the lower end of the distribution. This does 
not lend credence to the notion that individual firms are changing their production 
technologies in a way that is biased towards skill. 
Changes in observable characteristics, which mainly involved the aging of the 
workforce within each industry, tended to shift earnings distributions to the right. The 
effect of having an increasingly experienced workforce was to decrease earnings 
inequality in eight of the nine industries we consider, in each case primarily by increasing 
earnings at the bottom end of the earnings distribution. 
On the other hand, the net impact of firm entry and exit was to reduce the 
dispersion of earnings for all industries. In nearly all industries, firm turnover acted to 
bolster earnings at the bottom end of the distribution relative to the top. To the extent that 
firm wage premia reflect rent sharing, unionization, and/or efficiency wage payments, it 
is difficult to reconcile the fact that firms pay these premia disproportionately to workers 
at the bottom end of the earnings distribution with a declining importance of wage setting 
institutions for low-wage workers. In addition, we do not find the changing sectoral 
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earnings inequality in low-wage and highly unionized industries that would be consistent 
with hypotheses about the impact of changing unionization and real minimum wages.  
Finally, sorting of workers based on the human capital measures over time tended 
to increase the dispersion of industry earnings distributions between 1992 and 2003. This 
is consistent with the idea that the driving force of economic change is the entry and exit 
of firms, and can be linked to the selection of new technologies, and the associated 
workforce, by new firms. 
Our analysis, which uses new techniques to demonstrate the utility of employer-
employee matched panel data in decomposing changes in earnings distributions over 
time, ultimately suggests that even when earnings distributions change little overall, the 
extensive amounts of worker and firm reallocation that have been documented in the 
literature do have large effects on different parts of the earnings distribution. In 
particular, the entry and exit of firms and sorting of workers and firms based on 
underlying worker skills are important determinants of changes in industry earnings 
distributions over time. 
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Appendix A  
Model of Job Hopping, Earnings Dynamics, and Industrial Agglomeration 
This appendix is devoted to developing the details of a model of industrial 
clustering that features a spatial dimension and industry-specific skills. The model, the 
basic setup and implications of which I present in Chapter 1 along with my empirical 
analysis, builds on models of on-the-job search pioneered by Burdett and Mortensen 
(1998) and extended by Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002a, 2002b).  
A.1 Wage Outcomes Inside an Industry Cluster 
Let V0 be the lifetime utility of a worker in industry L and let V(w, p) be the utility 
of a worker when employed in industry H at a firm with productivity p at a wage w. 
Workers in the L industry receive wage offers from the sampling distribution F(x) at a 
rate λ. Hence, with linear utility and discounting, the value associated with working in the 
L industry solves the following Bellman equation:  
 
(ρ + λ)V0 = b + λ[1 - F(b)]Ep[V(w’0(p), p) | p > b] + λ[F(b)]V0 
 
Any H-type that meets a worker in industry L will make the lowest possible wage offer to 
hire the worker, which in this case equals the opportunity cost of employment in industry 
L, V0. That is, with firms fully informed about workers’ reservation wages, we have for 
all x ∈ [pmin, pmax] that V(w’0(x), x) = V0. Given this, the above expression collapses to 
ρV0  = b. 
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Workers in a cluster who are already employed in the H industry receive wage 
offers from the sampling distribution F(x) at a rate γ. Figure A.1 depicts the three 
different possible outcomes of Bertrand competition over a worker between two H-type 
firms in a cluster: a worker could switch jobs (when pr > p), receive a wage increase at 
his or her current employer (when q(w, p) < pr ≤ p), or experience no change in his or her 
employment status or wage (when pr ≤ q(w, p)).94 
 
Figure A.1: Possible Outcomes of Bertrand Competition 
 
The maximum wage a worker can earn at a firm with productivity p is exactly p, 
and therefore the maximum utility a worker can achieve from being at a firm with 
productivity p is V(p, p). Thus, a worker will move to a firm of type pr > p if the more 
productive firm offers at least the wage w’(p, pr) defined by  
 
                                                 
94 For the figure, I assume for simplicity that F is uniform for the purposes of deriving q(w, p). More 




V(w’(p, pr), pr) = V(p, p).  
 
Similarly, in the case in which q(w, p) < pr ≤ p, the worker will receive a promotion to 
the wage w’(pr, p); this wage represents the optimal offer a firm with productivity p could 
make to a firm with productivity pr ≤ p that the worker would be willing to accept. The 
Bellman equation for the value function associated with working in the H industry at a 
firm with productivity p at a wage w, V(w, p), is then  
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(q(w, p))])V(w, p) = w + γ[1 – F(p)]E pr[V(w’(p, p
r), pr)| pr > p] 
 + γ[F(p) – F(q(w, p))]E pr[V(w’(pr, p), p)| q(w, p) < pr ≤  p]  
+ δV0   
 
On the right-hand side of the expression, we have the flow wage plus the expected value 
associated with being poached by another more productive firm, which happens with 
probability γ[1 – F(p)], and in which case the worker receives the value of having the 
new wage offer w’(p, pr) and being employed at the new pr firm; plus the expected value 
associated with being approached by an alternative employer whose productivity is less 
than or equal to that of his or her current employer, but whose offer acts to boost her 
wage at the current firm; plus the value associated with being exogenously separated 
from the H industry job. 
If pr > p, then the poaching firm hires the worker at wage such that V(w’(p, pr), 
pr) = V(p, p); that is, the more productive firm will never pay more than the amount that 
makes the worker indifferent between being at the two firms and that the less productive 
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firm is willing to pay. Likewise, if q(w, p) < pr ≤  p, the worker’s new wage w’(pr, p) 
must be such that V(w’(pr, p), p) = V(pr, pr). Thus, we can substitute to get   
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(q(w, p))])V(w, p) = w + γ [1 – F(p)]V(p, p) 
+ γ[F(p) – F(q(w, p))]Epr[V(pr, pr)| q(w, p) < pr ≤  p] + δV0   
 
To obtain an expression for V(p, p), the value of working at an H-type firm with 
productivity p at the highest wage it would be willing to pay, we impose w = p, 
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(p)])V(p, p) = p + γ[1 – F(p)]V(p, p) + 0 + δV0 
 
This implies after some cancellation that 
 
V(p, p) =(p + δV0)/(ρ + δ) 
 
Substituting this expression back into the original Bellman equation, replacing the 
expectation operator by an integral, and noting that q(p, p) = p, we get the Bellman 
equation associated with the value of working in the H-industry at a wage w in a firm 
with productivity p, 
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(q(w, p))])V(w, p) = w + γ[1 – F(p)][(p + δV0)/(ρ + δ)] 
  + γ∫q(w, p)
p




The lowest productivity firm in the H industry from which an H-type firm with 
productivity p that offers a wage w can successfully attract a worker is one with 
productivity q(w, p). Therefore,  
 
V(w, p)  = V(q(w, p),q(w, p))  
= [q(w, p) + δV0]/(ρ + δ) 
 
Using this result to substitute into the previously derived Bellman equation,  
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(q(w, p))]){(q(w, p) + δV0)/(ρ + δ)} = w  
+ γ[1 – F(p)][(p + δV0)/(ρ + δ)] 
+ γ∫q(w, p)
p
[(x + δV0)/(ρ + δ)]dF(x) 
+ δV0  
 
Integrating by parts yields 
 
(ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(q(w, p))]){(q(w, p) + δV0)/(ρ + δ)} = w  
+ γ[1 – F(p)][(p + δV0)/(ρ + δ)] 
+ [γ/(ρ + δ)]{(p + δV0)F(p)  









(ρ + δ)q(w, p) = (ρ + δ)w - γ[1 – F(q(w, p))]q(w, p)  
- (ρ + δ)δV0 - γ[1 – F(q(w, p))]δV0 
+ γ[1 – F(p)]p + γ[1 – F(p)]δV0 + γF(p)p + γF(p)δV0 -  γF(q)q  
+ γF(q)δV0  - ∫q(w, p)
p
F(x)dx + (ρ + δ)δV0 
 
Hence, with some additional cancellation of terms, we arrive at an expression for the 
threshold productivity level, 
 
q(w, p) = w + γ/(ρ + δ) ∫q(w, p)
p
[1 – F(x)]dx 
 
Turning to the derivation of the threshold wage offered by a potential poacher with pr > 
p, we substitute in w’(p, pr) for w in the expression for q(w, p) and use that q(w’(p, pr), pr) 
= p to get 
 
p = w’(p, pr) + γ/(ρ + δ)∫p
pr[1 – F(x)]dx  
 
So for a potential poacher with pr > p, 
 
w’(p, pr) = p – γ/(ρ + δ)∫p
pr[1 – F(x)]dx  
 
We can derive a similar equation for the offer made to a worker in the L industry 




w’0(p) = w’(b, p) = b – γ/(ρ + δ)∫b
p
[1 – F(x)]dx 
 
since for x ∈ [pmin, pmax] we have V(w’0(x), x) = V0. 
A.2 Wage Outcomes Outside an Industry Cluster 
The value function for an L-industry worker in an unclustered area depends on the 
flow wage b plus the value associated with being picked up by a firm in the H industry, 
which happens at a rate λ: 
 
(ρ + λ)V0 = b + λE0[V(w’0(x), x)] 
 
For all x ∈ [pmin, pmax], we have that V(w’0(x), x) = V0. Substituting this into the above 
expression yields ρV0 = b. The lack of other H-type firms with which to compete over 
workers implies γ = 0, which in turn gives us the Bellman equation for the value to a 
worker of being in an unclustered area and working at an H-type firm with productivity 
p:  
 
(ρ + δ)V(w, p) = w + δV0 
 
Thus, w’0(x) = w’(b, x) = b, and we have V(w, x) = V(b, x) = V0 for all x ∈ [pmin, pmax]. 
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A.3 Firm Employment95  
We now turn to deriving steady state H-type firm employment in a cluster and in 
dispersed regions. In the clustered region and in all dispersed regions, it must be the case 
in steady state that the employment rate in the L industry, denoted e, satisfies e = δ/(δ + 
λ) since worker flows out of L, λe, must balance flows into L, δ(1-e). 
Let lu(w| p) denote the steady state number of workers employed at a wage less 
than or equal to w at an H-type with productivity p in an unclustered region and let lc(w| 
p) denote the steady state number in the clustered region. Hence, lu(p-c| p) denotes total 
employment at an H-type firm with productivity p in an unclustered region (a firm in an 
unclustered area will never pay more than p-c to a worker) and lc(p| p) denotes total 
employment for a firm with productivity p in the cluster.96  
In an unclustered region, an H-type firm employs labor such that lu(p-c| p) = lu(b| 
p) for all p ∈ [pmin, pmzx]. Hence, equating inflows and outflows of workers at the firm 
and recalling that there are M workers in each region, δlu(b| p) = λeM, which implies that 
in equilibrium, employment at an isolated H-type firm is a constant lu.97 
 
lu(b| p) = (λM)/(δ + λ) = lu 
 
Let n denote the number of firms in a cluster. A worker that is employed at a 
clustered H-type firm with productivity p at a wage w could separate either for exogenous 
reasons (at a rate δ) or because that worker receives an offer from another H-type firm 
                                                 
95 The model results from this point onward are very preliminary. Comments and suggestions are welcome. 
96 That is, lu(p) = ∫ w’0(p)
p-c
dlu(x|p) and lc(p) = ∫ w’0(p)
p
dlc(x|p). 
97 Of course, this expression for lu is equivalent to (1-e)M. 
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with productivity pr > p. Setting outflows equal to inflows for the stock of workers 
employed at all H-type firms with productivity less than p in the cluster yields 
  
(δ + γ[1 – F(p)])n∫pmin
p
lc(x|x)dF(x) = λeMF(p) 
 
Differentiating this expression with respect to p yields an expression for lc(p| p): 
  
lc(p| p) = {[(δ + γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)n]} (1/{δ + γ[1 – F(p)]}2)  
 
Unlike lu, which does not vary with p, lc(p| p) depends on p as well as the number of 
firms in the cluster and other parameters of the model. 
A.4 Firm Profits 
Current operating profits in an isolated area, in which an H type firm must pay a 
recurring productivity cost per worker of c, sets wages equal to b, and employs lu 
workers, are given by πu(p): 
 
πu(p) = [(p – c – b)λM]/(δ + λ) 
 
Clearly, operating profits are increasing linearly in p in an isolated region (∂πu(p)/∂p > 0 
and ∂πu2(p)/∂p2 = 0). 
In a cluster, given that the lowest a worker can earn in an H-type with 
productivity p is w’0(p) and that the highest is p, current operating profits π
c(p) for a firm 






(p – w)dlc(w | p) 
 
Integrating by parts, canceling terms, and noting that lc(w| p) = lc[q(w,p)|q(w,p)] since in 
equilibrium an H-type with productivity q(w,p) has the same number of total employees 
that an H-type with productivity p has at a wage less than or equal to w, we arrive at the 
following expression for operating profits for an H-type firm in a cluster:98 
 
πc(p) = {[(δ+γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)n]}  
 ∫b
p
( {ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(x)]} / {δ + γ[1 – F(x)]}2)dx 
 
Applying Leibniz’s rule and given that ∂F(p)/∂p > 0, operating profits in a cluster are 
increasing at an increasing rate in p (∂πc(p)/∂p > 0 and ∂πc2(p)/∂p2 > 0). The convexity of 
πc(p) reflects the fact that higher productivity firms that cluster have higher profits per 
worker and can accumulate more workers. That is, there is a size effect that arises in a 
cluster that amplifies the per-worker productivity advantage of having a higher p.  
A.5 Endogenous Productivity  
I endogenize productivity distributions in clustered and unclustered areas by 
permitting each firm to make investment choices that, in turn, feed into its individual 
productivity level.99 I continue to take the fact that some firms are located in a cluster and 
                                                 
98 Intuitively, in the case in which there is no on-the-job search in the H industry (γ=0), operating profits 
collapse to 
πc(p) =[(p-b)λM]/[(δ + λ)n]  
99 This framework borrows from Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) and Acemoglu and Shimer (2000). 
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others outside a cluster as given, and show later that such a spatial distribution can arise 
in an equilibrium setting. 
Suppose that firms are ex-ante identical, each possessing technology with 
constant returns to labor and decreasing returns to capital. In particular, suppose that 
output per capita for a firm with a capital stock of K is p = f(K), where ∂f(k)/∂k > 0 and 
∂f2(k)/∂k2 < 0. Further assume for the sake of simplicity that f(K) = Kα, where 0 < α < 1. 
Then, taking the user cost of capital as an exogenous and constant rate r, total profits for 
an unclustered establishment with productivity p, Πu(p), can be written as 
 
Πu(p) = πu(p) – rp1/α 
 
Substituting for πu(p) and taking the derivative with respect to p, we arrive at the optimal 
investment choice outside a cluster: 
 
 ∂Πu(p)/∂p = (λM)/[δ + λ] – (r/α)p1/α - 1 = 0 
 
Rearranging this expression yields pu*, 
 
pu* =  {(αλM)/[r(δ + λ)]} α /(1-α) 
 




Profits for a clustered establishment with productivity p, Πc(p), can be expressed 
as 
   
Πc(p) = πc(p) – rp1/α 
 
or, substituting in for πc(p), 
 
 Πc(p) = {[(δ+γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)n]}  
  ∫b
p
[ {ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(x)]}  / {δ + γ[1 – F(x)]}2 ]dx – rp1/α 
 
Inside a cluster, the optimal investment choice can once again be determined by the first 
order condition, which in this case is 
 
∂Πc(p)/∂p =  
{[(δ+γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)n]} [{ρ + δ + γ[1 – F(p)]}/{δ + γ[1 – F(p)]}2]  
 – (r/α)p(1- α)/ α = 0 
 
With the lower bound of the distribution F being such that 1 – F(pmin) = 1, the first-order 
condition at pmin becomes 
 
(1) {(λδM)/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)n]} [(ρ + δ + γ)/(δ + γ)] = (r/α)pmin (1- α)/ α 
 




(2) pminc*  =  {[α(ρ + δ + γ)λδM]/[r(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)(δ + γ)n]} α/(1-α)  
 
The distribution of productivities arising from the first order condition (1) and such that 
the minimal productivity in the cluster satisfies (2) represents an equilibrium solution.100 
No firms have an incentive to deviate by choosing an investment level that yields 
productivity lower than pminc* nor one that yields productivity greater than pmaxc*, as p < 
pminc* results in an inability to attract sufficient workers to offset investment costs and p 
> pmaxc* results in sufficiently high investment costs to overwhelm any gains in terms of 
attracting a greater number of workers (given the convexity of p1/α).101 
Hence, inside the cluster, firms’ dispersed investment choices give rise to 
productivity dispersion in equilibrium, while outside the cluster investment choices are 
identical and productivity dispersion is not present. 
A.6 The Spatial Distribution of Firms   
To derive the distribution of firms across locations, I impose the condition that 
profits inside the cluster must equal profits outside the cluster and must be driven to zero. 
                                                 
100 See Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002b) for a formal proposition of this equilibrium solution. 
101 At the upper bound, 1 – F(pmax) = 0, yielding the following: 
 
{[(δ+γ)λM]/[δ(δ + λ)n]} = (r/α)pmax (1- α)/ α 
 
which solves as 
 




pmaxc*/pminc* = {[(ρ + δ)(δ + γ)2]/[δ2(ρ + δ+ γ)]}(1- α)/α  
 
which implies pmax = pmin if γ = 0.  
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This results because of free entry and exit and the freedom of firms to choose their 
locations.  
Equilibrium profits for firms outside the cluster are  
 
Πu* = [(pu* – c – b)λM]/(δ + λ)] – r(pu*)1/α 
 
or, substituting in for pu*, 
 
Πu* = (1 – α)(α/r) α/(1-α)[λM/(δ + λ)] 1/(1-α) – (c + b)[λM/(δ + λ)] 
 
Using pminc*, optimal profits inside the cluster are  
 
Πc* = {[(pminc* – b)(ρ + δ + γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)(δ + γ)n]} – r(pminc* )1/α 
 
or, substituting in for pminc*, 
 
Πc* = {[({[αλδ(ρ + δ + γ)M]/[r(ρ + δ)n]} α/(1-α) – b)(ρ + δ + γ)λδM]/ 




Πc* = (1 – α)(α/r)α/(1-α) {[(ρ + δ + γ)λδM]/[(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)(δ + γ)n]}1/(1-α) 




In the long run, free entry and exit drive profits across locations to zero. Setting 
Πc* = 0 yields n* as a function of the parameters of the model: 
 
n* = [(1 – α)/b](1-α)/α{[α(ρ + δ + γ)λδM]/[r(δ + λ)(ρ + δ)(δ + γ)]} 
 
Given that there is some range of values such that n* > 1, there exists an uneven 
geographic distribution of firms in which some cluster and some disperse. Further, from 
the condition Πu* = 0, we have c*, the differential that must exist to sustain such a 
distribution: 
 
c* = (1 – α){αλM/[r(δ + λ)]}α/(1-α) – b 
 
This productivity differential in favor of labor in clustered firms could stem from local 
workers’ increased exposure to the industry, social networking, or any other form of 




Appendix B  
Data Details and Sample Descriptive Statistics for Job Hopping, Earnings 
Dynamics, and Industrial Agglomeration 
B.1 Data Details  
In Chapter 1, I use employee-employer matched data for one large U.S. state for 
the third quarter of 1991 through the third quarter of 2003. I chose the sample state based 
on its size, its representativeness, the relatively long time span of its data, and the quality 
of the geographic coding of its establishments. Ideally, my sample would cover as many 
states as possible. Although I have corroborated my results with data for four additional 
states, the computational burden of pooling individual and establishment-level panel data 
across multiple states are considerable. Still, I hope to expand the sample geographically 
in future work. 
Geographic coding in my sample state, while better than in many other states, is 
not perfect. Roughly 88% of sample establishments have rooftop-confident geographic 
coordinates (latitude and longitude), the most precise coordinates possible. About 95% of 
establishments have coordinates that are accurate at least at the Census tract level, and 
98% have coordinates that are accurate at least at the county level.  
Throughout the analysis, I use the sample of establishments for which we have 
accurate rooftop address information. I experimented with more inclusive samples of 
establishments, in which I assigned the latitude and longitude of the centroid of the 
lowest level of geography possible to those businesses without rooftop coordinates. 
Overall, this changed the results little, though there was evidence that “heaping” of 
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establishments in geographic centroids sometimes biased clustering statistics upward and 
resulted in spurious patterns of agglomeration. While using a more restricted sample 
eliminates this problem, it is worth noting that the sample of rooftop-confident 
establishments is not a random sample of units. In general, geographic information tends 
to be worse for establishments in rural regions, establishments in slower-growing areas, 
and establishments that are part of larger multi-unit firms. See Freedman et al. (2006) for 
further details.  
B.2 Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table B.1 presents statistics on sample establishments and job spells. The average 
size of software establishments in the sample increased over the sample period, as did 
mean real ($1997) annualized earnings within establishments. The average fraction of 
males in establishment workforces inched slightly higher during the decade, while the 
average fraction of whites edged lower. The average of mean within-establishment 
educational attainment levels, though high compared to many other sectors, declined over 
the sample period. Consistent with the statistics aggregated to the establishment level, the 
descriptive statistics for job spells reveal that males comprised a high and rising share of 
workers in the industry and whites a declining share. Further, the average age of workers 
on the job in the industry rose over the decade, while the average educational attainment 
level slipped somewhat. Average annualized real earnings and dispersion in earnings, 
however, rose markedly between the early 1990s and the early 2000s. 
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Table B.1: Software Industry Sample Descriptive Statistics 
NAICS 5112 
  1992Q2  2003Q2 
Software Establishments 822  882 
      Mean Employment 20  46 
      Share with 1-4 Employees 0.48  0.55 
      Share with 5-19 Employees 0.32  0.24 
      Share with 20-49 Employees 0.12  0.1 
      Share with 50+ Employees 0.08  0.11 
      Share in Metropolitan Area 0.84  0.87 
Software Workers 19,234  40,364 
      Share Male 0.61  0.65 
      Share White 0.75  0.58 
      Mean Age 35  38 
      Mean Annualized Earnings ($1997)  61,392   97,302 
Based on LEHD data.    
 
Workers and firms in clusters differ from those outside clusters along several 
observable dimensions. As shown in Figure B.1, while clustered establishments do not 
differ substantially from their unclustered counterparts in average educational attainment, 
gender composition, or average workforce age, clustered establishments tend to be larger, 
to pay more, and to have more racially diverse workforces. Hence, central to the 
empirical analysis is controlling for worker and firm heterogeneity across locations in an 
effort to isolate the effects of clustering on labor market dynamics. 
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Figure B.1: Workforce Characteristics of Clustered and Unclustered Software 
Establishments 
NAICS 5112, 1991-2003 
Clustering defined with employment-based LQs using a 25-mile radius. 
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